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A B S T R A C T
Important decisions in everyday life require a sequential search of options, often
without the possibility to return to an earlier choice. The optimal stopping strategy
selects the first option that is above a sequence dependent threshold. Human decision
making commonly diverges from this strategy but the reasons for this discrepancy
remain unknown. The goal of this thesis is to help understand and predict human
response in situations that require sequential decisions by exploring links between
computational models and psychological processes.
The first part of this thesis introduces a novel, data driven, linear threshold model
(LTM) for human stopping decisions in sequential decision making. Three studies
demonstrate that the proposed LTM outperforms existing models. Furthermore,
the results reveal that the LTM predicts accurately search behavior in different
environments and in real–world problems.
In the second part, the thesis presents investigations on how people adapt to
outcome variance and time horizon within the framework of the LTM. Optimal
stopping problems appear in a variety of contexts, including changing time limits or
different environments, and humans have to adjust the parameters of their strategy.
The results demonstrate that people adjust to both task variables. We find that
decision thresholds are perfectly adapted to the variance of the sampling distribution,
indicating that the value of an option is perceived relative to the options within the
sequence. Moreover the results reveal that people adjust parameters consistently
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across time horizons. In particular, longer time horizons lead to more selective initial
decision thresholds and weaker adjustments thereof during the course of search.
Several studies have found that people stop their search too early and suggested
risk aversion as a potential explanation. However, studies attempting to link individ-
ual risk preferences elicited in single decisions with search behavior in sequential
decision tasks have failed to show any relationship. The third part of this thesis
investigates the reasons of this non-convergence, by identifying the characteristic
components of sequential search tasks which may affect choice behavior. The results
reveal that both the sequential order of choices and the unequal frequency of accept
and reject decisions lead to systematic biases in people’s choices, giving rise to
distortions between observed and stable risk preferences.
The thesis contributes to the theory of psychology as well as to applied decision
making. Understanding the psychological processes that underlie sequential deci-
sions will help quantify the conditions under which people may succeed or fail in
such tasks. In turn, this will provide knowledge necessary for structuring decision
problems in order to assist humans in making critical decisions that reflect their
fundamental individual preferences.
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Z U S A M M E N F A S S U N G
Viele wichtige Entscheidungen unseres Lebens erfordern eine sequentielle Suche,
oft ohne die Möglichkeit zu einer früheren Option zurückzukehren. Die optimale
Strategie zu solchen sogenannten Optimal Stopping Problemen wählt die erst Option
welche über einem sequenzabhängignen Schwellwert liegt. Das menschliche Ent-
scheidungsverhalten weicht von solch einer Strategie ab, wobei die Gründe dafür im
Dunkeln liegen. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, menschliche Antworten in sequentiel-
len Entscheidungen zu verstehen und vorauszusagen, indem Verbindungen zwischen
Computermodellen und psychologischen Prozessen untersucht werden.
Der erste Teil dieser Dissertation führt ein neues daten-getriebenes Entscheidungs-
modell ein, das linear threshold model (LTM), welches das Antwortverhalten in
sequentiellen Entscheidungen beschreibt. In drei Studien wird gezeigt, dass das
LTM bisherige Modelle der Optimal Stopping Literatur übertrifft. Weiter wird nach-
gewiesen, dass das LTM menschliches Verhalten nicht nur in neuen Umgebungen,
sondern auch in realistischen Suchproblemen beschreiben und voraussagen kann.
Im zweiten Teil dieser Arbeit wird untersucht, wie sich Menschen an die Streuung
der Alternativen und an Zeithorizonte anpassen. Optimal Stopping Entscheidungen
treten in unterschiedlichen Kontexten auf und die Parameter der Strategie müssen
angepasst werden. Resultate zeigen, dass Menschen ihre Entscheidungen an beide
Aufgabenvariablen angleichen. Die Entscheidungslevels sind perfekt an die Streu-
ung der Optionen angepasst was darauf hindeutet, dass der Wert einer Option in
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Optimal Stopping Aufgaben relativ zu den übrigen Alternativen bestimmt wird.
Die Ergebnisse der zweiten Studie ergeben, dass Parameter konsistent an den Zeit-
horizont angepasst werden. Zudem führen längere Sequenzen an Alternativen zu
einem höheren initialen Anspruchsniveau und einer schwächeren Anpassung über
die Suche hinweg.
Viele Studien haben gezeigt, dass die Suche in Optimal Stopping Aufgaben zu
früh beendet wird. Dieses Verhalten wird mit Risikoaversion in Verbindung ge-
bracht. Allerdings haben neuere Studien ergeben, dass Risikopräferenzen gemessen
in sequentiellen Entscheidungsaufgaben nicht mit Risikomassen aus einzelnen Risi-
koentscheidungen korrelieren. Im dritten Teil dieser Arbeit wird geprüft, inwieweit
die spezifischen Komponenten der sequentiellen Aufgabe das Entscheidungsverhal-
ten beeinflussen, welche zu dieser Nicht-Konvergenz führen. Die Ergebnisse deuten
darauf hin, dass sowohl die sequentielle Präsentation wie auch das hohe Ungleich-
gewicht an Entscheidungen zu akzeptieren oder abzulehnen das Entscheidungsver-
halten systematisch verändern und zu Abweichungen zwischen beobachteten und
stabilen Risikopräferenzen führen.
Diese Dissertation leistet einen Beitrag zur Theorie der Psychologie wie auch
zur angewandten Entscheidungsfindung. Das Verständnis der zugrundeliegenden
Prozesse in sequentiellen Entscheidungen hilft zu quantifiziern, unter welchen
Bedingungen die Menschen Erfolg haben oder scheitern. Dieses Wissen wiederum
hilft sequentielle Entscheidungen so zu strukturieren, dass man bei diesen wichtigen
Entscheidungen unterstützt wird.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Some of the most important decisions in a human life, ranging from finding a partner
or a job to choosing an apartment or a parking spot, require a sequential processing
of decision options. Sequential decision making is necessary either because options
are separated in time (Dudey et al., 2001) or they reside in a dynamic and uncertain
environment (Paz et al., 2016). Decisions in such problems involve a tradeoff of
accepting a subprime option prematurely and the danger of rejecting the best offer
out of false hopes for the future.
For instance, imagine you plan an extended research visit in Boston and have to
find a place to stay in a particular neighborhood. Apartments are rented out quickly
and once you refuse an offer, it might not be available anymore. Your search is
limited in time and thus you have to accept or reject a place without knowing if
future apartments will be more attractive.
This class of optimization problems, generically known as optimal stopping prob-
lems (see Ferguson, 1989, for a historical overview), have features that make them
well-suited to studying human decision-making on limited sequences of alternatives.
For this reason, these problems have received significant and sustained attention by
theoretical and empirical studies in cognitive psychology (e.g., Bearden et al., 2005;
Corbin et al., 1975; Dudey et al., 2001; Kahan et al., 1967; Lee, 2006; Rapoport
et al., 1970; Rydzewska et al., 2018; Seale et al., 1997, 2000; von Helversen et al.,
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2012; von Helversen et al., 2011) and other fields, such as experimental economics
(e.g., Cox et al., 1989; Kogut, 1990; Zwick et al., 2003).
While significant research has focused on comparing human behavior to optimal
solutions (Bearden et al., 2006; Gilbert et al., 1966; Seale et al., 1997), the psycho-
logical processes underlying them have been largely neglected. Furthermore, the
focus on comparing behavior to an optimal solution has let researchers to constrain
the structure of the decision problem in order to facilitate the computation of the
optimal solutions. Some of these constraints, such as assuming that people have
no knowledge about the distribution of the quality of the options have distanced
decision problems in a laboratory setting from human behavior in the real world.
The “secretary problem” has been the most representative task for optimal stop-
ping problems. In a typical scenario, the aim is to find the “best” of N applicants for
a secretary job with optimality (the “best”) measured by a single criterion/objective.
The N applicants are presented in a sequence and the searcher has no knowledge
of the distribution of the applicants’ quality. The searcher must decide whether to
hire the newly presented applicant or to continue the search in hope for a better
applicant. She cannot choose an applicant that was earlier rejected (e.g., Bearden
et al., 2006). The optimal solution for this problem involves searching for 37.5%
of the available applicants and then taking the next one that is better than the ones
seen so far (Ferguson, 1989; Gilbert et al., 1966). Indeed, behavioral research has
generally found that people’s behavior can be well described by such a cut-off
strategy, however people tend to set their threshold too low (Bearden et al., 2006;
Seale et al., 1997; von Helversen et al., 2011).
Some studies have investigated tasks closer to real sequential choice problems
in which option values are drawn independently from a known distribution and the
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decision maker observes this exact values as each option is considered. (Guan et al.,
2018; Guan et al., 2015; Kogut, 1990; Lee, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2012). In this
version, the optimal solution is to choose according to a thresholds which is based
on the probability of winning on the later positions (Gilbert et al., 1966, Section
3). Corresponding to the optimal approach, it has been argued that whether people
accept or reject an option is linked to an internal threshold or aspiration level. If
an option is better/worse than the threshold, it is accepted/rejected. However, there
are differences in whether individuals have a single fixed threshold or the threshold
decreases as the sequence progresses (Lee et al., 2014; von Helversen et al., 2012).
Several of these studies (Guan et al., 2018; Guan et al., 2015; Kogut, 1990;
Lee, 2006) have the restriction that only the best alternative is rewarded—a payoff
function that is found in only few real world situations. We often find a place to
live in, a partner, or a secretary to hire, and thus receive a payoff, even if it is
not the highest possible one. In this variant of the search problem, the optimal
decision thresholds are calculated based on the expected reward of the remaining
options (Gilbert et al., 1966, Section 5b) and change dynamically across position.
However, research has shown that in the presence of such complex tasks, the innate
bounded rationality (Simon, 1997) limits the ability to memorize and process all
information. In turn this makes us rely on simplified mental models (Camerer, 1998;
Gigerenzer et al., 2002). Simon (1955, 1957) has argued that rather than maximize,
people often satisfice when making decisions. Satisficers have an internal threshold
of acceptability against which they evaluate options, and will choose a decision
outcome when it crosses this threshold. Therefore, satisficers are content to settle
for a good enough option—not necessarily the very best outcome in all respects.
4 I N T RO D U C T I O N
The goal of this dissertation is to help understand and predict how people respond
in situations that require sequential decisions by developing a computational model
and linking it with psychological processes. While focusing on realistic optimal
stopping tasks, where payoff is proportional to the chosen value, I implement a
model and conduct a comparative study of its predictions with those of human
decisions. Furthermore, I will use this model to understand how people are affected
by variations in the task context and by specific characteristics of the task itself.
In the first part of thesis, I introduce a threshold model of human decision behavior
in optimal stopping tasks that is an instantiation of the satisficing heuristic proposed
by Simon (Simon, 1955). The linear threshold model (LTM, Baumann et al., 2020)
proposes that humans rely on a mental shortcut and use internal decision thresholds
that are adjusted in a linear manner across the sequence of search. The model identi-
fies and measures three hidden processes underlying human choices in an optimal
stopping task: an initial aspiration level, its adjustment across the sequence and the
choice sensitivity towards deviations between the option and the (adapted) aspiration
level. Results reveal that the LTM is capable to accurately predict human choices in
optimal stopping paradigms and further generalizes to changing environments.
The desire to determine cognitive mechanisms in optimal search task has led me
to the second research question of this thesis: How do people adapt to changes in the
task structure and how is this adaptation reflected in the cognitive parameters? The
context of the decision problem (number of alternatives, time pressure) demands
from the decision maker to adjust her search strategy in order to succeed. Despite
the consensus that people adjust their choices to structural differences in optimal
search tasks (Corbin et al., 1975; Cox et al., 1989; Guan et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2004;
Shapira et al., 1981), the question of how people adjust is mostly neglected. The goal
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of the second part is to address the reasons and the robustness of adaptive behavior
in optimal stopping problems. The analysis relies on the LTM which provides a
framework to measure and identify the processes involved in human adaptation.
Despite the results showing stable individual differences in cognitive parameters
across structurally changing tasks, people are very heterogeneous with respect to
their choice behavior. It has been suggested that this heterogeneity in dynamic choice
situations is reflected in risk preference heterogeneity (Schotter et al., 1981; Schunk,
2009; Sonnemans, 1998, 2000) whereas risk averse agents would stop earlier in the
sequence. However, studies attempting to link individual risk preferences elicited in
single gamble tasks with search behavior in sequential decision tasks have failed
to show any relationship (Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni et al., 2017; Schunk, 2009;
Schunk et al., 2009). Moreover, the studies throughout this thesis have revealed a
time dependence for the participants risk attitudes. While at the beginning of the
sequence, participants accept a choice too often compared to the optimal model,
thus seem to behave risk averse, they become too selective at the end of search,
which corresponds to apparently risk seeking behavior. The core of the asymmetry
in risk preferences across the sequence resides in the linear structure of the decision
threshold.
The third project in this thesis aims to determine the characteristic components
if an optimal stopping tasks such as the stepwise incremental decisions or the fact
that only one option can be chosen and measures their impact on the emergence
of the linear threshold strategy. The understanding of systematic effects on the
particular task characteristic on human search behavior may reconcile the seemingly
inconsistent findings in risk preferences.
6 I N T RO D U C T I O N
1.1 M O D E L S O F O P T I M A L S T O P P I N G B E H AV I O R
The optimal and the linear threshold model are introduced based on a classical
optimal stopping example which is employed as experimental paradigm throughout
the thesis. We consider a decision maker (here a customer) who is planing a vacation
and chooses to buy the plane ticket online. The ticket prices vary from day to day
and the customer wants to find the cheapest price. The customer checks the offer
every day and decides if she wants to accept or reject it, without having the option to
go back in time to a previously rejected price. Search time is limited by her vacation
schedule (i.e., 10 decisions per trial) and, once accepted, the search ends.
More formally, we consider a decision maker who encounters a sequence of prices
with values denoted by x1, ,x10 and she wants to find the minimum value in the
sequence. If the decision maker accepts the price xi, the sequence terminates and
she has to pay xi; otherwise, she continues to the next ticket. When the last ticket is
reached, it must be accepted.
1.1.1 Optimal stopping model
The optimum strategy is derived based on the expected reward of the remaining
prices, which depends upon the distribution of the prices’ values as well as upon
the number of price opportunities. Based on the expected reward, a threshold Ti
is calculated for each day i (for a detailed description of the calculation of optimal
thresholds, I refer to the Supporting Material of Chapter 2: A linear threshold
model for optimal stopping behavior, Text A). Consequently, a price xi is accepted
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von Helversen et al., 2012) and suggest that people must rely on a different strategy
when solving such tasks. I propose the linear threshold model (LTM, Baumann
et al., 2020) which postulates that human’s decision thresholds are constrained by a
linear relation to each other. In particular, it assumes that human choices in optimal
stopping problems can be described by (1) an aspiration or acceptance level which
reflects the option’s value above which an option is accepted directly in the first
decision (2) an adaptation rate, reflecting the change of the aspiration level with
the time/number of available options running out in a linear manner and (3) choice
sensitivity (or determinism), reflecting how sensitively people react to the extent by
which the current option value deviates from the (adapted) aspiration level.
More formally, the linear decision thresholds are completely defined by the first
threshold T0 and the linear increase as the sequence progresses,
Ti 1 Ti i. (1.1)
The model further assumes that the decision maker relies on a probabilistic threshold
to make the decision to accept or reject a ticket–i.e., ticket xi on position i is
compared to a position dependent threshold Ti. This comparison yields an acceptance
probability i based on a sigmoid choice function with sensitivity parameter and
i
1
1 exp xi Ti
. (1.2)
This model entails three free parameters, the first threshold T0, the increase of the
threshold , and the choice sensitivity .
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Comparing the LTM to existing models of sequential decision making showed
that it provided a better account for the observed data. Furthermore, it provided
an overall excellent account of the data. More specifically, we calculated – on a
by-participant basis – posterior predictive p-values comparing the misfit between
the observed data and the model predictions with the misfit between synthetic data
generated from the models and the model predictions. This analysis showed that for
almost all participant the observed misfit was in line with the misfit expected under
the model, indicating that the model adequately described their responses.
The LTM’s ability to generalizes to new environments is crucial to be a useful
model. Therefore, simulation studies from the LTM and the optimal model were
conducted to predict choice behavior in scarce (values sampled from left skewed
distribution) and plentiful environments (values sampled from right skewed dis-
tribution). While these models make contradictory predictions on search length,
participants search behavior agreed with the LTM’s prognosis. Whereas in the scarce
environment, in which good values occur very rarely, participants searched too long
compared to an optimal agent, they stopped too early in the plentiful environments.
The third experiment extended the experimental paradigm to a real-life scenario,
in which participants were asked to search sequentially for the best price for well–
known commodity products collected on Amazon.com. The prices for the products
varied in their mean and variance and thus thresholds were compared on a nor-
malized scale. The results revealed a close agreement between participants’ choice
behavior and the LTM’s prediction, indicating that the linear threshold strategy is a
robust way to adjust to optimal stopping tasks.
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1.2 A DA P T I V E B E H AV I O R I N O P T I M A L S T O P P I N G TA S K S
There is a broad agreement in the decision making literature that the processes used
to solve decision problems vary as a function of a number of task and context factors
(Payne, 1982; Payne et al., 1993; E. U. Weber et al., 2009, for reviews). Research
on optimal stopping behavior has consistently shown that people are responsive to
the environmental distributions of the values (e.g. Corbin et al., 1975; Cox et al.,
1989; Guan et al., 2018; Kahan et al., 1967; Lee et al., 2004; Rydzewska et al.,
2018; Shapira et al., 1981) or amount of alternatives within the sequence (Guan
et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2004; Seale et al., 1997). However, despite the consensus that
people adjust their choices to different contexts in optimal stopping tasks, relatively
little is known about how adaptation occurs. Therefore, in the second and third part
of this thesis, I address the issue of the reasons and robustness behind the adaptive
behavior in optimal stopping problems.
More specifically, the second project investigates adaptive behavior to variations
of task factors, such as the number of alternatives available and their dispersion. The
analysis relies on the LTM which provides a framework to study the differential
effect of adaptation in respect to the underlying cognitive variables. The third project
examines characteristic components of an optimal stopping task that give rise to
people’s linear threshold strategy which in turn leads to apparent inconsistencies in
risk preferences.
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1.2.1 Part 2: Search environment
1.2.1.1 Variance
Does the variation of alternative prices affect the choice to accept or reject a particular
offer? Research in simultaneous decision making has repeatedly shown that valuation
of an option is sensitive to the range of other options (e.g. Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005;
Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Rigoli et al., 2016; Tversky et al., 1993). Moreover, some
researchers suggest that people value an alternative based on the relative rank
within a pool of alternatives, and not by their absolute value (e.g. “normalization
hypothesis”, Rangel et al., 2012). Under this hypothesis, people are expected to
transform their value representations into value rankings taking the variance of
the alternatives into account. Decision thresholds are thus expected to differ on an
absolute but not on a normalized scale.
Alternatively, research on risky decision making suggests that variance in the
outcomes changes people’s risk preferences, where higher outcome variance implies
higher risk and thus results in more risk averse behavior (Genest et al., 2016; Holt
et al., 2002; Markowitz, 1959; E. Weber et al., 2004). As a consequence, acceptance
rates would be increased in high variance environments, resulting in shorter search
length and lower performance. Adaptive behavior to outcome variance would thus
be reflected in higher decision thresholds and potentially also higher adaptation rate,
when expressed on a normalized scale.
The first study demonstrates that the decision thresholds in a low and a high
variance environment are practically identical on a normalized scale ( 0, 1),
indicating that people accept prices within the same percentile on each position.
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This result suggests that the price’s value is assessed on the basis of its percentile
rank within the sample rather than on the basis of its absolute number. This finding
is in line with the normalization hypothesis, which assumes that the value of an
option is computed under a normalized code and corresponds to its relative position
in the distribution of options (Rangel et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2006).
1.2.1.2 Time Horizon
In optimal stopping task, time is a significant variable and must be included into
the decision process. For example, having plenty of time to search for a good ticket
price allows to increase the aspiration level whereas little time requires to lower
your standards. Previous studies have reported that humans search more, in absolute
terms, in longer time horizons (Lee et al., 2014; Seale et al., 2000) which is reflected
in either a higher initial aspiration level or a weaker adjustment rate during search.
To investigate the details of this phenomenon I used sequences with 5, 10 and 20
available choices (sequence positions). Thereby, three hypotheses were tested: If
time horizon affects (a) the initial threshold, (b) the change of threshold over time,
or (c) both.
Results revealed that the effect of time horizon was captured by changes in initial
decision thresholds (T0), and the adaptation rate ( ) of the thresholds with ongoing
sequence positions (i.e., with growing number of rejections). More specifically, with
longer time horizons, the initial aspiration level increased reflecting initially lower
acceptance rates in longer time horizons. Simultaneously, the adjustment of the
aspiration level during search was reduced, so people were less willing to depart
away from their initial decision threshold. Additionally, subjects adapted in a way
that a LTM simulation indicated were appropriate given the changes in the structure
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of the decision task. Results further suggest that participant’s initial thresholds and
adjustment rates are adapted systematically to time horizons in a non-linear way,
indicating that they may follow scaling regularities across time scales. Indeed, the
best performing linear thresholds predict a proportional adaptation of the initial
threshold and its adjustment rate and in this sense, participants’ adaptation is optimal.
1.2.2 Part 3: Characteristic components of sequential search task
The linear adaptation of the decision thresholds across search has been shown to be
a robust and efficient way to solve sequential search tasks. However, compared to
the optimal thresholds, it reveals a consistent pattern: While thresholds are usually
higher at the beginning of the search, thus people accept too often, they tend to be
too low at the end, thus people accept too little. This behavior is inconsistent under
the perspective of risk preferences. While the optimal model assumes expected value
maximization, i.e., risk neutrality, participants choose as if they reverse their risk
preference during the course of search, from risk averse to risk seeking behavior. In
my third project I investigate if the characteristic structure of an optimal stopping task
encourages the emergence of linearity which leads to the appearance of asymmetries
in risky behavior. In particular, I tested in three experiments if (1) the presentation
of the underlying sampling distribution (2) the stepwise incremental decisions or (3)
the unequal frequency of accept and reject decisions leads to systematic biases in
peoples’ decision thresholds which give rise to the observed risk attitudes during
search.
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1.2.2.1 Experience versus description
In an optimal stopping task, subjects discover the sampling distribution by observing
options from the respective distribution. However, several studies have shown that
the way how we acquire information about a distribution can lead to a systematic
bias in estimates thereof (Barron et al., 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; E. Weber et al.,
2004). In particular, experimental investigation on decision under risk relies on
two distinct types of paradigms, involving either experience- or description-based
choices (Hertwig et al., 2009). In experience-based choices, outcome distributions
are inferred by encountering repeated draws from the respective distribution, which
corresponds to the optimal stopping paradigm. In decisions by description, outcome
distributions are explicitly described, by numerically presenting outcomes and prob-
abilities. Furthermore, it was suggested that outcome and probability information
translate into systematically different subjective representations in description- ver-
sus experience-based choice (Hertwig et al., 2004; Lejarraga et al., 2011; Madan
et al., 2019; Wulff et al., 2018). This perspective leads to the assumption that biases
in optimal stopping behavior may emerge from the sampling distribution’s format.
The first study thus compares choice behavior between two tasks which only varied
in the presentation of the sampling distribution. It was hypothesized that the format
of the presentation, by experience of by description, causes different biases in the
estimates of the underlying distributions which would result in diverging search
behavior.
Results showed no significant difference in performance between the two con-
ditions, despite the fact that participants accepted earlier than in the descriptive
format. Importantly, the way how the underlying distribution is presented – either by
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experience or by description – led to the same linear dependency between decision
thresholds and thus to an apparent shift in risk preferences in both conditions. In
contrast to the hypothesis, these results demonstrate that the presentation format
of the underlying distribution has a minor effect on peoples strategy selection in
optimal stopping task.
1.2.2.2 Sequential versus single gambles
People often have illusory beliefs about the sequential dependence of successive
independent events. In the gambler’s fallacy, negative dependence is assumed: A run
of heads leads me to believe that tails is due. In the “hot hand” fallacy, a positive
dependence is inferred: A sequence of successful shots leads me to believe that a
basketball player is temporarily “in for” (Gilovich et al., 1985; Keren et al., 1994).
In both cases, present payoffs are believed to differ from past payoffs, because
event probabilities are assumed to have changed, although this is not in fact the
case in these particular instances (Miler et al., 2009). Following this idea, decisions
in optimal stopping tasks may be prone to the gambler’s fallacy by believing that
a sequence of low values must be followed by a high one. As a consequence,
decision thresholds would depend on the prior history and not – as prescribed by the
optimal rule – exclusively on the remaining future options. Consequently, this bias
in decisions would – at least partly – overshadow stable risk preferences, leading
to the apparent shift in their risk attitudes. The second study thus was designed
to test if the sequentiality in choices has an effect on peoples decision thresholds.
Participants performed two versions of the optimal stopping task which differed only
in the presentation format: The first one corresponded to a regular optimal search
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problem while the second one consisted of single gambles which were identical to
the first one in respect to outcomes and probabilities.
Results revealed that people’s choices differed significantly between sequential
and single choices, despite their identical underlying statistical properties. While
the sequential task encourages the linear strategy, single choices facilitate decision
thresholds to be updated more independently. Consequently, in the later case, the
adaptation across the sequences is in closer agreement with the non-linear pattern
predicted by the optimal model, which leads to an attenuation of the apparent risk
asymmetries in optimal stopping tasks.
1.2.2.3 Unequal frequency in accept and reject decisions
A third important characteristic in optimal stopping tasks is that only one option can
be accept within the sequence. Consequently, this leads to an imbalance between
choices such that reject decisions are predominant during the session. While the
optimal model prescribes to reduce the proportion of reject decisions during search,
reaching 50% on the second–to–last position, people’s reject rate is significantly
below this rate at the end of search. Studies have found that people are inclined to
repeat decisions which were favourable prior in history (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016;
Erev, 2012) and argue that there exists a strong tendency to simply reiterate the
most recent decision, which is even stronger than the tendency to react optimally
to the most recent outcome. From this viewpoint, peoples’ higher reject rate on
the later positions – compared to the optimal model – could arise from the overall
dominance of reject decisions within the process of search. Despite this decision
bias being unrelated to risk preferences, it may contribute to the seemingly increase
of risk seeking behavior observed on final positions. To examine this possibility,
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participants performed two tasks: In the first one, the proportion of accept and reject
decisions corresponded to the ratio found in optimal stopping tasks. In the second
one, inequalities in accept and reject choices were removed.
Results show that the imbalance in choices affects choice behavior significantly.
Once people decide in a setting in which the inequality is removed, decision thresh-
olds are adjusted non-linearly across positions and in close agreement with the
optimal model. This result indicates that an unequal proportion of opposite choices
in the decision environment leads to biases in people’s choices which at the same
time overwrite stable risk preferences.
1.2.3 General Discussion
In many real life decisions, options are distributed in space and time, making it
necessary to search sequentially through them, often without a chance to return
to a rejected option. The psychological processes underlying sequential decisions
are still poorly understood even though some of the most important decisions such
as the choice of a job, or a partner are made sequentially. The goal of this thesis
is to contribute to this topic by increasing knowledge about the psychological
processes underlying sequential decisions and their responsiveness to changes in the
context. In the first project, I introduce the linear threshold model, suggesting that
humans decide on the basis of an internal decision threshold which is adjusted in a
linear matter across the sequence. As a consequence, people become less selective
during search, which may lead them to accept options on later time steps which
were rejected earlier in search. Results revealed that participants’ choices are well
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captured by the model and accurately predicted in new environments. Based on these
findings, the second project addresses the question of robustness and adaptability of
the cognitive parameters to task contexts, such as the number of alternatives or their
dispersion. The manipulation of the sampling variance revealed that people adapt
their decision thresholds on an absolute scale, while a higher variance leads to lower
decision thresholds (when searching for the minimum). However, the difference
in decision thresholds disappears on a standardized scale ( 0, 1), which
leads to the conclusion that decision thresholds are formulated on a percentile level
(e.g. accept all prices on the first position that belong to the 12% lowest prices
within the sampling distribution). The manipulation of the number of alternatives
resulted in adjusted choices in a way which the LTM simulation indicated were
appropriate given the changes in the structure of the decision task. In particular, an
increased amount of alternatives resulted in more selective initial decision thresholds
and weaker adjustments across the sequence. Moreover, the study of the robustness
of cognitive parameters provides evidence that the LTM parameters reflect stable
individual processes across changing contexts.
Participants’ linear decision thresholds revealed a consistent phenomenon through-
out this thesis’ studies. While acceptance rates are too high, compared to the optimal
model, in the beginning of search, they are too low at later stages. This behavior
reflects a shift in risk attitudes across search, from risk averse to risk seeking behav-
ior. The third project examined if the particular characteristic of sequential search
task, such as sequential presentation or the inequality of accept and reject decisions,
could account for the linear thresholds and thus for the apparent asymmetries in
risk preferences. The first experiment indicates that the presentation of the sampling
distribution, by experience or by description, has no effect on the linear updating
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of decision thresholds, and thus leads to similar inconsistencies of risk preferences
across search. However, the sequential order of choices and the unequal frequency
of accept and reject decisions reveal a significant effect on decision thresholds,
encouraging the emergence of linear threshold. Once these components are removed,
decision thresholds are adapted independently and in closer agreement with the opti-
mal model. This result indicates that the characteristics of a sequential search tasks
leads to systematic biases in choice behavior which override stable risk preferences.
This thesis’ results provide evidence that humans tend to adjust their decision
thresholds in a linear matter to solve the complex task of optimal stopping search.
Simulations studies have shown that the linear threshold strategy achieves an almost
optimal performance and thus it represents an efficient way to adapt to the task.
However, when sequences grow larger (i.e., 20 alternatives), participants struggle to
adapt to the best performing linear thresholds and thus their performance decreases.
Computational modelling results indicate that an increase in complexity leads them
to diverge from a strict linear threshold strategy. Indeed, research has suggested
that humans’ strategy selection can be formulated as a function of both its costs,
primarily the effort required to use a rule, and its benefits, primarily the ability of a
strategy to select the best alternative (Beach et al., 1978; Payne et al., 1988; Russo et
al., 1983). Under this perspective, peoples’ divergence from a strict linear threshold
rule in extended time horizons may be caused by an increased effort outweighing its
benefits.
The value of an option in an optimal stopping task seems to be encoded as its
percentile rank within its sampling distribution. Consequently, decision thresholds
are formulated on percentile levels (e.g, accept all prices that belong to the 12%
lowest prices within the sampling distribution). This finding is in line with studies
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showing that people evaluate an attribute upon their relative rather than their absolute
value within the generating distribution (Rangel et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2006).
For example, Brown et al. (2008) argue that ordinal rank has a statistically significant
effect upon well-being and that to understand what make human beings content is is
therefore necessary to look at the whole distribution of incomes. This thesis’ results
have shown that despite the heterogeneity in individual decision thresholds, they
are relatively consistent across task contexts. It would be interesting to investigate
whether this observed individual differences in acceptance levels are related to more
traditional measures of problem solving ability and psychometric intelligence. Given
that optimal stopping problems are representative of a class of real world sequential
decision-making tasks, they allow the possibility that there is a similar relationship
for non-perceptual tasks to be examined.
This thesis has revealed the characteristic components of an optimal stopping
problem involves that decision thresholds are updated depending on earlier out-
comes. In particular, it seems as if the decision maker thinks that a good offer
must follow a sequence of unsatisfying options. This a mental representation of the
optimal stopping environment would correspond to drawing from a pool of options
without replacement (i.e., hypergeometric distribution). Indeed, studies on related
paradigms, such as the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART, Lejuez et al., 2002) or
the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1999), showed that people misunderstood
the dynamic event probabilities in related paradigms (Pleskac, 2008; Wallsten et al.,
2005). Preliminary results from a simulation study indicate that a distorted mental
representation of the dynamic distribution may strongly contribute to the emergence
of linearity in peoples’ decision thresholds.
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An optimal stopping choice represents a risky decision between a certain outcome
and the risk to continue search for a better one. However, studies attempting to link
individual risk preferences elicited in single gamble tasks with search behavior in
sequential decision tasks have failed to show any relationship (Frey et al., 2017;
Pedroni et al., 2017; Schunk, 2009; Schunk et al., 2009). Nevertheless, this work
has found a relationship between risk preferences measured in the gamble task and
search length in the optimal stopping task such that participants who were relatively
more risk seeking in the single gambles searched more in the optimal stopping task.
It seems that the specific implementation of the optimal stopping task used in this
thesis allows to find convergence in risk preferences between single gambles and
dynamic search tasks and thus may help uncover a common mechanisms underlying
these risky decisions (Frey et al., 2017).
Limitations
While one of the strengths of this work is that it proposes a framework for under-
standing human decision making in optimal stopping problems, it will be imperative
to investigate the limits of this framework in additional contexts. The work presented
here is merely a first step toward answering important questions about underlying
processes, and all three parts make way for a number of new questions to be an-
swered. The experiments we present are simple and controlled in order to act as
proof of concepts, but this factor limits the number of questions we can answer and
does not always provide a perfect analogy to real-world circumstances.
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1.2.4 Future directions
The LTM proposes that decisions in optimal stopping tasks are taken based on
decision thresholds which are defined by the initial aspiration level and its linear ad-
justment on each position. Despite the LTM’s accuracy in capturing people’s choices,
it assumes no change on the part of the participant as he or she proceeds through the
session. This assumption is reasonable as long as the sampling distribution is known
– either by providing an accurate description beforehand or by expecting participants
to hold an accurate representation of the real-life distribution in long-term memory.
However, in unknown environments participants have to gain an understanding of
the environment during search and adapt decision thresholds accordingly. In such
novel scenarios, modeling how the participant learns from experience is an impor-
tant part in understanding the optimal stopping behavior. Bayesian learning models
have been proposed in related sequential search tasks such as the BART (Lejuez
et al., 2002), and the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1999). These models
suggest that the decision maker uses Bayesian updating to change prior estimate
of the payoff probabilities into posterior probabilities on the basis of experience
with the outcome observed (Speekenbrink et al., 2015; Steyvers et al., 2009). Such
algorithms are very promising candidates for incorporating learning and adaptation
processes into the framework of the LTM.
The optimal stopping paradigm involves that one can not return to a previously
rejected option which is in conflict with the properties of many real-world tasks.
Many search situations involve the probability of going back to a former option
or considering some of the options simultaneously. For instance, when deciding
between job offers one may wait to make a decision about one offer until having
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seen the next one. However, this may imply that the probability of receiving this
offer will be lower than when it was first received. Future work should extend the
optimal stopping problem by allowing the decision maker to return to previously
passed options and test how this setting would affect the linearity in decision
thresholds. Furthermore, this analysis could reveal if choices improve – because now
an erroneously passed option can be retrieved – or whether it may impair choices –
because the higher complexity makes the task more difficult and takes more time.
Optimal stopping tasks involve stepwise incremental decisions and immediate
feedback, which correspond to “hot” decision making paradigms. Figner et al.
(2009) have shown that in a “hot” version of a dynamic risk taking decision task,
the affective system tends to override the deliberative system in states of heightened
emotional arousal. Therefore, affective processes may play an important role during
the course of search, in which each time step involves an increase of risk. Indeed,
this thesis has shown that the removal of the stepwise decisions leads to a change in
peoples’ decision strategy closer to the optimal solution, indicating more deliberative
information processing takes control. It seems that the interplay of deliberative and
affective processes plays a key role in sequential search tasks which should be
addressed in future studies.
1.2.5 Conclusion
This thesis introduces a model of human behavior in optimal stopping tasks which
proposes that decision thresholds are adjusted linearly over time. The model provides
an accurate fit and makes non-trivial predictions about search behavior, which were
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confirmed experimentally. Furthermore, it investigates whether and how context
task variables affect the linear model’s cognitive parameters, and test their reliability.
Results show that people consistently adapt their decision thresholds to variance
and time horizon and indicate that thresholds are formed based on percentile ranks
rather than absolute values. Finally, the thesis shows that peoples’ linear threshold
strategy is an adaptation to the characteristic components of an optimal stopping
task and overrides to large extent their basic risk preferences. While there is an
enormous experimental literature on the foundations of decision behavior in static
decision situations, the foundations of behavior in dynamic decision situations,
despite being equally important, remain largely unexplored. This thesis aims to shed
light on humans’ strategy, adaptivity and reliability in optimal stopping tasks and
thus provides an important step in understanding human behavior in dynamic choice
situations.
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A B S T R AC T
In many real life decisions, options are distributed in space and time, making it
necessary to search sequentially through them, often without a chance to return to
a rejected option. The optimal strategy in these tasks is to choose the first option
that is above a threshold that depends on the current position in the sequence. The
implicit decision making strategies by humans vary but largely diverge from this
optimal strategy. The reasons for this divergence remain unknown. We present a
new model of human stopping decisions in sequential decision making tasks based
on a linear threshold heuristic. The first two studies demonstrate that the linear
threshold model accounts better for sequential decision making than existing models.
Moreover, we show that the model accurately predicts participants’ search behavior
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in different environments. In the third study, we confirm that the model generalizes
to a real-world problem, thus providing an important step towards understanding
human sequential decision making.
2.1 I N T RO D U C T I O N
Decisions that arise in everyday life often have to be made when options are pre-
sented sequentially. For example, searching for a parking spot, deciding when to take
a vacation day, or finding a partner, all require that the decision maker accepts or
rejects an option without knowing if future options will be more attractive. Decisions
in such problems involve a trade-off between accepting a possibly suboptimal option
prematurely and rejecting the current offer out of false hopes for better options in
the future.
Despite the importance of such decisions, relatively little work has been made
toward characterizing the process by which humans decide to stop searching in
natural settings of this task.
Earlier research has focused on a simplified version of optimal stopping problems,
the so-called secretary problem, where only the rank of the option relative to those
already seen is shown (Bearden et al., 2006; Seale et al., 1997, 2000) and only the
overall best alternative is rewarded. In the secretary problem, the optimal strategy
is to ascertain the maximum of the first 37% options and choose the next option
that exceeds this threshold (Gilbert et al., 1966). Empirical studies suggest that in
general people follow a similar strategy but usually set the cut-off (i.e., from which
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point on they will accept an option that exceeds the previous options) earlier than
the 37% prescribed by the optimal solution (Kahan et al., 1967; Seale et al., 1997).
Some studies have investigated tasks closer to real sequential choice problems
by presenting the actual value of the option to the decision makers (Guan et al.,
2018; Guan et al., 2015; Kogut, 1990; Lee, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2011). In
this version, the optimal is based on calculating the probability of winning on the
later positions. From this probability, a threshold is calculated for each option in
the sequence as described by Gilbert and Mosteller (Gilbert et al., 1966, Section
3). Lee (2006) estimated a family of threshold-based models and showed that most
participants decreased their choice thresholds as sequences progress. Although
people are overall quite heterogeneous in their search behavior, they tend to cluster
around the optimal solution (Guan et al., 2018; Guan et al., 2015). Importantly, these
studies still kept the restriction that only the best alternative is rewarded—a payoff
function that does not correspond well with everyday experiences. Humans do find
a mate, an apartment to live, or a ticket to fly to their vacation destination, and thus
receive some payoff, even if that may not be the highest possible payoff.
In the present research, we propose a model of human decision making in optimal
stopping problems using payoffs that are based on the actual values. In this variant
of the search problem, the optimal decision thresholds are calculated based on the
expected reward of the remaining options ((Gilbert et al., 1966, Section 5b) and
Supporting Material, Text A). This leads to a decision threshold that changes notably
nonlinear over the sequence.
In contrast, we propose that people rely on a mental shortcut and adapt their
thresholds linearly over the sequence. We show that a model with this linearity
assumption accurately captures when people stop search and accept an option, even
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in a real-world setting. Furthermore, this model allows us to predict under which
conditions people search more or less than the optimal model, making it a useful
tool to understand human sequential decision making.
We first sketch a family of cognitive models for describing behavior in optimal
stopping problems. We then present results from three behavioral experiments that
provide evidence for the validity of the linear model in a laboratory setting as well
as in a real-world scenario.
2.1.1 Computational models
We explain the computational models based on a typical optimal stopping problem
that we also used in our first two experiments. The decision maker (here a customer)
is planing a vacation and decides to buy the plane ticket online. Ticket prices vary
randomly from day to day and the customer wants to find the cheapest ticket. The
customer checks the ticket price every day and decides if she wants to accept or
reject the ticket, without having the option to go back in time to a previously rejected
offer. Search time is limited by her vacation schedule (i.e., 10 decisions per trial)
and, once accepted, the search ends.
More formally, we consider a decision maker who encounters a sequence of
tickets with values denoted by x1, ,x10 and she wants to find the minimum value
in the sequence. If the decision maker accepts ticket xi, the sequence terminates and
she has to pay xi; otherwise, she continues to the next ticket. When the last ticket is
reached, it must be accepted.
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All models assume that the decision maker relies on a probabilistic threshold
to make the decision to accept or reject a ticket—i.e., ticket xi on position i is
compared to a position dependent threshold ti. This comparison yields an acceptance
probability i based on a sigmoid choice function with sensitivity parameter and
i
1
1 exp xi ti
. (2.1)
Small values of produce more stochasticity in decisions, whereas the policy
approaches determinism when .
We examine the setting of thresholds by comparing the performance of four
different models.
• The Independent Threshold Model (ITM) serves as our baseline. It assumes
no dependency between the thresholds. It entails N independent threshold
parameters t1, ..., tN , one for each position in the sequence, where the decision
maker can decide to accept or reject an offer (at position N 1 the ticket
must be accepted). The thresholds can take any value across positions. The
model maintains maximal flexibility and provides an upper limit how well
any threshold model can describe a person’s decision given the assumption of
a probabilistic threshold.
• The Linear Threshold Model (LTM) postulates that the thresholds are con-
strained by a linear relation to each other and therefore are completely defined
by the first threshold t0 and the linear increase as the sequence progresses:
ti 1 ti i, (2.2)
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This model entails three free parameters, the first threshold t0, the increase of
the threshold and the choice sensitivity .
• The The Biased Optimal Model (BOM) is based on the Bias-from-Optimal
threshold model proposed by Guan et al. (Guan et al., 2015), assuming that
humans are using thresholds that deviate systematically from the optimal
thresholds.. The optimal thresholds ti for each position i are derived by
determining the expected reward of the remaining options (derivation in
(Gilbert et al., 1966, Section 5b) and in Supporting Material, Text A). The
model entails a systematic bias parameter that reflects the divergence of the
human threshold from the optimal one. Additionally, the thresholds depend
on a parameter that determines how much their bias increases or decreases
as the sequence progresses.
ti ti i, (2.3)
When and are set to 0, the thresholds represent the optimal thresholds
that lead to best performance. This model is therefore defined by three free
parameters, , and the choice sensitivity .
• The Cut-off Model (CoM) is inspired by the optimal decision rule for the
rank information version of the secretary problem where the distribution of
the prices is unknown. It assumes that the DM has a fixed cut-off value k
that determines how long she explores in the beginning of the sequence. The
highest value seen in that initial sample of k tickets is then set as her threshold,
and the first value that exceeds this threshold in the remainder of the sequence
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is chosen. This model has two free parameters, the cut-off value k and the
sensitivity parameter .
Models were implemented in a hierarchical-Bayesian statistical framework using
JAGS (Plummer et al., 2003) (Supporting Material, Text B).
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We asked 129 participants to solve a computer-based optimal stopping problem
following the ticket-shopping task described above. Tickets were normally dis-
tributed with a mean value of $180 and a standard deviation of $20. In the first phase,
subjects learned the distribution using a graphical method proposed by (Goldstein
et al., 2014) (Material and Methods). Supporting Material, Fig. 2.4 shows that this
procedure was successful in ensuring participants learned the distribution.
In the second phase, participants performed 200 trials of the ticket-shopping
task. In each trial, participants searched through a sequence of ten ticket prices. For
each ticket, they could decide to accept or reject it at their own pace. Participants
were aware that they could see up to 10 tickets in each trial, and they were always
informed about the actual position and the number of remaining tickets (Supporting
Material, Fig. 2.5 for a screen shot). It was not possible to go back to an earlier
option after it was initially declined. If they reached the last ticket (10th) they were
forced to choose this ticket. When participants accepted the ticket, they received
feedback about how much they could have saved if they had chosen the best ticket
in the sequence. Performance was incentivized based on the value of the chosen
ticket (Material and Methods).
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F I G U R E 2. 1: ( A) Pr o b a bilit y t o a c c e pt a ti c k et o n e a c h p ositi o n a cr oss all pri c es. T h e d ar k
li n e r e pr es e nts p arti ci p a nt’s fr e q u e n c y t o a c c e pt, t h e d as h e d y ell o w li n e a n
o pti m al a g e nt‘s pr o b a bilit y t o a c c e pt. ( B) P arti ci p a nts’ pr o b a bilit y t o a c c e pt.
E a c h li n e r e pr es e nts ti c k et pri c es r a n gi n g fr o m t h e first q u a ntil e t o t h e fift h
q u a ntil e. Q 1: Ti c k ets i n first q u a ntil e, Q 2: Ti c k ets r a n gi n g fr o m t h e first
t o t h e s e c o n d q u a ntil e et c. T h e si z e of cir cl es c orr es p o n d t o t h e n u m b er of
d at a p oi nts o n e a c h p ositi o n. ( C) Esti m at e d t hr es h ol ds f or t h e I T M wit h 9
fr e e t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers (s oli d bl u e li n e), t h e L T M wit h 2 fr e e t hr es h ol d
p ar a m et ers ( d as h e d r e d li n e) a n d t h e B O M wit h 2 fr e e t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers
( d as h- d ott e d y ell o w li n e) ( D) P ost eri or pr e di cti v e m e a n a n d 9 5 % H DI of t h e
L T M ( d as h e d r e d li n e) a n d t h e B O M ( d as h- d ott e d y ell o w li n e) f or Q 1 t o Q 5,
as i n di c at e d i n ( B). D at a: s oli d bl a c k li n es
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2.2.1 Behavioral results
Subjects earned on average 17.1 points (SD: 4.2) in each trial (maximum points =
20), which represents a 6% loss on optimal earnings. Participants’ marginal accept
probabilities steadily increased as the sequence progressed (Fig. 2.1A, black line),
but differed systematically from the optimal agent’s accept probability (Fig. 2.1A,
yellow line). On the second-to-last (9th) position, participants accepted the ticket
only with a 28%, 95%-CI [26%, 29%], probability, whereas following the optimal
policy would result in a significantly higher acceptance rate of 50%.
Overall, subjects stopped earlier than optimal. The average position at which a
ticket was accepted was 4.7 (SD: 2.9), whereas an optimal agent would have stopped
at an average stopping position of 5.2 (SD: 2.8). However, a closer look at Fig. 2.1A
reveals that whether subjects accept too early or too late depends on the position:
on earlier positions they accept options although they should continue to search,
whereas, if they get to position 7, they continue searching even for options that
should be accepted according to the optimal policy.
Fig. 2.1B shows the accept probabilities conditional on ticket prices, split into
the first five quantile ranges Q1 - Q5 (out of a total of ten quantile ranges). Qi is
defined as the range of ticket prices from the 0.ith to the 0.i 0.1 th quantile of
the ticket price distribution. In this experiment, the ticket distribution corresponds
to a Gaussian distribution with mean 180 and standard deviation of 20. Accept
probabilities for Q4 and Q5 did not reach 50% at position 9, in contrast to the
optimal strategy that predicts much higher acceptance probabilities at this position.
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Our models did not assume any learning over trials. This assumption was sup-
ported by an analysis of performance across trials. A linear mixed model on points
per trial with trial number as fixed effect and by-participant random intercepts
and random slopes for trial number showed no significant effect of trial number,
F 1,64.00 0.02, p 0.88.
2.2.2 Modeling results and discussion
First, we checked whether the key assumptions of the modeling framework were
supported. We calculated, per participant and model, posterior predictive p-values
(ppp) that compared misfit (i.e., deviance) of the observed data with misfit of syn-
thetic generated data from the model. For the baseline model, ITM, this analysis
indicated that the absolute fit was very good, and a probabilistic threshold adequately
describes participants’ responses; ppp .05 for only 8% of participants (Supporting
Material, Fig. 2.6A). For the vast majority of participants the observed misfit was
consistent with the assumptions of the ITM plus sampling variability.
The performance of the LTM was almost identical to the ITM, suggesting that the
considerably more parsimonious LTM (three free parameters for LTM compared
to ten for ITM) adequately describes behaviour in optimal stopping tasks. The
distribution of ppp-values of the LTM was almost identical to the ITM (Supporting
Material, Fig. 2.6A-B). Fig. 2.1D provides qualitative evidence of the agreement
between LTM and data; the LTM adequately predicts accept probabilities for each
quantile at every position (see Supporting Material, Fig. 2.7 for agreement between
ITM and data). Fig. 2.1C compares the recovered thresholds of ITM and LTM and
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shows that the ITM thresholds essentially form a straight line lying exactly on top
of the LTM thresholds.
The absolute fit of the BOM is clearly worse than for ITM/LTM; ppp .05 for
35% of participants (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.6C). The source for this increased
misfit can be seen in Fig. 2.1D. Only for Q1 and early positions of Q4 and Q5
did the BOM provide an adequate account. Furthermore, the recovered thresholds
(Fig. 2.1C) of the BOM clearly differ from the ITM in almost all positions. Results
of the CoM are not shown explicitly as its performance was extremely poor. All
ppp 0; there was not a single posterior sample for which the observed misfit of
the CoM was smaller than for synthetic data generated from the CoM. Furthermore,
choices were essentially random for CoM with CoM 0.02 [0.01, 0.06] (for the
other models, 0.21).
Participants differed in their first threshold and slope parameters estimated by the
LTM. However, all slope parameters are larger than 0 indicating that all participants
increased the thresholds over the sequence (see also Supporting Material, Text C).
These results suggest that humans use a linear threshold when searching for the
best option. In the present tests we found that the human performance is only 6%
off from the performance of an optimal agent, indicating that the linear strategy
performs quite well. Therefore, using linear thresholds could be an ecologically
sensible adaptation to sequential choice tasks. However, it could also mean that the
LTMs good performance might not generalize to new task environments, in which
the linear model performs less well – an ability that would be crucial for the LTM to
be a useful model of human behavior.
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Search behavior in Experiment 1 indicated that people deviate from the optimal
model depending on the price structure of the sequence: In trials with good options
in the beginning people tended to accept them too early. However, in trials with few
or no good options they continued search longer than the optimal model prescribed
(Supporting Material, Fig. 2.8). Accordingly, in tasks with plenty of good options
people might search less than optimal. However, in tasks in which good options are
rare they might be tempted to search too long.
To find out and further predict how people will adapt to the tasks, we conducted
a simulation study comparing the optimal solution with a best performing linear
model (using a grid search to find the best performing parameter values for the linear
model) and an empirical study manipulating the distributions of ticket prices across
three conditions: (1) a left skewed distribution simulating a scarce environment, (2)
a normal distribution, (3) a right skewed distribution simulating an environment with
plentiful desirable alternatives. As illustrated in Supporting Material, Fig. 2.9, the
simulation study showed that the optimal model predicts more search in a plentiful
environment, whereas a linear model predicts more search in the scarce environment.
Furthermore, the linear model predicts a stronger decline in performance in the
scarce environment than the optimal model (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.9 A).
2.3 E X P E R I M E N T 2 : D O E S T H E LT M G E N E R A L I Z E T O N E W E N V I RO N -
M E N T S
To show that the LTM can capture people’s choice behavior across different tasks
and allows us to predict when people will search too much or too little we con-
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ducted a second experiment changing the distribution of options. We manipu-
lated the different task environments by sampling tickets from (1) a left skewed
(PERT1(40,195,200)), (2) a normal (PERT(90,140,190)) or (3) a right skewed dis-
tribution (PERT(120,125,400)), representing a scarce, a normal and a plentiful
environment, respectively (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.4B-D, red lines, participant’s
estimate in black lines). Each participant was assigned to only one condition. The
final sample included 172 participants. The procedure was identical to Experiment
1, consisting of a learning phase, where participants got acquainted with the distribu-
tion (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.5A-D), and a testing phase. In the testing phase,
participants had to choose the lowest-priced ticket out of a sequence of 10 tickets
with 200 trials (Material and Methods).
2.3.1 Behavioral results
Participants’ performance increased from the left-skewed (scarce) environment to
the right-skewed (plentiful) environment (F 2,268 114, p .0001). As predicted
by the best performing linear model, the loss compared to optimal performance was
largest in the left-skewed condition, where only few good tickets occur (Supporting
Material, Fig. 2.9A).
The average search length decreased from the left skewed scarce environment to
the right skewed plentiful environment, F 2,268 11.5, p .0001. This pattern
also follows the predictions of the best performing linear model in the simulation
1 The PERT distribution is a special case of the beta distribution defined by the minimum (a), most likely
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ri g ht s k e w e d di stri b uti o nC
F I G U R E 2. 2: R es ults of e x p eri m e nt 2: E m piri c al d at a a p p e ar i n bl a c k li n es a n d t h e p ost e-
ri or pr e di cti v e m e a ns of t h e L T M i n r e d li n es. B ars r e pr es e nt t h e 9 5 % H DI.
T h e diff er e nt li n es r e pr es e nt t h e ti c k ets r a n gi n g i n fr o m t h e Q 1 t o Q 5. Q 1:
Ti c k ets i n first q u a ntil e, Q 2: Ti c k ets b et w e e n t h e first a n d s e c o n d q u a ntil e
et c. ( A) C o n diti o n 1: Ti c k ets ar e l eft s k e w e d distri b ut e d ( P E R T( 4 0, 1 9 5, 2 0 0))
c orr es p o n di n g t o a s c ar e e n vir o n m e nt. ( B) C o n diti o n 2: Ti c k ets ar e n or m all y
distri b ut e d ( P E R T( 9 0, 1 4 0, 1 9 0)). ( C) C o n diti o n 3: Ti c k ets ar e ri g ht s k e w e d
distri b ut e d ( P E R T( 1 2 0, 1 2 5, 4 0 0)) c orr es p o n di n g t o a pl e ntif ul e n vir o n m e nt.
st u d y b ut is i n c o ntr ast t o t h e o pti m al m o d el’s pr e di cti o ns ( S u p p orti n g M at eri al,
Fi g. 2. 9 B). S p e ci fi c all y, i n t h e l eft s k e w e d e n vir o n m e nt, w h er e g o o d ti c k ets o c c ur
v er y r ar el y p arti ci p a nts s e ar c h e d t o o l o n g c o m p ar e d t o a n o pti m al a g e nt, w h er e as i n
t h e e n vir o n m e nt w h er e g o o d ti c k ets ar e a b u n d a nt, p arti ci p a nts e n d e d t h eir s e ar c h
t o o e arl y c o m p ar e d t o t h e o pti m al str at e g y.
2. 3. 2 M o d eli n g R es ults a n d Dis c ussi o n
M o d eli n g r es ults r e pli c at e t h e r es ults fr o m E x p eri m e nt 1 a n d i n di c at e t h at t h e
L T M b ut n ot t h e B O M p erf or m e d e xtr e m el y w ell ( p p p < . 0 5 f or 7 % t o 1 0 % of
p arti ci p a nts a cr oss t h e t hr e e c o n diti o ns f or L T M, b ut p p p < . 0 5 f or 2 0 % t o 5 5 %
of p arti ci p a nts f or B O M, S u p p orti n g M at eri al, Fi g. 2. 1 0 A). T h e o bs er v e d a c c e pt
pr o b a biliti es ( Fi g. 2. 2 A- C, bl a c k li n es, w h er e e a c h li n e r e pr es e nts a ti c k et pri c e
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within the specified quantile range) are adequately described by LTM predictions (red
lines) on almost all positions and in all three environments. Moreover, the threshold
parameters for the ITM are again on top of the threshold parameters estimated by the
LTM in all the three environmental conditions (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.11A-C).
These results indicate that humans use a linear threshold in optimal stopping
problems, independent of the distributional characters of the task. However, this
does not mean that people do not adapt to the task at all. Participants are responsive
to task features and adapt their first threshold and the slope to the distributional
characteristics of the task within the constraints of the linear model (Supporting
Material, Fig. 2.11A-C).
Experiment 1 and 2 show that the linear model reflects a robust psychological
process when deciding between sequentially presented options. However, in both
experiments deciders were explicitly trained on the distribution of options, something
not common in real life decision making. The next experiment tests if the linear
strategy can also explain choices in a realistic optimal stopping task where initial
learning is omitted.
2.4 E X P E R I M E N T 3 : LT M ’ S P E R F O R M A N C E I N R E A L I S T I C C H O I C E
TA S K
The decision maker’s goal is to buy online products at the lowest rate where prices
for this product are presented sequentially. We selected commodity products from
different categories (e.g food, leisure, kitchen tools) and collected for each product
a set of prices from Amazon.com. Only products with approximately normal price
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distributions were selected for a final set of 60 products (Supporting Material, Table
2.1). In the experiment, prices were sampled from a normal distribution, with a mean
and standard deviation estimated from the real prices. All participants worked on
120 trials, divided into two blocks of 60 trials. In these two blocks, the 60 products
were displayed in a random order (each product was encountered twice). Participants
were aware that they could see up to 10 prices in each trial, and we indicated the
average price of each product on the screen to reflect that people often have an idea
of familiar products’ prizes and to minimize individual differences in these.
2.4.1 Behavioral Results
Data from 95 participants were analyzed and replicated the results from Experiments
1 and 2 (normal distribution condition). Again, participants accepted too early, on
average at position 4.6 (SD: 2.9). Comparing the performance in detail to the
optimal strategy showed that (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.12) participants accepted
too frequently at the beginning of the sequence (i.e., too low threshold) and searched
too long towards the end of the sequence (i.e., too high threshold). We again found no
evidence for learning across trials (linear mixed model on points per trial with trial
number as fixed effect and by-participant random intercepts and random slopes for
trial number showed no significant effect of trial number F 1,94 0.13, p 0.72).
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F I G U R E 2. 3: ( A) S cr e e ns h ot of t h e pr o d u ct p ur c h asi n g t as k. ( B a n d C) R es ults of e x p er-
i m e nt 3: ( B) E m piri c al d at a a p p e ar i n s oli d bl a c k li n es a n d t h e p ost eri or
pr e di cti v e m e a ns of t h e L T M i n d as h e d r e d li n es. ( C) E m piri c al d at a a p p e ar
i n s oli d bl a c k li n es a n d t h e p ost eri or pr e di cti v e m e a ns of t h e B O M i n d as h e d
y ell o w li n es. B ars r e pr es e nt t h e 9 5 % H DI. T h e diff er e nt li n es r e pr es e nt t h e
pr o d u ct pri c es r a n gi n g fr o m t h e first q u a ntil e t o t h e fift h q u a ntil e. Q 1: Pr o d-
u ct pri c es i n first q u a ntil e, Q 2: Pr o d u ct pri c es b et w e e n t h e first a n d s e c o n d
q u a ntil e, Q 3: Pr o d u ct pri c es r a n gi n g fr o m s e c o n d t o t hir d q u a ntil e, et c.
2. 4. 2 M o d eli n g R es ults
T o d e al wit h t h e pri c es’ v ari a bilit y w e n or m ali z e d all v al u es usi n g m e a n a n d S D pri or
t o fitti n g o ur m o d els. We c o ul d r e pli c at e t h e r es ults fr o m E x p eri m e nt 1 a n d 2, d es pit e
t h e f a ct t h at p arti ci p a nts di d n ot e x pli citl y l e ar n t h e pr o d u ct’s pri c es b ef or e h a n d: T h e
L T M ( 1 0 % of p p p < . 0 5, S u p p orti n g M at eri al, Fi g. 2. 1 4 ), b ut n ot t h e B O M ( 3 1 % of
p p p < . 0 5), w as a bl e t o c a pt ur e t h e o bs er v e d a c c e pt pr o b a biliti es a c c ur at el y o n e a c h
p ositi o n a n d f or e a c h q u a ntil e ( Fi g. 2. 3 B & C). F urt h er m or e, t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers
esti m at e d b y t h e L T M w er e v er y si mil ar t o t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers esti m at e d b y t h e
I T M ( S u p p orti n g M at eri al, Fi g. 2. 1 3 ).
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2.5 D I S C U S S I O N
In this paper, we designed a variant of an optimal stopping task that allowed us
to quantitatively characterize the deviations of human behaviour from optimality.
We found that humans apply a simplifying strategy, where thresholds are linearly
increased over time. We implemented this assumption in a computational framework
and demonstrated that this model not only provided an excellent fit to the data, it also
outperformed other models found in the optimal stopping literature. Furthermore,
the linear threshold assumption makes a non-trivial prediction about search length,
which we confirmed experimentally: Humans stop earlier in environments with
many desirable alternatives compared to scarce environments. These results contrast
with the prediction from the optimal model. Finally, in a online product purchase
paradigm we could show that our model generalizes to real-world sequential choice
problems. Understanding how humans make sequential decisions will help quantify
the conditions under which people may succeed or fail in such tasks.
But why are humans relying on a linear strategy in adapting their thresholds
when an optimal policy is nonlinear? For one, our findings correspond well with
recent studies demonstrating that human choice behavior in related explore-exploit
paradigms is well described by a linear threshold rule (Sang et al., 2020; Song et al.,
2019). But a human linearity bias seems to be more general. Indeed, a tendency
to assume linear relationships has been reported in a range of domains such as
function learning (Kalish et al., 2007; Lucas et al., 2015) and reasoning (Little et al.,
2009; Stango et al., 2009; Wagenaar et al., 1975). Crucially, simple strategies do
not necessarily perform badly. In particular in uncertain and complex environments,
simple heuristics can be efficient and powerful tools if they are adapted to the
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structure of the environment (Gigerenzer et al., 2009; Todd, 2001). In this context,
linearity could be considered as an adaptation of the human mind to its environment.
Material and Methods
2.5.0.1 Participants
We recruited 438 participants (272 females; age range: 18-62; N1 144, N2left 92,
N2normal 110, N2right 92, N3 100 in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, respectively)
on Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in the experiments. Participants gave
informed consent, and the Harvard Committee on the Use of Human Subjects
approved the experiments. Participants were excluded from analysis if they accepted
the first option in a trial in more than 95% of the trials. After applying these
criteria, we included data from 499 participants in the subsequent analysis N1
129,N2left 86,N2normal 102,N2right 84,N3 95 .
2.5.0.2 Task
In Exp. 1 and 2, participants performed the same online ticket shopping task that
consisted of a learning and a testing phase. In the learning phase, participants
experienced the distribution from which the ticket prices were drawn. In Exp. 1, the
distribution from which the values were sampled was normal with 180,
20 . The procedure was as follows (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.5A-F): Participants
encountered sequentially 50 ticket prices drawn from the predefined distribution.
After every ten tickets, participants had to guess the average value of the tickets seen
so far. After each guess, participants were told the correct response. At the end of
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the learning phase participants were asked to complete a histogram (by dragging
the bars) for an additional 100 tickets that were drawn from the same predefined
distribution. Participants received feedback by observing the correct distribution
superimposed over their estimate (Goldstein et al., 2014).
In Exp. 2, we used three conditions to realize three different distributional en-
vironments, a left skewed distribution, PERT(40,195,200), a normal distribution,
PERT(90,140,190), and a right skewed distribution, PERT(120,125,400). The pro-
cedure of the learning phase was identical to Exp. 1, except that we removed the
section about reporting the mean for the skewed distributions (Supporting Material,
Fig. 2.5B). Visual inspection of the performance in the histogram task suggested
that participants learned the target distributions well (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.4).
In the second phase of Exp. 1 and 2, participants performed the ticket-shopping
task. It started with a practice trial followed by 200 test trials. In each trial participants
searched through a sequence of 10 ticket prices randomly drawn from the predefined
distribution. For each ticket, they could decide to accept or reject it at their own
speed. People were aware that they could see up to 10 tickets in each trial and they
were always informed about the actual position and the number of remaining tickets
(Supporting Material, Fig. 2.5E). It was not possible to go back to an earlier option
after it was initially declined. If they reached the last (10th) ticket they were forced
to accept this ticket. When participants accepted the ticket, they received explicit
feedback about how much they could have saved by choosing the lowest-priced
ticket in the sequence (Supporting Material, Fig. 2.5F).
Participants were paid according to their performance. In each of the 200 trials
there was a maximum of 20 points to earn. The participants received the maximum
number of 20 points if they chose the lowest-priced ticket and 0 points for the worst
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ticket in the sequence. The payoff for a ticket that lied between the lowest-priced and
the highest-priced was calculated proportional to the distance to the lowest-priced






where ticketmax represents the most expensive ticket in the sequence and ticketmin
the cheapest ticket in the sequence. Participants received a base payment of $4 and
earned between $0 and $4 additionally depending on their performance.
In Exp. 3, participants performed an online product shopping task that started
with a practice trial followed by 120 test trials divided into two blocks containing the
same sixty products. In each trial, they encountered a product and searched trough a
sequence of ten prices. Prices were randomly drawn from a normal distribution with
a mean and standard deviation estimated from realistic prices collected from Ama-
zon.com. Participants received a base payment of $2 and a performance contingent
bonus between $0 and $4.
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Data Availability
Data and modeling scripts are available on the Open Science Framework: https:
//osf.io/wqth3/
2.6 S U P P O RT I N G M AT E R I A L : A L I N E A R T H R E S H O L D M O D E L F O R O P -
T I M A L S T O P P I N G B E H AV I O R
Text A: Calculation of optimal thresholds
We describe the calculation of optimal thresholds applied to our scenario, where
payoff is proportional to the chosen value and the goal is to find cheapest ticket price.
We first derive the optimal solution mathematically based on the paper of Gilbert
and Mosteller (Gilbert et al., 1966, Section 5b) and further provide a more intuitive
explanation.










and the goal is to find the lowest ticket price in this sequence.
The optimum strategy for this task is:
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If n 1, the decision maker has to accept the ticket, therefore the threshold of the
last ticket is:
T1 (2.6)
The expected price of the last ticket (P1) is the mean ( ) of the distribution.
If n 2, the decision maker decides to keep the first option or to reject it and
to go on to the second one. If he goes on, his expected ticket price is . Therefore
he keeps the current one, x, if x , rejects it if x and is indifferent if x .
Therefore, the expected price of the last ticket (P1) is also the threshold for the
second last option:
T2 P1 (2.7)
Than for n 2, his expected price (P2) is:
P2
P1
f x xdx P1
P1
f x dx (2.8)
The remaining terms of the sequence can be computed in a recursive manner. For
each n, the decision maker accepts the ticket if it is lower than the expected price
of the remaining n 1 tickets (x Pn 1) but rejects if the ticket is higher than the
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remaining expected price (x Pn 1) therefore the threshold on the n-th position (Tn)
is:
Tn Pn 1 (2.9)
Accordingly the expected price (Pn) is :
Pn
Pn 1
f x xdx Pn 1
Pn 1
f x dx (2.10)
Intuitive explanation
The optimal thresholds Ti for maximising the payoff is calculated working back-
ward from the last ticket price: The threshold of the final item (T1) is , because
the rules of the task stipulate that the final item must be accepted if no earlier item
has been chosen. The thresholds for the previous items are determined by working
backward from the final item, using conditional expectations. First, we calculate
the expected value of the final item (P1). For the last item, this is the expectation of
the overall probability distribution from which the options are sampled. Therefore,
to maximize expected reward on the second last position, one’s policy should be
to accept a particular option if it is better (in our case smaller) than the expected
reward if one continues under the optimal policy. The second-to-last item should be
accepted if its value is smaller than the expected value of the final item. This means
that the threshold of the second-to-last item (T2) is the expected value of the last
item (P1).
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The expected value of the second-to-last item (P2) is the expected value of the part
of the probability distribution that is better (in our case smaller) than the threshold
(T2) for the second-to-last item. The probability of this expected value is the area
under the probability distribution that is better than this threshold. The overall
expected reward at the second-to-last position (P2) (and therefore the threshold for
the third-to-last item (T3)) is calculated as follows: we multiply the expected value
for the second-to-last item with its probability plus the expected value of the last
item multiplied with its probability (which is equal to 1 minus the probability of the
second-to-last item). The remaining thresholds are calculated in the same way.
Text B: Modelling
Models were implemented in a hierarchical-Bayesian statistical framework using
JAGS (Lee et al., 2014; Plummer et al., 2003). In a Bayesian framework, information
regarding model parameters is represented by probability distributions. The data
is used to update prior distributions resulting in posterior distributions, which
were used for inference. A hierarchical implementation allows us to fit data on
the individual trial-level, while simultaneously taking into account information
shared across participants via group-level distributions. Results reported in the
main manuscript are based on the group-level posterior distributions, unless noted
otherwise.
Fitting involved running four independent chains, each with 2000 samples drawn
from the posterior distribution, with a burn-in period of 100 samples. Chain con-


















<60 <80 <100 <120 <140 <160 <180 <200
B
<95 <110 <125 <140 <155 <170 <185 <200
C








FIGURE 2.4: A-D: Results of the distribution learning phase: Participants’ aggregated
responses in the histogram task (details in Methods). Empirical data appear
in black lines and the predefined distribution in red dashed lines and generally
show good agreement. A: Experiment 1: Predefined distribution is a normal
distribution, B-D: Experiment 2. B: Condition 1: Predefined distribution
is a left skewed distribution. C: Condition 2: Predefined distribution is a
normal distribution. D: Condition 3: Predefined distribution is a right skewed
distribution.
vergence was monitored via the calculation of Gelman-Rubin statistics on the four
chains, autocorrelation plots, and visual inspection of the chains.
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FIGURE 2.5: A-F: Screen shots of online experiment. A-D: learning phase, E-F: testing
phase. A: Sequential presentation of ticket values sampled from predefined
distribution. B: After each 10 tickets, participants are asked to estimate the
average of the tickets just seen (this section was removed for the left and
right skewed distribution in experiment 2). C: At the end of the learning
phase, participants have to predict how a future sample from the same
predefined population might look, where they essentially had to draw a
histogram using this interface. D: Feedback was provided by superimposing
the correct distribution over their estimate. E: Testing phase: In every trial
participants encounter ten tickets sequentially and have to decide to accept
it or to continue. Each ticket indicates the ticket’s actual position in the
sequence. F: Feedback was provided about how much they could have saved
if they had chosen the cheapest ticket in the sequence.
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FIGURE 2.6: Results of experiment 1: Individual posterior predictive p values for the LTM
(A) the ITM (B) and the BOM (C) for each individual.
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F I G U R E 2. 7: R es ults of e x p eri m e nt 1. E m piri c al d at a a p p e ar i n bl a c k li n es a n d t h e p os-
t eri or pr e di cti v e m e a ns of t h e I T M i n r e d d as h e d li n es. B ars r e pr es e nt t h e
9 5 % H DI. T h e diff er e nt li n es r e pr es e nt t h e ti c k ets r a n gi n g i n fr o m t h e first
q u a ntil e t o t h e fift h q u a ntil e, fr o m a t ot al of t e n q u a ntil es. Q 1: Ti c k et pri c es
r a n gi n g i n first q u a ntil e, Q 2: Ti c k et pri c es r a n gi n g b et w e e n t h e first a n d
s e c o n d q u a ntil e et c.













position 1 − 3 position 4 − 6 position 7 − 9 position 10
sequence section
Trials in which participants:
stopped on pos 1−3 (nr of trials=10868)
stopped on pos 4−6 (nr of trials=7432)
stopped on pos 7−9 (nr of trials=4362)
stopped on pos 10 (nr of trials=3141)
mean ticket prices accepted with optimal thresholds
FIGURE 2.8: Illustration of the structure of prices for trials in which participants either
accepted in the beginning (black line), in the middle (red line) or at the end of
the sequence (blue line). Price structure in trials in which participants reached
the last position are shown in green. The sequences of 10 ticket prices each for
the 200 trials were generated and stored in the beginning of the experiment,
ensuring that we could analyse all prices in each sequence, regardless of the
stopping position of the participants. The yellow dashed line shows the mean
of the accepted ticket prices when using the optimal threshold in each of the
respective section. The black line shows the price structure of trials that were
accepted in the beginning of the sequence, indicating that sequences that
included low prices in the beginning were more likely to be accepted than
the optimal threshold would prescribe (black line vs yellow line). However
the blue line shows the price structure of trials that were accepted in the
later part of the sequence, indicating higher prices on position 1 - 6. In
these trials, participants continued search longer than the optimal model
prescribed (participant’s mean accepted ticket price is lower than the the
optimal threshold’s mean accepted ticket price, blue line vs yellow line)



















































































































































































































































Pr e di cti o n s ( si m ul ati o n st u d y)
− − − o pti m al t hr e s h ol d
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F I G U R E 2. 9: ( A) A v er a g e p erf or m a n c e (i n p oi nts/tri al) vs distri b uti o n al str u ct ur e of t h e
t as k. D at a: bl a c k li n e ( gr e y d ots: i n di vi d u al d at a p oi nts), p erf or m a n c e w h e n
usi n g o pti m al t hr es h ol ds: y ell o w li n e, p erf or m a n c e w h e n usi n g b est p erf or m-
i n g li n e ar t hr es h ol ds: bl u e li n e. ( B) A v er a g e s e ar c h l e n gt h vs distri b uti o n al
str u ct ur e. D at a: bl a c k li n e, i n di vi d u al d at a p oi nts: gr e y d ots, o pti m al t hr es h-
ol ds: y ell o w li n e, b est- p erf or mi n g li n e ar t hr es h ol ds: bl u e li n e. N ot e t h at
m o d el pr e di cti o ns ar e b as e d s ol el y o n distri b uti o n al c h ar a ct eristi cs of t h e
e n vir o n m e nts a n d n ot o n m o d el fit o n h u m a n d at a.
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FIGURE 2.10: Individual posterior predictive p values for the LTM (A-C) and for the
BOM (D-F) for each condition and each individual. A and D: Condition 1,
scarce environment; B and E: Condition 2; C and F: Condition 3, plentiful
environment








































FIGURE 2.11: Experiment 2: (A) Left skewed distribution (B) Normal distribution (C)
Right skewed distribution. Estimated threshold parameters from the ITM
(solid blue line) and the LTM (dashed red line). The optimal threshold
(no model fit) is shown as yellow dotted dashed line. The grey dashed
horizontal lines indicate the first (Q1) and second (Q2) quantile of the
respective distribution.
















FIGURE 2.12: Experiment 3 (realistic products): Probability to accept a product price
depending on the position across all prices. The dark line represents par-
ticipant’s frequency to accept, the dashed yellow line the optimal agent‘s
probability to accept.




























FIGURE 2.13: Experiment 3: Estimated thresholds for the ITM with 9 free threshold
parameters (solid blue line), the LTM with 2 free threshold parameters
(dashed red line) and the BOM with 2 free threshold parameters (dash-
dotted yellow line). Product prices differed for each product, in order to
make them comparable we transformed them to z-scores and calculated the
thresholds a the z-scale.
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FIGURE 2.14: Results of experiment 3. Individual posterior predictive p values for the
LTM (A) the ITM (B) and the BOM (C) for each individual.
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Product mean sd
1. Philips Electric Toothbrush 62.5 3.3
2. Nintendo Switch Console With Joy-Cons 330. 26.1
3. Nintendo Switch Pro Controller 83.5 11.6
4. Adidas Men’s Stan Smith Shoes 91.1 8.5
5. Hardcover Lord of the Rings Boxed Set 53.9 7.3
6. JBL Flip 4 Portable Speaker 87.7 9.7
7. Game of Thrones: The Complete Sixth Season 32 6.1
8. GoPro Waterproof Digital Action Camera 311. 50.4
9. Crocs Adult Unisex 37.6 2.8
10. Ray-Ban Men’s Wayfarer Sunglasses 147. 13.8
11. Fjallraven Kanken Backpack 83.9 8.5
12. Nespresso Inissia Espresso Machine 146. 11.5
13. Monster Energy Drink, Zero Ultra - 24 pack 36.4 1.1
14. Black+Decker Rice Cooker and Food Steamer 34.3 6.7
15. Dyson V7 Trigger Cord-Free Handheld Vacuum Cleaner 242. 34.8
16. HP 952 Cyan, Magenta Ink Cartridges, 3 Cartridges 69.6 3.8
17. Maglite LED 3-Cell D Flashlight 35 2
18. Bosch GSR18V-190B22 18-Volt 1/2 Cordless Drill/Driver Kit 128. 16.2
19. Disney Pixar Toy Story Ultimate Walking Buzz Lightyear 43.9 8.2
20. TheraBand 23025 55 cm Pro-Series Exercise Ball Slow Red 36.4 7.6
21. Nikon 8252 ACULON A211 10-22x50 Zoom Binocular 169. 13
22. Howard Leight by Honeywell Impact Sport Sound Amplification Electronic Shooting Earmuff 66 8.7
23. STIGA Pro Carbon Performance-Level Table Tennis Racket 76.3 13.4
24. Winmau Blade 5 Bristle Dartboard 79.4 6.5
25. Coleman Sundome 4-Person Dome Tent 79.5 14.2
26. Coleman Camping Chair 31.5 5.8
27. Fuzion X-3 Pro Scooter (2018 Gold) 96.9 15.7
28. Roller Derby Women’s V-Tech 500 Button Adjustable Inline, Mint 48.4 3.2
29. Quality Suites Orlando Lake Buena Vista - Orlando, 4.6 miles to Walt Disney World Resort – 7 nights 95.4 12
30. NBA – Ticket - LOS ANGELES LAKERS VS GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS - Staples Center - Los Angeles, United States 122. 11.7
31. Hardcover Novel: Where The Crawdads Sing 21.3 3.6
32. Apple EarPods with Lightning Connector 19.1 2.4
33. BIC Soleil Women’s Disposable Razor 9.7 2.1
34. Listerine Total Care r 14.1 3.8
35. Harry Potter and The Sorcerer’s Stone (Hardcover) 25.3 5.2
36. Queen: The Platinum Collection 22.4 7
37. Fujifilm INSTAX Mini 2 Packs 16 1.7
38. Haribo Gummi Candy, 5 Pound Bag 15.3 0.9
39. Duracell Alkaline Batteries AA, 48 Count 24.1 4.3
40. Charmin Ultra Soft 2 - 12 rolls 24.3 3.1
41. Twister 20.5 2.3
42. La Roche-Posay Anthelios Ultra Light Sunscreen Fluid, SPF 60 - 1.7 fl oz bottle 28.7 3.9
43. Vitafusion MultiVites Gummy Vitamins for Adults, Assorted - 150 count 12.1 2.9
44. Extra Strength Bayer Aspirin 500mg Coated Tablets, 100ct 12.5 0.9
45. Quest Nutrition Quest Bar, Chocolate Chip Cookie Dough - 12 bars, 2.12 oz each 26.6 2.3
46. Barbie Dreamtopia Mermaid Doll 3 16.3 4.2
47. Monopoly Board Game 18.5 2.9
48. CamelBak Eddy Water Bottle, Dragonfruit, 0.75 L 12.8 2.3
49. Bear Grylls Fire Starter Gerber 17.9 3.9
50. Victorinox Swiss Army Classic SD Pocket Knife 16.9 2.4
51. Wilson NFL Super Grip Official Football 30.4 5
52. Biofreeze Professional Pain Relieving 360 Spray 4 oz 14.3 2.9
53. Bell Sports Bicycle Combination Cable Lock 5’ Watchdog 100, Black 11.2 2.5
54. Frogg Toggs FTP1714-12 Action Poncho 14.4 1.9
55. Speedo Vanquisher 2.0 Mirrored Goggle Silver 20.5 3.9
56. Intex Unicorn Inflatable Ride on Pool Float 20.6 6.2
57. Rain-X 5079280-2 Latitude 2-in-1 Water Repellency Wiper Blade - 24-inches 23.8 3.3
58. The Easy 5-Ingredient Ketogenic Diet Cookbook 12.8 1.9
59. Speck Apple iPhone XR Presidio Case 30.1 2.4
60. RoomMates Lisa Audit Butterfly Quote Peel and Stick Wall Decals 17.9 4.9
TABLE 2.1: Products with mean and standard deviation of prices
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Text C: Individual differences
2.6.0.1 Experiment 1
Figure S12 A shows the posterior individual-level threshold parameters (transparent
red lines) and posterior group-level threshold parameters (solid red line) of the Linear
Threshold Model (LTM). Participants differ in both their first threshold parameter
(95% range between 144 and 168) and their slope parameters (95% between 0.3
and 2.6) but they all show the same general pattern (i.e., all participants’ slope
parameters are positive). Figure B and C show the individual threshold and slope
parameters with respect to optimality: The x axis represent the parameter values
and the y axis represents the percentage difference in performance from optimality,
where negative numbers indicate worse than optimal performance. We see that there
is an inverse u-shaped relationship between the first threshold and difference in
performance from the optimal policy (i.e., performance for participants with a first
threshold near the mean show almost optimal performance but participants with
first thresholds further away from the mean in either direction do not do so), but
no relationship between the slope and difference in performance from the optimal
policy.
2.6.0.2 Experiment 2
The figures in columns A-C in Figure S13 represent the three environmental condi-
tions: Column A correspond to the scarce environment (condition 1: ticket prices are
sampled from a left skewed distribution), column B corresponds to the environment
with normal distributed ticket prices (condition 2) and column C corresponds to the
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plentiful environment (condition 2: ticket prices are sampled from a right skewed
distribution). The top row shows the posterior individual-level threshold parameters
(transparent red lines) and posterior group-level threshold parameters (solid red line)
of the Linear Threshold Model (LTM) for each condition. Individual threshold and
slope parameters vary between participants in each condition but the group-level
variance (which capture inter-individual variability) is higher in condition 1 than
in condition 3 ( cond1
cond3
1) for the first threshold parameter (1.24 CI: [0.93,1.66])
and the slope parameter (2.26 CI: [1.46,3.62]). Further, all the slope parameters are
larger than 0 confirming the general trend to use a positive increasing threshold also
in changing environments. Figuers in the middle and bottom row show the individ-
ual threshold and slope parameters compared to the difference from the optimal
performance (in percentage, negative numbers indicate a worse performance than
optimal). As in the first experiment, we find a u-shaped relationship between the
first threshold and difference in performance from the optimal policy in condition 2
and 3, but not in condition 1. However we find no discernible relationship between
the slope and difference in performance from the optimal policy.
2.6.0.3 Experiment 3
Figure S14 A shows the posterior individual-level standardized threshold parameters
(transparent red lines) and posterior group-level standardized threshold parameters
(solid red line) of the Linear Threshold Model (LTM). We observe from these figures
that there are differences between individuals in both first thresholds and slopes.
However the participants overwhelmingly follow the same general pattern (only
two participants have a negative slope parameter). B and C show the individual
parameters in comparison to the difference in optimal performances (in percentage).
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F I G U R E 2. 1 5: I n di vi d u al diff er e n c es i n e x p eri m e nt 1: ( A) P ost eri or i n di vi d u al-l e v el t hr es h-
ol d p ar a m et ers (tr a ns p ar e nt r e d li n es) a n d p ost eri or gr o u p-l e v el t hr es h ol d
p ar a m et ers (s oli d r e d li n e) of t h e Li n e ar T hr es h ol d M o d el ( L T M). ( B) S c at-
t er pl ot of t h e i n di vi d u al t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers ( x- a xis) a n d its d e vi ati o n
i n p erf or m a n c e fr o m o pti m al str at e g y ( y- a xis) ( C) S c att er pl ot of t h e i n di-
vi d u al sl o p e p ar a m et ers ( x- a xis) a n d its d e vi ati o n i n p erf or m a n c e fr o m t h e
o pti m al str at e g y ( y- a xis).
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F I G U R E 2. 1 6: E x p eri m e nt 2: ( A- C) T o p r o w: P ost eri or i n di vi d u al-l e v el t hr es h ol d p ar a m e-
t ers (tr a ns p ar e nt r e d li n es) a n d p ost eri or gr o u p-l e v el t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers
(s oli d r e d li n e) of t h e Li n e ar T hr es h ol d M o d el ( L T M). ( A) C o n diti o n 1,
s c ar c e e n vir o n m e nt; ( B) C o n diti o n 2; ( C) C o n diti o n 3, pl e ntif ul e n vir o n-
m e nt. Mi d dl e r o w: S c att er pl ot of t h e i n di vi d u al t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers
( x- a xis) a n d its d e vi ati o n i n p erf or m a n c e fr o m o pti m al str at e g y ( y- a xis) f or
e a c h c o n diti o n. B ott o m r o w: S c att er pl ot of t h e i n di vi d u al sl o p e p ar a m et ers
( x- a xis) a n d its d e vi ati o n i n p erf or m a n c e fr o m t h e o pti m al str at e g y ( y- a xis)
f or e a c h c o n diti o n.
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F I G U R E 2. 1 7: E x p eri m e nt 3: ( A) P ost eri or i n di vi d u al-l e v el t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers (tr a ns p ar-
e nt r e d li n es) a n d p ost eri or gr o u p-l e v el t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers (s oli d r e d li n e)
of t h e Li n e ar T hr es h ol d M o d el ( L T M). ( B) S c att er pl ot of t h e i n di vi d u al
t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers (st a n d ar di z e d) a n d d e vi ati o n i n p erf or m a n c e fr o m
o pti m al str at e g y ( y- a xis) ( C) S c att er pl ot of t h e i n di vi d u al sl o p e p ar a m et ers
(st a n d ar di z e d) a n d d e vi ati o n i n p erf or m a n c e fr o m o pti m al str at e g y ( y- a xis).
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A B S T R AC T
Sequential decision making – a decision where available options are encountered
successively - is a hallmark of our everyday life. When we search for a job or an
apartment, we may decide to accept or reject it without knowing potential future
options. Despite the great advances in understanding optimal stopping tasks, little
is known about the adaptive behavior to changes in choice context. In this paper,
we present two experiments where (1) outcome variance and (2) time horizon
is modified. First we will provide empirical evidence that people adapt to both
context manipulations. Secondly, we apply a recently developed threshold model
of individual performance to our data that allows to separate different cognitive
processes that are involved in optimal stopping behavior. Results from Study 1 show
that that participants adapt perfectly to the variance of the sampling distribution and
thus suggests that the value of an option is perceived relative to the options within
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the sequence. Results from Study 2 suggest that participants adapt their aspiration
level to time horizon in two ways: First, a short time horizon results in a more
relaxed initial acceptance level leading to a higher acceptance rate. Additionally, in
a short time horizon, this acceptance level is stronger adjusted during search. The
studies provide insights into the underlying processes that guide adaptive behavior
in optimal stopping tasks, thus providing an important step towards understanding
human sequential decision making.
3.1 I N T RO D U C T I O N
To accept a safe offer or to continue searching for a better alternative is a hallmark of
everyday life, whether house-hunting, selling or buying stocks, or finding a partner.
In these so called optimal stopping problems, options are presented sequentially and
people must choose the best option among alternatives (see Ferguson, 1989, for an
early review). An important characteristic of such tasks is that there is no going back
to an earlier option after it is initially declined. Therefore, the difficulty lies in the
trade-off between accepting a possibly suboptimal option prematurely or rejecting
it, hoping for a better one in the future. Previous research has emphasized on either
studying choice behavior in comparison to normative models (see, e.g. Brickman,
1972; Corbin et al., 1975; Kahan et al., 1967; Rapoport et al., 1970) or introduced
alternative choice models to characterise optimal stopping behavior (Baumann et al.,
2020; Bearden et al., 2006; Cox et al., 1989; Goldstein et al., 2020; Guan et al., 2015;
Hey, 1982; Lee, 2006; Lee et al., 2004; Sang et al., 2020; Seale et al., 2000; Zwick
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et al., 2003). These studies have shed light onto humans’ simplifying strategies when
decisions are made repeatedly.
However, an often neglected but important challenge when solving optimal stop-
ping problems is to adapt one’s behavior to the changes in the environment, such
as dealing with outcomes of different magnitude or with limited time horizons for
searching. As an example, let’s assume it is Black Friday (sales for three days)
and Barbara is bargain hunting for a specific video game. She explores offers from
different discounters which range between $10 - $20, but the game sells fast and
offers disappear quickly. At the same time, a luxury mall extends the Black Friday
days over two weeks, and Barbara intends to purchase an expensive bag that is
now offered for a price ranging between $700 and $900. However, price offers are
changing from day to day and Barbara has to choose the right time to purchase the
bag. How does Barbara adjust her choice strategy to different time and price scales?
The idea that humans are adaptive decision makers and can adjust their decision
strategies to different situations is well established (Newell et al., 1972; Payne, 1982;
Simon, 1990; Todd et al., 2012). Likewise, studies on optimal stopping behavior
have consistently shown that people are sensitive to the environmental distributions
of the values. (e.g. Corbin et al., 1975; Cox et al., 1989; Guan et al., 2018; Lee
et al., 2004; Shapira et al., 1981). For example, some studies found diverging
choice behavior in non-stationary environments in which presented values tended
to increase or decrease over the presented sequence. (Brickman, 1972; Shapira
et al., 1981). Other studies provided evidence that the skew of the options’ value
distribution has an effect on optimal stopping behavior (Baumann et al., 2020; Guan
et al., 2018; Guan et al., 2014; Kahan et al., 1967; Rydzewska et al., 2018, e.g.)
whereas plentiful environments (many good options) resulted in higher aspiration
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levels relative to scarce environments. Additionally, Lee at al. (2004) have shown
that acceptance levels are adapted to the amount of available options, with shorter
sequences leading to higher levels of acceptance (see also Guan et al., 2020; Seale
et al., 1997). However, despite the consensus that people adjust their choices to
different contexts in optimal stopping tasks, little is known about their adaptation
strategies. Therefore, in this paper, we will investigate the robustness and reasons
behind the adaptive behavior in optimal stopping problems.
Our analysis relies on the linear threshold model (LTM, Baumann et al., 2020)
that allows to measure different cognitive processes that are involved in optimal
stopping behavior. In particular, it assumes that human choices in optimal stopping
problems can be described by (1) an aspiration or acceptance level which reflects
the option value above which an option is accepted directly in the first decision (2)
an adaptation rate, reflecting the change of the aspiration level with the time/number
of available options running out in a linear manner and (3) choice sensitivity (or
determinism), reflecting how sensitively people react to the extent by which the
current option value deviates from the (adapted) aspiration level. The model thus
provides a framework to measure the impact of changing task features on these
mechanisms.
Our experiments include the variation of two contextual factors: (1) the outcome
variance and (2) time horizon. For Study 1, participants performed an optimal
stopping task where options where sampled from a distribution with either a low
or a high variance. This manipulation reflects real-life optimal stopping scenarios,
e.g. when bargain hunting for the best price of a tooth brush (where prices vary
little) versus hunting for the best price of a luxury bag (which prices can vary
largely). The question is how people adapt to such different value ranges in order
3.1 I N T RO D U C T I O N 71
to succeed. Research in simultaneous decision making has repeatedly shown that
valuation is sensitive to the range of other options (e.g. Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005;
Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Rigoli et al., 2016; Tversky et al., 1993). Moreover, some
researchers suggest that people value an alternative based on the relative rank
within a pool of alternatives, and not by their absolute value (e.g. “normalization
hypothesis”, Rangel et al., 2012). Following this line of research, we would expect
that variance has little effect on search performance (i.e. on accepting optimal
options), but that, in order to do so, people transform their value representations into
value rankings taking the variance of the alternatives into account.
Alternatively, research on risky decision making suggests that variance in the
outcomes changes people’s risk preferences, where higher outcome variance implies
higher risk and thus results in more risk averse behavior (Genest et al., 2016; Holt
et al., 2002; Markowitz, 1959; E. Weber et al., 2004). From this perspective, an
optimal stopping task can be viewed as repeated risky decisions, while accepting
the current option would reflect a ‘safe’ choice, and rejecting the current option
would reflect choosing an uncertain outcome (‘gamble’). If variance influences risk
preference, we would expect behavioral changes under different value distributions,
where higher variance would lead to enhanced risk averse behavior, translating into
decreased aspiration levels in the LTM, compared to lower variance.
For Study 2, we consider the behavioral impact of the time horizon, that is, the
number of options that could be explored over the sequence of choices. For instance,
when time is limited, as in the mentioned example above where sales appear during
three days, rejecting an option implies the possibility that only more expensive
options remain. In this case, one should lower the aspiration level to ensure not to
end up with a last, probably unsatisfying price offer. However, when more time is
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available to reach a decision, there is greater hope to find a satisfying option in the
future thus the aspiration level can be raised. Indeed, studies have repeatedly shown
that humans increase their general acceptance level (lowering aspiration and thus
accept more) in shorter sequences, compared to longer time horizons (e.g. Lee et al.,
2004; Rydzewska et al., 2018; Seale et al., 1997; Zwick et al., 2003) thus resulting in
less search. These results indicate a qualitative existence of aspiration level effects,
however they are limited in what they can tell us about the quantitative properties of
this process (i.e., adaptation rate over subsequent rejections). That is, most research
on search in optimal stopping problems has focused on data which reflect only
the end product of the decision process, such as search length and accuracy. Here,
we aim to identify and quantify the cognitive mechanisms that could account for
adaptive process of sequential search to different time scales.
Finally, we are not only interested in how people adapt to the environment,
but also whether individual differences in the decision parameters, such as the
aspiration level and the adaptation rate, are stable across contexts (e.g., comparing
low and high variance value distributions). Research on exploration-exploitation
trade-offs has frequently emphasized that individual search might be driven by a
general mechanism that affects search across different domains and tasks (Hills
et al., 2008; Hills et al., 2015; Mata et al., 2015; Pirolli, 2007), however, attempts to
link behavior across different exploration-exploitation tasks have been unsuccessful
(e.g. Meyers et al., 2020; von Helversen et al., 2018). Our further goal thus is to
uncover underlying cognitive processes that are consistent across search contexts
and thus to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of search beyond optimal
stopping tasks.
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In the following, we first review previous research on sequential search and
present three decision strategies that have been shown to account for human search
behavior. We then describe our formal hypotheses and our general methodological
approach, before we present each experiment separately.
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In a standard optimal stopping task, a decision maker encounters a series of single-
valued options one at a time and must decide when to stop searching and accept a
currently observed option. As an example, a decision maker (here a customer) is
planing a vacation and decides to buy the plane ticket online. Ticket prices vary
randomly from day to day and the customer wants to find the cheapest ticket. The
customer checks the ticket price every day and decides if she wants to accept or
reject the ticket, without having the option to go back in time to a previously rejected
offer. Search time is limited by her vacation schedule (i.e., 10 days with one decision
on each day) and, once accepted, the search ends.
In the classic version of the problem, sometimes also referred to as the “Secretary
Problem”, only the rank of the option relative to the ones already seen is shown.
In this version of the problem, the optimal strategy is to go through the first 37%
and choose the next price that is the best (has rank 1) (see Gilbert et al., 1966, for
the mathematical derivation). Empirical evidence, however, suggests that, if people
have such a cut-off, it is usually lower than the 37% (Kahan et al., 1967; Seale et al.,
1997; von Helversen et al., 2011), thus, sub-optimally accepting too early.
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The full information version of the problem differs from the classic version by
showing the actual price instead of its rank. In this version, the optimal solution is
derived based on the probability of finding a better price on the remaining days. From
this probability, a threshold is calculated for each day (see Gilbert et al., 1966, for a
mathematical derivation of the thresholds, and Supporting Material, Text 1). These
optimal thresholds increase non-linearly across the time course. A threshold can
be interpreted as an “acceptable” price, where anything below (when searching the
minimum) is regarded “satisfactory”, anything above as “unsatisfactory”. However,
studies considering the full information version of the problem have found that
human choices are not fully described by assuming that they use such optimal
thresholds when deciding to accept or reject an alternative (e.g. Goldstein et al.,
2020; Guan et al., 2014; Lee, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2012). For instance, Guan
and Lee (Guan et al., 2015) showed that despite clustering around the optimal
solution, participants behavior could be better described by a Biased Optimal Model
(BOM, Guan et al., 2015). The BOM assumes that participants’ decision thresholds
deviate systematically from the optimal ones. Accordingly, this model implies that
thresholds change non-linearly across the time course (Guan et al., 2015).
In contrast, recent studies have shown that a model assuming linear adaptation of
thresholds better accounts for the empirical data than optimal (non-linear) threshold
models (Baumann et al., 2020; Sang et al., 2020; Song et al., 2019). In a recent study
we developed the Linear Threshold Model (LTM, Baumann et al., 2020) which
assumes that humans set an aspiration level (inital threshold) at the beginning of
the search process (i.e., directly affecting the first decision). Once set, the initial
aspiration level is adjusted linearly with ongoing search from one option to the next
(i.e., with every rejected decision, the threshold becomes more tolerant). Therefore,
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the strength of the adjustment and length of the sequence of choices define how far
one departs from the initial aspiration level. The LTM’s strength lies in its accuracy
in describing human choices in optimal stopping tasks in changing environments
(Baumann et al., 2020). Furthermore, its parameters can be related to psychological
processes, such as an aspiration level prior to search, its adaption across time and
the choice sensitivity, thus making it an appropriate model to study the adaptive
processes involved in optimal stopping search.
We formally introduce the LTM, the BOM and a third model, that serves as a
baseline (Independent Threshold Model (ITM)), using the ticket purchasing example
mentioned at the beginning of this section. More formally, the customer is presented
with a sequence of ticket prices p1, , pN for N sequence positions with the goal
to find the minimum. If the decision maker accepts the price pi on position i, the
process terminates; otherwise, she continues to the next ticket price. When the last
price pN is reached, it must be accepted. Ticket prices vary across the sequence
positions and the customer can’t revert to a previously rejected offer.
According to the three models, the decision to accept or reject follows from a
comparison of the current ticket price pi with the threshold i (adjusted aspiration
level) on the current sequence position i, and the models differ in how they calculate
this adjusted threshold. The comparison between the option’s value and the threshold
yields an acceptance probability i based on a sigmoid choice function defined by
i , pi, i
1
1 exp pi i
. (3.1)
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The parameter (sensitivity) governs how deterministic the decision threshold is.
Small values of reflect stochasticity in decisions, whereas the policy approaches
determinism with larger values. In other words, large indicate that a decision
maker applies the decision threshold very consistently, while low values indicate
sporadic violations (e.g. either strategically to explore remaining options once in a
while, or due to less precise cognitive processes during the evaluation).
The LTM postulates that the decision threshold changes over time in a linear
fashion. Formally, it is defined by the first threshold 0 and the incremental value
which is added to i whenever a price was rejected.
i 1 0 i, (3.2)
Formally, an increasing i over time (i.e., positive values of , in the current example)
means that the decision maker becomes more likely to accept more expensive plane
tickets compared to the the previous sequence positions. In sum, this model entails
three adjustable parameters, the first threshold 0, the increment of the threshold
and the choice sensitivity . The corresponding psychological interpretations are
listed in Table 3.1.
Parameter Cognitive function
0 Aspiration level before search
Adaptation rate during search
Sensitivity to differences between
aspiration level and actual price
TABLE 3.1: LTM parameters.
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In contrast to the LTM, the BOM (Guan et al., 2015) assumes that people use
the optimal thresholds but diverge from them in a systematic way. Unlike the LTM,
the BOM predicts non–linear increasing decision threshold over time. The optimal
thresholds i for each position i are derived by determining the expected reward
of the remaining options (derivation in Gilbert et al., 1966, Section 5b, and in Sup-
porting Material Text 1). The model entails two parameters, a systematic bias that
reflects how much above or or below their threshold is from optimal. Additionally,
the thresholds depend on that determines how much the bias increases or decreases
as the sequence progresses (Supporting Material Text 2 for a formal description).
The Independent Threshold Model (ITM) is identical to the LTM, but freely
estimates N 1 independent threshold parameters 1, ..., N 1, one for each position
in the sequence. The thresholds can take any value across positions and therefore
provides an upper limit for how well any threshold model can describe a person’s
decision given the assumption of a probabilistic threshold.
In following paragraph, we formulate hypotheses about choice behavior adaption
to (1) variance and (2) time horizon and their theoretical implications regarding the
cognitive parameters described by the LTM.
3.2.1 Effects of variance
In the first study, we investigate the effect of outcome variance on search behavior
and decision thresholds. In two tasks, values are drawn from the same distribution
with either a low or high variance, with a constant mean.
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Several studies investigated how value is represented psychologically suggesting
that the perceived value of a reward strongly depends on the context in which it
is evaluated (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Rigoli et al., 2016; Tversky et al., 1993).
Accordingly, the normalization hypothesis (Rangel et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2006)
postulates that participants evaluate the prices upon their relative rather than their
absolute value within the price generating distribution. The relative position of the
value is thus calculated by normalizing it to the distribution of alternatives that
will be encountered. Therefore, the same price in the low and the high variance
environment would correspond to a higher value in the low variance environment
since its percentile rank within its price distribution is lower. Furthermore, two prices
that correspond to the same percentile rank in their sampling distribution would be
valued equally (see also Bavard et al., 2018; Kahan et al., 1967; Klein et al., 2017;
Louie et al., 2012). Under this perspective, we would not expect variance to alter
search length nor performance.
This idea further implicates that the decision thresholds in low- and high-variance
contexts differ with regards to the absolute scale, such that the thresholds are
proportional to the variance of the value distributions. However, this difference
should disappear when the value distributions are normalized to pn
0, 1 . Figure 3.1 A1–A2 depicts the corresponding hypothesis when thresholds
would be measured on an absolute-scale value distribution (A1), or on a normalized
scale (i.e., standard-normal scale; A2). The normalization hypothesis implies, that
there is no difference in both search length and performance between low and high
variance search environments, and that a corresponding threshold adaptation should
be captured on the absolute scale, but not on a normalized scale.





















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
position
B
FIGURE 3.1: Thresholds predicted for low (blue line) and high (red line) variance en-
vironment. A1-A2: Normalization hypothesis: Thresholds differ on an ab-
solute scale (A1) but are identical on a normalized scale (A2, when =0
and =1). B: Variance-risk hypothesis: High variance environment implies
higher risk, therefore people accept earlier compared to low variance en-
vironment. Consequently, normalized thresholds would be higher in high
variance environments than in low variance environments.
Alternatively, an optimal stopping task can be considered as a repeated risky
decision between a safe (to accept) and an uncertain option (to reject) (Cox et al.,
1989). Under this perspective, higher outcome variance in the gamble may lead
to higher risk aversion, as has been shown in the risky decision making literature
(Genest et al., 2016; Holt et al., 2002; E. Weber et al., 2004). As a consequence,
acceptance rates would be increased in high variance environments, resulting in
shorter search length and lower performance. Adaptive behavior to outcome variance
would thus be reflected in higher decision thresholds ( 0) and potentially also higher
adaptation rate ( ), when expressed on a normalized scale (see Fig. 3.1B).
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FIGURE 3.2: Hypotheses about the impact of time horizon on decision thresholds ( 0:
initial threshold, : adjustment of threshold across position. A: Time horizon
affects the initial threshold 0). B: Time horizon affects adjustment parameter.
C: Time horizon affects both 0 and
3.2.2 Effects of time horizon
In the second study, we investigated the question whether the time horizon (i.e., how
many choices could be made until the ultimate one), affects choice behavior and
which cognitive processes are involved. Previous studies observed that in longer
time horizons, humans search more (in absolute terms) (Seale et al., 2000) and
showed that decision thresholds are lower in longer sequences (Guan et al., 2015;
Lee et al., 2004). This adaptation to longer time horizons could be explained either
by a lower initial aspiration level prior to search or by a lower adjustment rate of the
threshold across the sequence. To investigate the details of this phenomenon in our
study, we used sequences with 5, 10 and 20 available choices (sequence positions).
Thereby, we wanted to find out if time horizon affects (a) the initial threshold (see
Fig. 3.2 A), (b) the change of threshold over time (Fig. 3.2 B), or (c) both (see Fig.
3.2 C).
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To translate our LTM hypotheses into the predictions of search length and per-
formance we conducted a series of model simulations illustrated in Fig. 3.3.1 First,
Fig. 3.3 A shows the predictions of performance (A1) and search length (A2) in the
three conditions of time horizon (x-axes; 5 vs. 10 vs. 20) depending on different
aspiration levels (colored circles; 0), without changing them over time (i.e., with
set to 0). First, Fig. 3.3 A1 shows that, within each condition, the maximum
performance predicted by the LTM is a curvy-linear function of the initial aspiration
level. Intuitively speaking, when searching for the minimum, too high aspiration
levels lead to accepting too many sub-optimal options and too low aspiration levels
lead to rejecting too many optimal options.
Second, the connected dots represent identical threshold values across conditions
(indicated by their color in Fig. 3.3). As can be seen, the threshold that yields optimal
performance with a time horizon of 5 (orange circles) predicts only sub-optimal
performance with a time horizon of 10 (the same holds for a comparison between
10 and 20). This means, according to the LTM, if participants seek to optimize
their behaviour, relative to a time horizon of 5, they actually have to decrease their
aspiration levels (less tolerant thresholds). Specifically, with the assumption that
there is no adaptation across sequence positions ( =0), the LTM predicts that the
optimal initial thresholds for the conditions of 5, 10 and 20 are -0.4, -0.8 and -1.2
(on a normalized scale), respectively. Correspondingly, for these optimal initial
thresholds, the LTM predicts that the relative search length (relative to the time
horizon; A2) decreases with increasing time horizon.
1 For each sequence length (N=5, 10 and 20), an equivalent amount of 60 trials were simulated, where
values were sampled from 180, 20 for a total of 100 participants, which were aggregated
on measures of performance and search length. We approximated the range of the parameters to the range
of values obtained in experiment 1 and used any possible combination of initial threshold ( 0) and rate of
increase ( ) to simulate choices
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FIGURE 3.3: LTM simulation study. A1-A2: Performance (average amount of
points/maximum amount of points) and search length (i/N; i = accepted
position, N = time horizon) for a range of 0 values (see legend) and 0.
Optimal thresholds differ between time horizons: N=5: 0=-0.4 (orange),
N=10: 0=-0.8 (red), N=20: 0=-0.8 (purple). B1-B2: =0.025, 0 values
according to legend, C1-C2: =0.1, 0 values according to legend. Points
connected with a line represent the same 0 values. In (A2), (B2), and (C3),
search length is calculated in relative terms (i.e., i/N; i = accepted position,
N = time horizon).
Up to now, our simulation assumes that the thresholds remain fixed across the
sequence. In the next step, we allow the initial threshold ( 0) to change across
positions by a constant adjustment rate . The simulation results indicate that also
contributes to optimal performance in the LTM, suggesting differences between the
time horizon conditions, as illustrated in Fig. 3.3 B and C. First, while 0 in
Fig. 3.3 A1, introducing a small adaptation rate ( 0.025 in Fig. 3.3 B1) leads the
previously “optimal” threshold (e.g. orange circle in A1 for time horizon = 5) to
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become sub-optimal. Further, whereas a small adaptation of ( 0.025) leads to
a higher performance when N=20 (B1), a large adaption (in C1) seems to impede
performance in this condition (when 0.1).
This model dynamic can be plausibly verbalized in a psychological way. That
is, if participants adapt to the task, they might approach the different time horizons
with different initial aspiration levels in the first place (longer time horizon = lower
aspiration level 0, see A1). In the second place, they would regulate their adjustment
of the aspiration level over time according to the time horizon with lower increases
in long time horizons, because too strongly adapting the threshold over long time
horizons leads to prematurely accepting sub-optimal offers. The combination of
these two hypotheses schematically corresponds to Fig. 3.2C, in contrast to the
alternative hypotheses, that either only the initial thresholds adapt (Fig. 3.2A) or
only their change over time (Fig. 3.2B).
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The first study investigated how outcome variance affects search behavior in the
optimal stopping task. In an online purchase task, we asked participants to repeatedly
perform a sequential choice task in which they choose the cheapest airplane ticket.
We manipulated the variance within participants by generating ticket prices from
two Gaussian distributions with high and low variance (but constant mean; i.e.
180, 10 or 180, 40 ).
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3.3.1 Methods
Participants
We recruited 205 participants (78 females; age range: 19-70) on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to participate in the experiment. Participants gave informed consent, and the
study design and methods were approved by the ethics committee of the University
of Zurich. Participant were excluded from analysis if they accepted the first option
in a sequence in more than 90% of the trials with 199 participants remaining for the
subsequent analysis. Participants received a fixed payment of $4 and a performance
dependant bonus ranging between $0 - $4 that was calculated contingent to the
choices in each trial (see following section for the exact calculation).
Procedure
The task was adapted from the study of Baumann et al. (2020)) and imitates an
airline ticket-shopping scenario where people search for the cheapest price. In each
trial, participants search through a sequence of ten prices. For each price, they decide
to accept it or to reject it at their own pace. Participants are aware of the total number
of prices in each trial and of the actual position in the sequence (see Fig. 3.4 E). It is
not possible to go back to an earlier option after it is initially declined. If they reach
the last price (10th) they are forced to choose it. When participants accept the price,
they receive feedback about how much they could have saved if they had chosen the
best price in the sequence. A bonus was paid proportional to the performance (see
Equation 3 below).
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Prior to each of the two conditions, participants learned about the respective distri-
bution to exclude learning effects in the stopping task. During learning, participants
saw 50 ticket prices drawn from the target distribution, presented sequentially in
randomly ordered trials (Fig. 3.4 A). After every tenth trial, participants had to
guess the overall average and the correct answer was revealed (Fig. 3.4 B). Finally,
participants estimated a histogram (by dragging the bars) of the true distribution (Fig.
3.4 C), before the correct distribution was superimposed over their estimate (see
Fig. 3.4 D) (method proposed in Goldstein et al., 2014). If their estimates deviated
more than 20% from the correct answers, they were instructed to repeat the learning
phase, with a maximum of three repetitions.
All participants completed 80 sequences in each of the high and low variance
conditions. Within each condition, we sampled the ticket prices either from
180, 10 or 180, 40 . The order of the two conditions
was randomized and each participant encountered a newly generated sample.
Before the task started, participants were informed that their payoff was deter-
mined by a lump sum of $4 plus a bonus between $0 and $4 contingent on their
performance. Each trial offered a maximum of 25 points to earn, which translated
into a bonus 0.025 cents per trial. The maximum number of 25 points was awarded
when the cheapest ticket was chosen and 0 points for the most expensive one. The
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FIGURE 3.4: A-F: Screen shots of online experiment. A-D: learning phase, E-F: testing
phase. A: Sequential presentation of ticket values sampled from predefined
distribution. B: After each 10 tickets, participants are asked to estimate
the average of the tickets just seen. C: At the end of the learning phase,
participants have to predict how a future sample from the same predefined
population might look, where they essentially had to draw a histogram
using this interface. D: Feedback was provided by superimposing the correct
distribution over their estimate. E: Testing phase: In every trial participants
encounter ten tickets sequentially and have to decide to accept it or to
continue. Each ticket indicates the ticket’s actual position in the sequence. F:
Feedback was provided about how much they could have saved if they had
chosen the cheapest ticket in the sequence.
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where pmaxj is the highest and p
min
j the lowest price in trial j. The final bonus was
calculated by dividing the total amount of points by 1000. The average bonus earned
was $ 3.38 (min:$ 2.83 max:$ 3.64).
Results
3.3.2 Behavioral results
3.3.2.1 Search length and performance
We first investigated if outcome variance affects search length and overall per-
formance. Search length is measured as the number of ‘reject’ decisions in a
sequence plus 1. Performance was defined as the average sum of accumulated
points in each trail. The visual inspection of the plotted data (Fig. 3.5 A and
B) indicates that there is no difference in both measures between conditions. A
Bayesian t test (R BayesFactor::ttestBF package, prior scale = medium; Morey
et al., 2018) confirms that there is moderate to strong evidence against a difference
between the high and low variance conditions in search length (MSL 10 5.03,
MSL 40 4.99, M
SL







Di f f 0.058, HDI95 0.14,0.025 ,
BF10 0.27). This result supports the normalization hypothesis which predicts that
changing variance has no effect on search length or performance.
Fig. 3.5 C shows participant’s probability (blue line: low variance, red line:
high variance) to accept on each position for both variance conditions. The accept
probabilities increase over position (participants become less selective) with only
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FIGURE 3.5: A: performance (maximum 25 points), B: Search length (maximum: 10
positions), blue: high variance environment, red: low variance environment.
C: Probability to accept a ticket on each position across all prices. Blue line:
mean and 95% CI in low variance condition, red line: mean and 95% CI in
high variance condition. Black dotted line: optimal threshold rule. Points
size according to number of data points (largest points: 16000 data points,
smallest points: 4000 data points.
small differences between the two variance conditions. This finding further supports
the normalization hypothesis, which expects no differences in accept probabilities
between conditions. Furthermore, participants’ accept probabilities largely deviate
from predictions of the optimal threshold (dashed black line) which will be further
analysed in the following modeling section.
3.3.3 Modeling results
Model comparison
We use a model comparison to determine which of the proposed models, the LTM,
the BOM and the ITM, provides the best approximation to participants’ choices. The
models were implemented in a hierarchical-Bayesian statistical framework using
JAGS (Plummer et al., 2003). The data is used to update prior distributions resulting
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in posterior distributions, which were used for inference. The hierarchical imple-
mentation allows to fit data on the individual trial-level, while simultaneously taking
into account information shared across participants via group-level distributions.
Results reported below are based on the group-level posterior distributions, unless
noted otherwise. A description of all models’ priors can be found in the Supporting
Material (Methods).
We first tested the performance of the LTM by comparing it to a hierarchical
implementation of the BOM. We compared these three models in terms of their
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) values. DIC is a model selection statistic
that takes into account models’ goodness of fit and penalizes them according to
their flexibility (see Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). DIC differences larger than 10 are
considered as strongly favouring the winning model (see Spiegelhalter et al., 2002,
p.613). As it turned out, the difference between the LTM the BOM was 704 in favour
of LTM. The comparison between the LTM and the more complex baseline model,
the ITM, yields a difference of 37 in favour of the LTM. Figure 3.6 A displays
the recovered thresholds for both the LTM and the ITM. We observe that the ITM
thresholds essentially form a straight line mirroring the thresholds estimated by
the LTM. These results suggest that the LTM provides a more parsimonious but
equally accurate account of the data compared to the ITM which infers thresholds
independently of each other.
In order to asses the accuracy of the LTM, we generated data sets simulated
from the posterior distribution of the LTM parameters. Fig. 3.6 B and C shows
the faithfulness of these replicates to the original data. In this figure, the accept
probabilities are conditional on ticket prices, split into the first six quantile ranges
Q1 - Q6 (out of a total of ten quantile ranges). Qi is defined as the range of ticket
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F I G U R E 3. 6: A: Esti m at e d t hr es h ol ds, l o w v ari a n c e c o n diti o n: L T M ( bl u e s oli d li n e)
v ers us I T M ( bl a c k d as h e d li n e), hi g h v ari a n c e c o n diti o n: L T M (r e d s oli d
li n e) v ers us I T M ( bl a c k d ott e d li n e) B a n d C: Pr o b a bilit y t o a c c e pt a cr oss
p ositi o ns, d at a v ers us L T M’s p ost eri or pr e di cti o ns. E m piri c al d at a a p p e ar i n
s oli d li n es, bl a c k arr o ws r e pr es e nt t h e t h e p ost eri or pr e di cti v e m e a ns a n d t h e
9 5 % H DI. T h e diff er e nt li n es r e pr es e nt pri c es r a n gi n g fr o m t h e Q 1 t o Q 6.
Q 1: Pri c es i n first q u a ntil e, Q 2: Pri c es b et w e e n t h e first a n d s e c o n d q u a ntil e
et c. B: l o w v ari a n c e c o n diti o n C: hi g h v ari a n c e c o n diti o n
pri c es fr o m t h e 0. it h t o t h e ( 0. i − 0. 1 )t h q u a ntil e of t h e ti c k et pri c e distri b uti o n. T h e
L T M a d e q u at el y pr e di cts a c c e pt pr o b a biliti es f or e a c h q u a ntil e at e v er y p ositi o n f or
t h e l o w a n d t h e hi g h v ari a n c e c o n diti o n.
3. 3. 3. 1 C o m p ari n g p ar a m et er esti m at es b et w e e n l o w a n d hi g h v ari a n c e c o n diti o n
Si n c e t h e b e h a vi or al e vi d e n c e s u p p ort e d t h e n or m ali z ati o n h y p ot h esis, t h e q u esti o n is
w h et h er t h e esti m at e d L T M t hr es h ol ds diff er b et w e e n t h e l o w a n d t h e hi g h v ari a n c e
c o n diti o n. We h y p ot h esi z e d, t h at t h e as pir ati o n l e v els (t hr es h ol d θ 0 ) diff er o n a n
a bs ol ut e, b ut n ot o n a n or m ali z e d o ut c o m e s c al e. T h e c orr es p o n di n g esti m at es, aft er
t h e m o d el w as a p pli e d t o t h e d at a, ar e pl ott e d i n Fi g. 3. 7 A ( m e a ns a n d i n di vi d u al
esti m at es). T h e vis u al i ns p e cti o n s u g g ests t h at t h e esti m at e d a bs ol ut e t hr es h ol ds
diff er s u bst a nti all y b et w e e n t h e t w o c o n diti o ns i n di c ati n g t h at p arti ci p a nts a dj ust
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their thresholds to variance. This finding was confirmed by comparing the group-
mean parameter estimates of the initial threshold ( 0) and its adjustment over time
( ) between the variance conditions which revealed a substantial difference between
the low and high variance condition (see Table 3.2, third column).
In order to test the correctness of the normalization or the variance-risk hypothesis,
we normalized prices to the same scale ( =0 and =1) before fitting the model.
This procedure ensures that the estimated thresholds are directly comparable on the
within the distribution. The scaled thresholds yield by the group-mean parameters
are plotted in Fig. 3.7 B, along with the individual-level parameters. This time,
thresholds in both conditions seem to match closely. The corresponding group-level
parameters are listed in Table 3.2.
The indifference of threshold estimates on the normalized scale implies that
participants accept prices in both conditions within the same percentile on each
position, thus providing strong support for the normalization hypothesis. Since the
normalization is based on a standard-normal distribution, the resulting thresholds
on each position can be interpreted akin to z-scores (e.g., z 1.1 lies above 86%
of the outcomes, and z 0 in the middle; see Table 3.2). That is, at this level the
model estimates a switch between accepting and rejecting an offer. However, how
strongly this translates to an accept/reject decision over neighboring outcomes is
co-determined by the choice sensitivity in the logistic response function, which is
estimated with about 3.6 and 3.9 in each condition, reflecting a rather deterministic
criterion on average.
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F I G U R E 3. 7: I n di vi d u al-l e v el t hr es h ol d p ar a m et ers f or b ot h v ari a n c e c o n diti o ns ( bl u e: l o w
v ari a n c e, r e d: hi g h v ari a n c e). T h e t w o d ar k er li n es s h o w t h e t hr es h ol ds b as e d
o n t h e gr o u p-l e v el p ar a m et ers. A: t hr es h ol ds esti m at e d usi n g a bs ol ut e pri c es
B: t hr es h ol d esti m at e d usi n g n or m ali z e d pri c es ( µ = 0 a n d σ = 1).
Gr o u p- m e a n p ar a m et er esti m at es
L T M p ar a m et er σ = 1 0 σ = 4 0 Diff er e n c e ( σ 1 0 - σ 4 0 )
θ 0 first t hr es h ol d 1 6 8. 3 [ 1 6 8. 8, 1 6 9. 2] 1 3 5. 2 [ 1 3 4. 0, 1 3 6. 8] 3 3. 4 [ 3 1. 7, 3 5. 0]
δ sl o p e 0. 7 [ 0. 6, 0. 8] 2. 4 [ 2. 2, 4. 2] - 1. 9 [- 3. 8, - 0. 3]
β c h oi c e s e nsiti vit y 0. 3 2 [ 0. 3, 0. 3 4] 0. 1 [ 0. 0 9, 0. 1 1] 0. 2 [ 0. 1 9, 0. 2 4]
θ 0 s c al e d - 1. 1 7 [- 1. 2 1,- 1. 1 4] - 1. 1 2 [- 1. 1 5,- 1. 0 8] - 0. 0 5 [- 0. 1 1, 0. 0 1]
δ s c al e d 0. 0 7 [ 0. 0 6, 0. 0 8] 0. 0 6 [ 0. 0 5 5, 0. 0 7] 0. 0 1 [- 0. 0 1, 0. 2]
β s c al e d 3. 6 1 [ 3. 4 3, 3. 7 8] 3. 8 9 [ 3. 6 9, 4. 0 1] - 0. 2 1 [- 0. 2 6, 0. 0 2 6]
T A B L E 3. 2: P ost eri or gr o u p-l e v el m e a n p ar a m et ers of t h e L T M ( 9 5 % H DI i n s q u ar e
br a c k ets) f or l o w a n d hi g h v ari a n c e c o n diti o n. 3 t o p r o ws: a bs ol ut e p ar a m et er
v al u es, 3 b ott o m r o ws: n or m ali z e d ( µ = 0 a n d σ = 1) p ar a m et er v al u es)
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3.3.3.2 Best-fit parameters and behavioral patterns
The goal of the following analysis is to understand the association between the
cognitive parameters and the participants’ performance indices, such as search
length and accumulated points. A scatterplot (Fig. 3.8) demonstrates the relationship
between each parameter and search length (in percent: search length/total length)
and performance (in percent: points/maximum points). Visual inspection suggests
that the first threshold 0 is negatively correlated with search length, with higher
values leading to longer search. The parameters and do not appear to be related
with search length. To further analyse these patterns we conducted a Bayesian
linear regression analysis with search length as the dependent variable and , ,
and the condition (0: low variance, 1: high variance) as fixed and subjects as
random effects (R BayesFactor::lmBF package, prior scale = medium; Morey et al.,
2018). The analysis reveals that the best model includes all the covariates except
the condition factor (see Supporting Material, Table 3.6, for the ranking of the
models). As suspected from the scatterplot (Figure 3.8 A1-A3), 0 accounts for a
large proportion of the variation of search length (R2=0.8), leaving little room for
and (R2< 0.04, see Supporting Material, Table 3.7, correlation analysis for each
parameter). This result indicates that the initial threshold is mainly responsible for
how long participants search, whereas the adjustment across the sequence plays just
a minor role.
Visual inspection of the scatterplot between performance and 0 (Fig. 3.8 B1)
indicates a non linear relationship, indicating that too extreme thresholds (too high
or too low) impede performance, which we also highlighted in the simulation in
Figure 3.3 (when Time Horzion = 10). Interestingly, the parameter reveals a
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strong positive association with performance, where higher values in reflect
more deterministic application of the outcome thresholds (Fig. 3.8 B3)). A linear
regression analysis (R BayesFactor::lmBF package, prior scale = medium; Morey
et al., 2018) reveals that a model including 2, and as predictors for performance
provides the strongest evidence (see Supporting Material, Table 3.8, ranking of the
five best models), compared to all possible models including 2, , , and condition
as predictors. 20 as well as mainly account for the variance in performance, with
explaining 42% and 55% (respectively) of its variation (see Supporting Material
Table 3.9). This result suggests that the initial threshold, which reflects the aspiration
level prior to search, has a large impact on search length and performance. In
particular, defining the level too low or too high in the beginning leads to poorer
performance. Choice sensitivity has an additional impact on performance, where
higher determinism and thus higher sensibility around the threshold leads to better
performance.
3.3.3.3 Stability of LTM parameters
In this section we address the question of how consistent the individually fitted
parameters are across both task conditions. To this goal, we correlated the obtained
individual values between the two sessions (R BayesFactor::correlationBF package,
prior scale = medium; Morey et al., 2018). Table 3.3 shows the results. There is very
strong evidence that the cognitive parameters are moderately to strongly correlated
between the two conditions. 0, reflecting participants’ aspiration level before search,
reveals the strongest correlation ( =0.62), pointing to a stable mechanisms across the
two tasks. Note that the first threshold ( 0) and the adjustment rate across search ( )
are negatively correlated to some extend, showing a typical parameter dependency
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FIGURE 3.8: A1-A3: Scatterplots of search length (in %, search length/total se-
quence length) vs parameters ( 0, and ) B1-B3: Performance (in %,
points/maximum points) vs parameters. Black: low variance, green: high
variance
as in all regression-like (intercept plus slope) models. That is, if the initial threshold
is very high in the first place, then the ceiling is almost reached and there is no point
in further increases, and starting with a very low threshold, naturally, allows for the
strongest increase. Importantly, all other correlations meander around 0, suggesting
an independent contribution to predictions.
3.3.4 Discussion Study 1
In line with previous literature (Lee et al., 2004; von Helversen et al., 2012; Zwick
et al., 2003), we found with the LTM that the first threshold (initial aspiration
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10 40 10 40 10
10 1
40 0.62[0.59,0.65] 1
10 -0.35[-0.47,-0.23] -0.26[-0.38,-0.13] 1
40 -0.06[-0.12,0.07] -0.34[-0.45,-0.21] 0.53[0.41,0.61] 1
10 0.08[-0.05,0.21] 0.01[-0.13,0.15] 0.08 [-0.05,0.21] -0.13[-0.26,0.00] 1
40 0.23[0.11,0.36] 0.19[0.06,0.32] 0.03[-0.10,0.17] 0.19[0.05,0.32] 0.56 [0.45,0.64]
TABLE 3.3: Study 1: Correlations between parameters with 95% HDI (square brackets,
bold numbers: BF > 150)
level) accounts for a large portion of variation in search length (about 80%) while
performance shows a curvilinear association with the first threshold parameter,
indicating that setting the threshold to low or to high in the beginning of the search
results in lower performance. Our analyses add on these findings by showing that
the adjustment of the acceptance level during search has minor impact on search
length and a negligible influence on performance. However, the parameter, that
represents the choice sensitivity between the aspiration level and the actual price,
accounts up to 55% of the performance’ variation. Therefore, the choice sensitivity
is highly related to performance, with high values (and thus more determinism)
leading to a higher performance.
The model parameters consistently correlated between the low and the high
variance conditions, with ranging between 0.53 and 0.62. While the magnitude
of the correlations are lower than usually reported retest reliability measures (e.g.
3.4 S T U DY 2 : T I M E H O R I Z O N 97
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), Lejuez et al., 2002, =0.70), one needs to
keep in mind that participants encountered two different versions of the optimal
stopping task. Thus, overall the results suggests that the processes captured in the
linear threshold model reflect reliable individual differences.
3.4 S T U DY 2 : T I M E H O R I Z O N
In the second study, we focused on the influence of the time horizon on adaptive
choice behavior in optimal stopping tasks, by manipulating the sequence lengths.
That is, sequences contained either 5, 10 or 20 options. Otherwise, the task was
equivalent to that in Study 1, where participants were conducting an online ticket-
shopping task with the goal to find the cheapest price.
3.4.1 Methods
3.4.1.1 Participants
We recruited 70 participants (20 females; age range: 25 - 60) on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to participate in the three-conditions within-subjects experiment. We selected a
sample size equivalent to an equal study of Baumann et al. (2020). Participants gave
informed consent, and the University of Zurich Committee on the Use of Human
Subjects approved the experiments. Participants were excluded from analysis if
they accepted the first option in a trial in more than 95% of the trials leaving 68
participants in the subsequent analysis. They received a fixed payment of $2 and
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a performance dependant bonus ranging between $0 – $4 (calculation in the next
section).
3.4.1.2 Procedure
The second experiment employs the same task as in Study 1. The sequence length
was varied, offering either 5, 10 or 20 values. All prices were generated from the
same distribution throughout the experiment ( 180, 20 ). All partici-
pants worked on a total of 180 trials, split into two parts of 90 trials. Both parts
consisted of 3 blocks with 30 trials, where trials within the block where either of
length N = 5, 10 or 20. The order of the blocks was randomized.
Participants were paid according to their performance. In each of the 180 trials
there was a maximum of 33 points to earn, which corresponds to 0.02 cents per trial.
The participants received the maximum number of 33 points if they chose the lowest
(and therefore 0.02 cents) and 0 points for the highest price in the sequence (and





where pmax represents the highest price and pmin the highest price in sequence i. Par-
ticipants received a base payment of $4 and earned between $0 and $4 additionally
depending on their performance.
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Results
3.4.2 Behavioral results
3.4.2.1 Search length and Performance
To examine the effect of time horizon on the participants’ performance indices, we
compared search length and performance (calculated as in Study 1) between the three
search length conditions (N=5, 10 and 20). Participant’s relative search length (search
length/total sequence length) is shown in (Fig. 3.9 A, black) for each condition. We
observe that participants search length decreases in relative terms with increasing
time horizon: When N= 5, participants search on average 58% (95% CI (between
0 and 1)=[0.57, 0.62], absolute search length: M: 2.9, SD: 0.49). When N=10,
average search length is reduced to 48.6% (95% CI=[0.46,0.51], M: 4.8, SD: 0.9)
and when N=20, average search length goes down to 38.4% (95% CI=[0.35,0.41],
M: 7.6, SD: 2.28). These results indicate a trend to search less with increasing search
length relative to the maximum time horizon. A test of mean group differences
supports this conclusion, showing strong evidence for differences in relative search
length between conditions for N=5 vs N=10: SLDi f f 0.12, HDI95 0.11,0.14 ,
BF10 300 and for N=10 vs N=20:
SL
Di f f 0.1, HDI95 0.08,0.12 , BF10
300 (R BayesFactor::ttestBF package, prior scale = medium; Morey et al., 2018).
Participants performance (accumulated points per trial/ total amount, see Figure 3.9
B) increased significantly with extended time horizon, from an average performance
of 82.8% (95% CI [0.82,0.83]) when N=5, to 85.7% (95% CI =[0.84,0.87]) when
N=10 and 86.1% (95% CI =[0.85,0.87])) when N=20. This finding was supported
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by a t test producing Bayes Factors > 300 in favor of a difference in performance
between time horizons.
Furthermore, we conducted a correlation analyses (R correlationBF package,
prior scale = medium; Morey et al., 2018) to test if participants are stable in search
length and performance across time horizons. The resulting Bayes factor > 300
indicates that there is extreme evidence for a correlation of search length across
time horizons (between N=5 and N=10: 0.79 0.63,0.85 and between N=10
and N=20: 0.81 0.75,0.88 ). Furthermore, we found strong evidence that per-
formance is correlated between time horizons (BF> 300, between N=5 and N=10:
0.63 0.59,0.79 and between N=10 and N=20: 0.82 0.76,0.90 ). These
results suggest that participants have stable search tendencies across time horizons.
Given that participants choices are best captured by a model that assumes linear
thresholds (we anticipate here the cognitive modeling results) we want to understand
to which extent participants behave optimal under the constraints of linearity. There-
fore, we calculated the best performing linear thresholds for each time horizon using
grid search to find the parameter values ( 0 and ) that result in the highest reward.
2 Figure 3.9 (pink color) displays the relative search length by a decision maker who
uses the best performing linear thresholds and reveals that relative search length
decreases as well with increasing time horizons (N=5: 58% (95% CI=[0.57,0.59],
M: 2.9, SD: 0.2) N=10: 53 % (95% CI=[0.52,0.52], M: 5.3, SD: 0.36), N=20: 48%
(95% CI=[0.47,0.49], M: 9.6, SD: 0.6)). Compared to participants relative search
length, a Bayesian t test indicates no evidence for a difference in search length when
N=5 ( SLDi f f 0.001, HDI95 0.02,0.02 , BF10 0.17) but strong evidence
2 We used the same procedure as simulation study that describes the relationship between parameters
and behavioral measures (Fig. 3.3, however we used a finer-grained grid to arrive at the best possible
parameter value.
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for a difference when N=10 ( SLDi f f 0.08, HDI95 0.06,0.1 , BF10 300) and
N=20 ( SLDi f f 0.11, HDI95 0.09,0.14 , BF10 0.17). These results show that in
longer sequences, participants search length is notably reduced compared to a policy
that assumes best performing linear thresholds, by 8% when N=10 and by 11%
when N=20. Performance of a best performing linear threshold model is increasing
with extended time horizons (N=5: 87.2% (95% CI [0.86,0.88]), N=10: 90.3% (95%
CI [0.89,0.91]), N=20: 92.7% (95% CI [0.92,0.93]). Participants thus achieve up
to 92% of the performance when N=5, 91% when N=10 and 89% when N=20,
which indicates of reduction of optimal adaptation in longer sequences. However,
some subjects arrive at levels of performance competitive with the best performing
linear threshold rule whereas others achieve only 47%. These findings suggest that
there are individual differences on how people adapt to time horizon, while some
participants may behave optimal relative to the best performing linear thresholds,
others show sub–optimal adaptation to extended time horizons. The causes of indi-
vidual differences in adaptive behavior may be found in the maladaption of cognitive
parameters such as the initial aspiration level or its aspiration rate to time horizon,
which will further investigate in the next sections.
Furthermore, Figure 3.9 displays that using the best performing linear thresholds
(pink) reduces performance only slightly relative to the optimal model (yellow), by
1.1% when N=5, by 3% when N=10 and by 6.5% when N=20. This result reveals
that an ideal adaptations of the linear thresholds to time horizon would lead to almost
optimal performance and emphasizes the efficiency of the linear threshold strategy
to solve the optimal stopping task.





































FIGURE 3.9: Violin plots of (A) Search length (in %: search length/total sequence length)
and performance (in %: points/maximum points) for each time horizon (N=5,
10 and 20). Black color: Participant’s data, pink color: Predictions from a
model that uses best performing linear thresholds, yellow color: Predictions
from a model that uses the optimal thresholds.
3.4.3 Modeling results
3.4.3.1 Model comparison
Using the same method as in Study 1, we applied the LTM, ITM and BOM to the
participants’ data to test their predictions against each other. The difference in the
DIC between the LTM the BOM was 1356 in favour of LTM, indicating that the
LTM is a better model to predict participants’ choices in different time horizons. The
comparison with the ITM revealed a lower DIC in favor of the LTM (a difference of
60). Figure 3.10 A shows the recovered thresholds for the LTM, the ITM and the
BOM. Apparently, the LTM and the ITM thresholds are almost congruent when N=5
and 10. However, when N=20, the overlap of the thresholds is reduced, mainly due
to a spike in the probability to accept higher ticket prices on position 19, which can
not be captured by a linear threshold. While this spike seems in line with the BOM
it is much less pronounced than predicted, thus indicating that the BOM, which






























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Position
B
FIGURE 3.10: A: Estimated threshold parameters from the LTM (dark solid lines), the
ITM (dotted blue lines) and the BOM (orange dashed lines). B: Individual-
level threshold parameters for N = 5 (blue), 10 (red) and 20 (black). The
three darker lines show the thresholds based on the group-level parameters.
Group-mean parameter estimates
LTM parameter N=5 N= 10 N= 20 N5 N10 N10 N20
0 161.1 [159.4,162.7] 156.2 [154.2,158.2] 151 [148.6,153.3] 4.9 [3.5,6.2] 5.2 [2.1,8.3]
4.4 [3.8,4.9] 1.48 [1.24,1.71] 0.58 [0.46,0.71] 2.9 [2.4, 3.3] 0.9 [0.6,1.1]
choice sensitivity 0.21 [0.18,0.23] 0.19 [0.16,0.21] 0.17 [0.15,0.19] 0.01 [-0.02, 0.04] 0.019 [-0.01,0.05]
TABLE 3.4: Posterior group-level mean parameters for each sequence length. 4th and
5th column: Difference between the posterior distribution (N5 - N10: 4th
column, N10 - N20: 5th column). Note: Values in square brackets are the 95%
credibility intervals (CI).
assumes biased optimal threshold parameters, is not capable to capture participants’
choices. Thus, the general pattern is in line with the LTM assumptions, leaving only
the question open, whether the final position, with fixed time horizons, reflects a
special case revealing itself with longer time horizons, which we seek to address in
future studies.
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3.4.3.2 Best-fit parameters
When assuming that the three LTM parameters have psychometric properties, the
comparison of the best-fit parameters between the time horizon conditions can shed
light on the processes involved in adaptive behavior. The estimated by-position
thresholds for each time horizon condition are plotted in Figure 3.10 B, along with
the thresholds obtained with the individual-level parameters. Table 3.4 summarizes
the group mean parameter values of 0, and in each time horizon condition, and
shows that both 0 and are reliably reduced with increasing time horizon. Column
4 and 5 report the mean of the difference of the population parameter’s posterior
distributions and indicates strong evidence for adaptation of the first aspiration level
( 0) and its adjustment across time ( ) across time horizon (difference is credibly
different from zero). However, there is no evidence that choice sensitivity ( ) is
modified between conditions (0 lies within the 95% confidence interval). This result
supports the hypothesis that both 0 and capture the participants’ adaptation to
the total number of options in the sequence. Furthermore, it confirms the LTM’s
predictions (simulation study, Fig. 3.3) indicating that in order to maintain optimality,
both the first thresholds and its adjustment over position should be reduced in longer
time horizons.
To understand if there is a systematic way how people adapt their thresholds
to time horizon, we looked at the quantitative properties of the threshold adaption
across time horizons. We find that doubling the sequence size from N=5 to N=10
leads to a reduction of the initial threshold by a mean value of 4.9 [3.5,6.2]. Likewise,
when doubling the sequence size again from N=10 to N=20, the initial threshold
is decreased by a mean value of 5.2 [2.1,8.3] (see column 4 in Table 3.4). The
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comparison of the initial threshold’ adaption between time horizon conditions
( N5 N100 -
N10 N20
0 : M= -0.02, CI=[-0.21 0.18]) indicates no difference (0 lies
within the 95% HDI). Furthermore, we investigated how participants adapt between
time horizons. The rate is reduced with increasing sequence length, leading to a
very little adjustment of the initial threshold when N=20. Our explorative analysis
suggests that is updated according to the time horizon such that doubling the
sequence size reduces the adjustment to one third of the original (and vice versa:
increased by 3 when sequence length is halved). Although it appears that participant’s
initial thresholds and adjustment rates are adapted systematically to time horizons,
further research is needed to investigate which cognitive functions could account for
this non–linear adaptation.
To understand participants’ decrease of search length and performance in extended
time horizon relative to the best performing linear threshold model, we compared the
participants’ thresholds with the best performing linear thresholds (see Supporting
Material, Fig. 3.14). The best performing linear threshold rule predicts an adaptation
of the initial thresholds proportional to time (doubling the sequence leads to a
decrease of the initial threshold by a constant amount) and the adjustment across
position (doubling the sequences leads to halving the adjustment rate). Therefore,
although participants seem to follow the same regularities in adapting the initial
threshold and its adjustment rate to time, they adapt too little to extending time
horizons. Accordingly, whereas participants’ decision thresholds are quite similar to
the best performing linear thresholds when N=5, they deviate more strongly when
N=10, and even more when N=20.
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FIGURE 3.11: Study 2: A1-A3: Scatterplots of search length (in %, search length/total
sequence length) vs parameters ( 0, and ). B1-B3: Performance (in %,
points/maximum points) vs parameters. Black: N=5, light green: N=10,
dark green: N=20.
3.4.3.3 Capturing behavioral patterns
To find out which of the estimated LTM parameters predict search length or perfor-
mance, we performed a correlation analysis. The scatterplot in Fig. 3.11 shows the
results for each condition, as indicated by the symbol colors. Fig. 3.11 A1 suggests
a negative linear relationship between the first thresholds 0 and search length in all
time horizons, and also indicates the systematic differences on both search length
and threshold estimates between conditions. A Bayesian linear regression analysis
(R BayesFactor::lmBF package, prior scale = medium; Morey et al., 2018) supports
the evidence of these assumptions: for each time horizon condition, that is N=5, 10
and 20, 0 is an important predictor of search length and accounts for 76%, 81% and
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FIGURE 3.12: Scatterplots of the relationship between and the probability to accept
on each position (N=5, see Supporting Material Fig. 3.15 for N=10 and
Fig. 3.16 for N=20). Cor: Correlation coefficients [HDI: 95% High Density
Interval]
66% (respectively) of search length’ variation (see Supporting Material Tab. 3.10
and 3.11 when N=5, Tab. 3.14 and 3.15 when N=10, and Tab. 3.18 and 3.19 when
N=20). These correlation results are in line with those from Study 1 and suggest
that the initial aspiration level is the main predictor for participant’s search length in
different time horizons. Furthermore, Fig. 3.11 A2 displays a non-linear interaction
effect between the manipulation of time horizon and , whereas the time horizon
groups (N=5, 10 or 20) can be either differentiated based on the values or search
length (for search length rather indicated as a variance reduction).
The scatterplot displaying the relationship between performance and parameters
(Fig. 3.11 B1) suggests an inverse U-shaped relationship between 0 and perfor-
mance, consistent with the prediction from the simulation study of the LTM (Fig.
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3.3). Furthermore, exhibits a linear relationship with performance (Fig. 3.11 B2).
A regression analysis reveals that in short sequences (N=5), the best model predicting
performance includes only the parameter (explaining up to 28% of its variation,
see Supporting Material Table 7 and 8), whereas in longer sequences (N=10 and 20),
the best model is comprised of both and 20, accounting for about 45% and 44%
(respectively) of the variance in performance (see Supporting Material, Tab. 3.17 and
3.18 when N=10 and Tab. 3.20 and 3.21 when N=20). This result indicates that with
increasing time horizon, the initial threshold becomes predictive of performance,
whereas setting it too high or too low leads to poorer performance. Additionally,
(choice sensitivity) is a further strong predictor of the variation in performance,
where higher values in result in higher payoff. For additional comparisons between
high versus low performing individuals see Supporting Material, Figure A1 Fig.
3.13
While the overall impact of in the above analyses rather concern differences
in time horizon, it further reveals individual choice dynamics in relation to the
probability to accept ticket prices over sequence positions. Figure 3.12 shows
corresponding scatterplots for the time horizon of N=5 (one for each sequence
position; plots for N=10 and N=20 show similar trends, see Fig. 3.15 (N=10) &
Fig. 3.16 (N=20)). As can be seen, on position 1, is negatively correlated with the
acceptance probability, which becomes increasingly positive with ongoing positions.
This result illustrates individual differences in adaptive behavior over positions by
the functional characteristics of the LTM. That is, weaker adaptation rates imply
higher initial thresholds and, thus, higher acceptance probabilities in the beginning
(i.e., an already high threshold leads to early accept choices by definition, without
requirement of strong adaptation). Consequently, the change in this relation with
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ongoing positions indicates individual differences between participants who accept
early, and those who accept late. The latter participants, as can be seen, seem to
drive the reversal of the correlation, as they become more and more likely to accept
ticket prices (regardless of their values). Thus, the adaptation rate could be an
interesting measure to further investigate individual differences in the cognitive
functions underlying behavioral adaptation in future studies.
3.4.3.4 Stability of LTM parameters
A further goal of this study is to asses the reliability of the search processes, cap-
tured in the LTM parameters, across tasks. A correlation analysis (R BayesFac-
tor::correlationBF package, prior scale = medium; Morey et al., 2018) of the param-
eters between time horizon conditions (see Table 3.5) reveals positive correlations
between the same parameters. 0, reflecting participants’ aspiration level before
search, reveals the strongest correlation ( between 0.61-0.8), pointing to a stable
mechanisms across conditions. The correlation coefficient of is smaller (between
0.27-0.51) across conditions, which could be an indication that this parameter is
estimated with higher uncertainty. Note that – as found in Study 1 – the first thresh-
old ( 0) and the adjustment rate across search ( ) are negatively correlated to some
extend, showing a typical parameter dependency as in all regression-like (intercept
plus slope) models.











0 0.80 [0.69,0.87] 1
20
0 0.61[0.45,0.74] 0.73[0.61,0.83] 1
5 -0.25[-0.4,-0.2] -0.12[-0.3,-0.1] -0.16[-0.4,0.06] 1
10 -0.2[-0.4,0.02] -0.14[-0.34,0.07] -0.19[-0.4,0.02] 0.51[0.32,0.67] 1
20 -0.2[-0.41,0.01] -0.11[-0.32,0.11] -0.15[-0.36,0.07] 0.31[0.1,0.5] 0.27[0.04,0.47] 1
5 0.00[-0.2,0.2] -0.15[0.36,0.07] -0.08[-0.3,0.14] -0.02[-0.4,-0.02] -0.12[-0.3,0.09] 0.00[-0.23,0.22] 1
10 0.00[-0.2,0.2] -0.05[-0.27,0.17] -0.05[-0.28,0.17] -0.13[-0.35,-0.1] 0.00[-0.22,0.2] -0.05[-0.27,0.18] 0.62[0.45,0.74] 1
20 0.00[-0.2,0.2] -0.05[-0.2,0.1] 0.07[-0.15,0.3] -0.06[-0.28,0.16] -0.1[-0.3,0.12] -0.05[-0.28,0.16] 0.66[0.51,0.77] 0.74[0.61,0.83]
TABLE 3.5: Correlations between LTM parameters when N=5, 10 and 20, with 95% HDI
(bold numbers: BF > 150)
3.4.4 Discussion Study 2
The main purpose of the second study was to investigate the systematic influence
of time horizon on adaptive choice behavior in optimal stopping tasks (searching
the cheapest ticket) and their cognitive description using the LTM (Baumann et
al., 2020). We found, participants stopped their search earlier in longer sequences
(relative to the total sequence length) and improved their performance, suggesting
that they were sensitive to the time horizon. Moreover, compared to shorter time
horizons, accept probabilities were lower in the beginning of search and increased
less strongly across positions. When modeling the participants’ choices with the
LTM using a Bayesian hierarchical approach, we showed that the effect of time
horizon was captured by changes in initial decision thresholds (aspiration level),
and the adaptation rate of the thresholds with ongoing sequence positions (i.e.,
with growing number of rejections). More specifically, with longer time horizons,
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the initial aspiration level increased reflecting more frequent initial rejections in
longer time horizons. Similarly, the adaptation rate of the threshold across sequence
positions was weaker for longer time horizons reflecting a slower change in the
probability of accepting ticket prices.
However, a comparison with a best performing linear threshold model (using grid
search to find best performing linear thresholds) reveals that not all participants
adapted their threshold perfectly and thus reach sub–optimal performances, yielding
corresponding average trends in all three time horizon conditions. Especially in
longer sequences, as for N=10 and 20, participants tended to set their initial aspi-
ration level too high and thus to terminate their search too early. Importantly, we
found that this pattern is more pronounced with a growing sequence length (N=20).
We further examined the relation between individual differences in the partici-
pants’ parameter estimates to search length and performance. In all three conditions,
we found that individual differences in search length were almost exclusively related
to the initial threshold (aspiration level prior to search). This was also functionally
related to the adaptation rate, such that strong adaptation of initially low thresholds
predicted an increase of the probability to accept tickets at later positions. Fur-
thermore, the first threshold is also predictive of performance, showing an inverse
U-shaped relationship, with extreme (too high or too low) values leading to lower
payoff (when N=10 and 20). These findings correspond to the results of Study 1 and
also to results from previous literature (Lee et al., 2004; von Helversen et al., 2012;
Zwick et al., 2003). Importantly, it suggests that the primary factor affecting search
length and performance is largely determined by the initial threshold reflecting
participants’ aspiration level prior to search.
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In addition, a strong predictor of performance was the LTM parameter of choice
sensitivity, representing the participants’ responsiveness to the distance between the
aspiration level and the actual price. A higher choice sensitivity reflects more deter-
ministic use of the decision threshold, while lower sensitivity reflects probabilistic
responding. Interestingly, the analysis of search behavior in related domains has
revealed that sensitivity parameters in the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) or the Iowa
gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994) are related to real world risky behavior (Guan
et al., 2020; Pleskac, 2008; Stout et al., 2004; Wallsten et al., 2005). Consequently,
one might predict that sensitivity in an optimal stopping task might as well be able
to identify real-world risk takers which merits further investigation in future studies.
We find moderate to strong consistency between the same parameters across
time horizon conditions which provides evidence for stable individual cognitive
processes beyond the different time scales. However, the correlation of the initial
thresholds between tasks is stronger than the threshold’s adjustments over time.
The individual choice sensitivity, also referred to as “decision noise” is strongly
associated between conditions, showing that participants are consistently sensitive
to the distance’ evaluation between the actual price and their threshold across time
horizon conditions.
3.5 G E N E R A L D I S C U S S I O N
The goal of our study was to learn about the aspects of adaptive behavior to outcome
variance (Study 1) and time horizon (Study 2) in optimal stopping tasks. Our
investigations were based on the idea, that decision makers can be described by three
3.5 G E N E R A L D I S C U S S I O N 113
parameters, the initial aspiration level, its adaptation over time, and choice sensitivity
(response determinism). To measure these parameters, we used the linear threshold
model (LTM, (Baumann et al., 2020)) which assumes that decision thresholds are
linearly adjusted over time.
In Study 1, we found that people show an almost perfect adaptation of their
decision thresholds to the sampling distribution. This finding is in line with the
normalization hypothesis which assumes that the value of an option is equal to its
rank within the given sample. In Study 2, we found that people adapt their choices
to the time horizon by decreasing both the first aspiration level and its adaptation
rate across positions with longer time horizons.
In the following we discuss the implications from perspectives of mental repre-
sentations (normalization of values) and other theoretical approaches to adaptive
behavior in sequential search.
3.5.1 Adaptivity
The first study shows that outcome variance has an effect on peoples decision
thresholds, with increased thresholds in lower variance environments. However, the
decision thresholds are practically identical on a normalized scale ( 0, 1),
showing that people accept prices within the same percentile on each position,
regardless of the variance. This result suggests that the price’ value is assessed
on the its percentile rank within the sample rather than on its absolute number.
Our finding is thus in line with the normalization hypothesis, which assumes that
the value of an option is computed under a normalized code and corresponds to
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its relative position in the distribution of options (Rangel et al., 2012). It is also
consistent with the idea that the value of a single option is calculated by comparing
it to a sample of attribute values drawn from memory and is its rank within the
sample (Stewart et al., 2006).
Consequently, the finding that the individual acceptance level is formulated on
a percentile level (e.g. accept all prices on the first position that belong to the 12%
lowest prices within the sampling distribution) and is consistently adapted to the
sampling distribution has implications for optimal choice behavior in different search
conditions. In particular, people are expected to use the same percentile threshold
in other distributional environments, for example when values are sampled from
a left– or right–skewed distribution. Indeed, some studies (Baumann et al., 2020;
Guan et al., 2018) have found evidence that that people used higher thresholds in an
environment with many good alternatives compared to an environment with only few
good options, which corresponds to the qualitative prediction of the normalization
hypothesis. Additionally, in accordance with our findings, Lee et al. (Guan et al.,
2018) have shown that thresholds which people use when searching for the maximum
(when values beta 4,2 ) can be modeled in the same way as the thresholds that
people use when searching for the minimum (values beta 2,4 ). Therefore, future
work should attempt to replicate our analysis in setting where options are sampled
from different distributions and thus investigate if the normalization hypothesis
represents a stable cognitive mechanism of the valuation process in sequential search
tasks.
A further questions arising under the normalisation hypothesis relates to the
valuation of options when the sampling distribution is not (or partly) known. Indeed,
there is evidence that search behavior in non–stationary environments are highly
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dependent on the history of samples during search (e.g. Brickman, 1972; Corbin
et al., 1975). These studies differ from our tasks regarding the knowledge about
the sampling distribution: Whereas in our study, the sampling distributing was
intensively learned before search, in these studies it was experienced during search.
In this case, the valuation of options happens relative to the options seen so far and
thus can lead to systematic biases in the threshold calculation. For example, if options
at the beginning of the sequence belong to the lower end of the distribution and
thus are not representative of the full sampling distribution, calculating a threshold
based on percentiles (“I am willing to accept the 10% best options”) would lead
to decision thresholds that are too low relative to the optimal thresholds. In order
to understand the impact of small samples on the valuation of options in optimal
stopping tasks, one would need to extend cognitive models of optimal stopping
search by incorporating a learning component, what we believe would be a useful
direction for future research.
The second study shows that time horizon affects the decision thresholds, whereby
extended time results in lower first thresholds and lower adjustment rates across
positions. In other words, participants are less selective at the beginning of the
the sequence in shorter time horizons and also adapt their acceptance rate more
strongly across positions. This strategy is intuitively correct because as the as the
task gets shorter, there are less chances along the way for a good option to appear.
The qualitative adaption of participants’ initial thresholds and its adjustment over
time is identical to the predictions of the LTM simulation about optimal parameter
adaption across time. However, with increasing time horizons, participants fail to
adapt the parameters optimally, leading to reduced search length and performance.
116 A DA P T I V E B E H AV I O R I N O P T I M A L S E Q U E N T I A L S E A R C H
Our investigation further suggests that participant’s initial thresholds and ad-
justment rates are adapted systematically to time horizons in a non–linear way,
indicating that they might follow scaling regularities across time scales. Similarly,
a study using a simplified explore–exploit task (Sang et al., 2020) has shown that
participants’ linear decreasing thresholds are declined in proportion to the length of
the game. Indeed, the best performing linear thresholds predicts a proportional adap-
tation of the initial threshold and its adjustment rate and in this sense, participants’
adaptation is optimal. Nevertheless, participants adapt too little in extended time
horizons, leading to stronger deviation from optimality. Further cognitive mecha-
nisms, which were not considered in our analysis, such as risk preference or search
costs, could be reasons for the sub–optimal adaption to extended time scales, which
we elaborate in the following section.
Some studies have suggested that people use biased decision thresholds and thus
search too little due to humans risk averse preference (Bhatia et al., 2021; Schotter
et al., 1981; Schunk, 2009). Unlike the risk neutral best performing linear threshold
model, human decision makers are often found to be risk averse (Pedroni et al., 2017,
e.g.), thus preferring the safe over the risky option. Based on this assumption, sub-
optimal adaptation of higher initial thresholds to longer time horizons may reflect
risk aversion that may become more visible with increased time horizons. However,
findings regarding the impact of risk aversion on optimal stopping behavior are
ambivalent. One study reports that there is no relationship between search length
in an optimal stopping task and risk preferences elicited in a series of lottery tasks
(Schunk, 2009). On the other side, a recent study about optimal sequential search
with recall found evidence that in this paradigm, risk aversion is one of the main
factors guiding people’s behavior (Bhatia et al., 2021). Moreover, Sonsino et al.
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(Sonsino et al., 2002) suggested that the probability of choosing a given option
decreases with the relative complexity of that alternative. In that sense, participants
might perceive a higher time horizon as more risky or more complex and thus
devalue the option of search more heavily, leading to behavior that deviates from
optimality.
Alternatively, Seale and Rapoport (Seale et al., 2000) hypothesized that stopping
too early in the optimal stopping task could result from the existence of endogenous
search costs, i.e. psychological costs arising from considering and evaluating options.
Although our experiment used a somewhat different design, participants may have
been motivated to end the experiment as quickly as possible and thus considered
the time spent in observing and reviewing the prices as a kind of search cost. This
idea is further supported by the literature on the accuracy-effort trade off reported by
Payne et al. (1993) and could also explain why search was more strongly reduced
with longer time horizons. In our experiment, search costs may be integrated into
the evaluation of the decision thresholds, while more alternatives sequences lead
to higher search costs (more steps to go through all the alternatives) and thus to a
higher impact on decision thresholds.
An simple explanation for the week adjustment of the threshold across position
(relative to the adjustment of the best performing linear thresholds) in extended time
horizons might be that they result from their originally higher initial thresholds.
However, the origins of such a maladaption of the thresholds within a sequence
might be that participants misrepresent the underlying outcome distribution. In a
sequential search paradigm such as the optimal stopping task, the outcome distribu-
tion changes dynamically and thus has to be recalculated on each time step. Since
people seem to lack the ability to infer many characteristics of aggregated outcome
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distributions correctly (Benartzi et al., 1999; Klos et al., 2005), simpler strategies
are used solve the task (see also Speekenbrink et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2014, for
similar discussion for bandit tasks). Indeed, results from the BART (a non–stationary
environment) showed that the best fitting model to two datasets assumes a stationary
representation (Bishara et al., 2009; Wallsten et al., 2005), showing that people sim-
plify the balloons’ exploding behavior. Preliminary results from simulation studies
of optimal stopping search indicate that subjects might believe that the environment
in an sequential search tasks corresponds to a hypergeometric distribution (sampling
options without replacement) which would lead to the observed choice patterns
across time scales. Future work is needed to incorporate such mental representa-
tions and updating mechanism into optimal stopping models to shed light on the
underlying mechanisms that drive the threshold adjustment across search.
3.5.2 Individual differences in choice behavior
Most research on optimal stopping search has focused on data which reflect only
the end product of the decision process, such as search length and accuracy. In
contrast, the present study provides valuable insights into the individual differences
in cognitive processing which led a subject to exhibit a particular choice.
Our result indicate that the initial aspiration level, set prior to search, is the
main factor predicting participants’ search length. Indicated by the negative linear
correlation coefficient across the tasks in both studies, higher initial aspiration levels
lead to less search and vice versa. Importantly, the rate of the threshold’s adjustment
during search has no additional impact on search length, indicting that participants’
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modification of their aspiration level during search has little impact on how long
their search. Furthermore, this result suggests that a too high aspiration level prior to
search may serve as an explanation for the general finding of undersearch (Hey, 1982;
Rapoport et al., 1970; Schotter et al., 1981) and thus deserves special consideration.
The relationship between the initial threshold and performance in non–monotonic,
indicating that too extreme values (too high or too low) in the initial threshold lead
to worse performance, and thus reveals that not only too little, but also too much
search can be sub–optimal. However, despite the finding that participants perform
surprisingly good throughout all the tasks, we find that a longer sequence length
(20 alternatives, Study 2) lead to more pronounced undersearch for a larger part
of participants (elongated longer tail in search length distribution) and thus lead
to worse performance. However, some participants that achieve almost optimal
performance across the tasks (Study 2) and thus adapt their decision thresholds
perfectly to the time horizons. Taken together, this result shows that participants’ not
only differ in their aspiration levels but also in how well they adapt them across time
horizons. What could be the reason for these individual differences ? A possible
explanation would be that the tendency to delay future outcome could play a role in
how people adapt to time horizon. However, Meyers et al. (Meyers et al., 2020) has
recently shown that delay discounting is inconsistently predictive of search behavior
in a secretary problem. Other studies have identified some individual characteristics
that could account for individual differences in adaptive behavior to time horizons,
such as working memory capacity (people with higher capacity tend to explore more)
(Hills et al., 2012), age (older people may adapt less) (Mata et al., 2013; Rydzewska
et al., 2018)) or people with depression may explore more (von Helversen et al.,
2011). An interesting problem for future research is whether the observed individual
120 A DA P T I V E B E H AV I O R I N O P T I M A L S E Q U E N T I A L S E A R C H
differences in adaptation are related to other measures such as delay discounting or
working memory.
Participants’ response sensitivity is highly predictive for their performance, with
higher values (and thus more determinism) leading to better performance. Indeed,
high performing participants’ choice curves are more consistent compared to low
performing participants thus showing less deviance from the intended choice (see
Fig. 3.13). However, we find no relationship between participants’ choice sensitivity
and their search length. This result could shed light on the complex relationship
between risk preferences and search behavior. On one side, studies relating risk
preferences elicited in lottery tasks with search length in optimal stopping tasks
have not found any correlation (Schunk, 2009). On the other side, results from
related sequential risk-taking tasks, such as the the Angling Risk Tasks or the
Balloon Analogue Risk Task report that sensitivity to the outcome evaluation as
being predictive for individual differences of real-world risk takers (Pleskac, 2008;
Wallsten et al., 2005). Exploring the relationship between choice sensitivity in search
tasks and risk preferences would be a useful direction for future research.
3.5.3 Stability of parameters
Finally, we measured consistencies in the LTM parameters, reflecting the initial
aspiration level (captured in the initial threshold), its adjustment rate and the choice
sensitivity, across contexts. We found that the same parameters are stable across
changing contexts such as different variances and time horizons and suggests that
these parameters thus reflect reliable processes that are involved when solving
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optimal stopping tasks. Nevertheless, the correlations are far from perfect. Besides
genuine instability, these may reflect variance in how people respond to the changes
in the task, i.e. the variance or the time horizon. Additionally, measurements of
the parameters become noisier with longer sequences leading to lower correlation
values when N=20. Research on exploration-exploitation trade-offs has frequently
emphasized that individual search might underlie a general mechanism that affects
search across different domains and tasks (Hills et al., 2008; Hills et al., 2015;
Mata et al., 2015; Pirolli, 2007). However, attempts to link behavior across different
exploration-exploitation tasks have been unsuccessful (e.g. von Helversen et al.,
2018). Stable cognitive process parameters in the sequential search tasks may thus
help to discover the common mechanism of search across different exploration-
exploitation tasks.
3.6 C O N C L U S I O N
We inquired into whether and how context task variables affect optimal choice
behavior by identifying and quantifying the cognitive processes involved in their
adaption strategies. Results show that people adapt their decision thresholds to
variance and time horizon. The adaption to variance leads to identical thresholds on
a percentile scale, suggesting that the value of an option is determined by the rank
within the pool of alternatives. Further, people adapt sub–optimally to time horizons,
leading to pronounced undersearch in extended time horizons. This work contributes
to the understanding of the adaptive processes that underlie sequential decisions and
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thus will help quantify the conditions under which people may succeed or fail in
such tasks.
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Text
1. Calculation of optimal thresholds
We describe the calculation of optimal thresholds applied to our scenario, where
payoff is proportional to the chosen value and the goal is to find cheapest ticket price.
We first derive the optimal solution mathematically based on the paper of Gilbert
and Mosteller (Gilbert et al., 1966, Section 5b) and further provide a more intuitive
explanation.










and the goal is to find the lowest ticket price in this sequence.
The optimum strategy for this task is:
3.7 S U P P O RT I N G M AT E R I A L 123
If n 1, the decision maker is forced to accept the ticket. The threshold on the
last position (T1) is set to and ticket prices below this threshold are accepted:
T1 (3.6)
Therefore the expected price of the last ticket (P1) is the mean ( ) of the distribu-
tion.
If n 2, the decision maker decides to keep the first option or to reject it and
to go on to the second one. If he goes on, his expected ticket price is . Therefore
he keeps the current one, x, if x , rejects it if x and is indifferent if x .
Therefore, the expected price of the last ticket (P1) is also the threshold for the
second last option:
T2 P1 (3.7)
Than for n 2, his expected price (P2) is:
P2
P1
f x xdx P1
P1
f x dx (3.8)
The remaining terms of the sequence can be computed in a recursive manner. For
each n, the decision maker accepts the ticket if it is lower than the expected price
of the remaining n 1 tickets (x Pn 1) but rejects if the ticket is higher than the
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remaining expected price (x Pn 1) therefore the threshold on the n-th position (Tn)
is:
Tn Pn 1 (3.9)
Accordingly the expected price (Pn) is :
Pn
Pn 1
f x xdx Pn 1
Pn 1
f x dx (3.10)
Intuitive explanation
The optimal thresholds Tn for maximising the payoff is calculated working back-
ward from the last ticket price: The threshold of the final item (T1) is , because
the rules of the task stipulate that the final item must be accepted if no earlier item
has been chosen. The thresholds for the previous items are determined by working
backward from the final item, using conditional expectations. First, we calculate
the expected value of the final item (P1). For the last item, this is the expectation of
the overall probability distribution from which the options are sampled. Therefore,
to maximize expected reward on the second last position, one’s policy should be
to accept a particular option if it is better (in our case smaller) than the expected
reward if one continues under the optimal policy. The second-to-last item should be
accepted if its value is smaller than the expected value of the final item. This means
that the threshold of the second-to-last item (T2) is the expected value of the last
item (P1).
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The expected value of the second-to-last item (P2) is the expected value of the part
of the probability distribution that is better (in our case smaller) than the threshold
(T2) for the second-to-last item. The probability of this expected value is the area
under the probability distribution that is better than this threshold. The overall
expected reward at the second-to-last position (P2) (and therefore the threshold for
the third-to-last item (T3)) is calculated as follows: we multiply the expected value
for the second-to-last item with its probability plus the expected value of the last
item multiplied with its probability (which is equal to 1 minus the probability of the
second-to-last item). The remaining thresholds are calculated in the same way.
2. Biased Optimal Model
The Biased Optimal Model (BOM) is based on the Bias-from-Optimal threshold
model proposed by Guan et al. (2015), assuming that humans are using thresholds
that deviate systematically from the optimal thresholds.. The optimal thresholds ti
for each position i are derived by determining the expected reward of the remaining
options (derivation in (Gilbert et al., 1966) and in Appendix Text 1). The model
entails a systematic bias parameter that reflects the divergence of the human
threshold from the optimal one. Additionally, the thresholds depend on a parameter
that determines how much their bias increases or decreases as the sequence
progresses.
i 1 i i, (3.11)
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When and are set to 0, the thresholds represent the optimal thresholds that
lead to best performance. This model is therefore defined by three free parameters,
, and the choice sensitivity .
Methods
• Linear Threshold Model (LTM):
j N g , g






g N 0,100 , g U 0.1,10
g N 0,100 , g U 0.1,10
t0
g U 100,200 ,
t0
g U 0.1,10
• Biased Optimal Model (BOM):
j N g , g
j N g , g
N g , g
g N 0,100 , g U 0.1,10
g N 0,100 , g U 0.1,10
g N 0,100 , g U 0.1,10
• Independent Threshold Model (ITM):
j N g , g
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g N 0,100 , g U 0.1,10
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FIGURE 3.13: Choice curves split into participant that belong to the 20% highest (red
lines) vs the 20% lowest performing group (black lines), for each search
length and on the first position. Well performing participants exhibit higher
determinism in choices than low performing participants. Solid lines are
logistic curves fitted to the data (red line: fitted to data of participants in
high performing group, black line: fitted to data of participants in high
performing group.)
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FIGURE 3.14: Thresholds for each time horizon (N=5, 10, 20). Black solid lines: Estimated
threshold parameters from data (LTM). purple dotted lines: best performing
linear thresholds (using grid search to find the best performing parameter
values ( 0 and ))
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FIGURE 3.15: Study 2: Time horizon =10: Relationship between probability to accept and
parameter across position. Scatterplots and correlation coefficients, HDI:
95% high density interval.
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FIGURE 3.16: Study 2: Time horizon =20: Relationship between probability to accept and
parameter across position. Scatterplots and correlation coefficients, HDI:
95% high density interval.
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Models Bm0 Bm f
+ + 10x10181 1
+ + + condition 3x10180 0.3
+ 2x10168 2x10 14
+ + condition 5x10 16 5x10 16
+ 5x10 40 5x10 20
TABLE 3.6: Study 1: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the search length
using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. Bm0: Bayes Factor between the
model and the null model (null model: intercept only). Bm f : Bayes factor of
each model relative to the full model (full model: SL + + + condition).
Only the five models with the highest support are presented.
Parameters R2
intercept 0.8x104
-0.98 [-1.0,-0.95] 0.89 [0.91,0.87] 0.80
-0.16 [-0.19,-0.12] 0.21 [0.11,0.29] 0.04
0.26 [0.23,0.30] 0.11 [0.16,0.20] 0.01
TABLE 3.7: Study 1: Coefficient estimates ( ) for each of the predictors in the best
fitting model in Table 1, along with the 95% HDI. : Correlation (plus 95%
HDI) with search length. R2: Proportion of variance in search length that is
predictable from the independent variable
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Models Bm0 Bm f
2 + + 4x1074 1
2 + + + condition 1.5x1074 0.4
+ 2+ + 3x1073 0.07
+ 2 + + + condition 1.2x1073 0.03
+ 3x1070 0.0005
TABLE 3.8: Study 1: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the performance
using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. Bm0: Bayes Factor between the
model and the null model (null model: intercept only). Bm f : Bayes factor of
each model relative to the full model (full model: SL + + + condition).
Only the five models with the highest support are presented.
Parameters R2
intercept 0.4x10 4
2 -0.38 [-0.43,-0.32] -0.65 [-0.59,-0.73] 0.42
0.15 [0.09,0.22] 0.20 [0.11,0.29] 0.04
0.7 [0.63,0.76] 0.73 [0.69,0.78] 0.55
TABLE 3.9: Study 1: Coefficient estimates ( ) for each of the predictors in the best
fitting model in Table 3, along with the 95% HDI. : Correlation (plus 95%
HDI) with search length. R2: Proportion of variance in search length that is
predictable from the independent variable
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Models Bm0 Bm f
+ + 1.9x1025 1
+ 1.6x1025 0.8
+ 3x1020 1.5x10 5
+ 1.02x1020 5x10 6
0.64 3.3x10 26
0.26 1.3x10 26
TABLE 3.10: Study 2: N=5: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the search
length using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. The six models with
the highest support are presented.
Parameters R2
intercept 2.97 2.94,3.01
-0.08[-0.09,-0.07] -0.87 [-0.92,-79] 0.76
-0.03 [-0.06,-0.00] 0.16 [-0.07,0.4 ] 0.03
1.36 [0.88,0.82] 0.17 [-0.06,0.4] 0.03
TABLE 3.11: Study 2: N=5: Mean of the posterior distribution of the covariates from the
the model with the highest support. Each parameter and its correlation with
search length is associated with the lower and upper limits of 95% highest
density interval
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Models Bm0 Bm f
1.9x104 1
+ 2 6.4x103 0.32
+ 4.6x103 0.23
+ 4.1x103 0.21
+ 2 + 2.3x103 0.12
+ + 1.6x103 0.08
TABLE 3.12: Study 2: N=5: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the perfor-
mance using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. The six models with




TABLE 3.13: Study 2: N=5: Mean of the posterior distribution of the covariates from the
the model with the highest support. Each parameter and its correlation with
search length is associated with the lower and upper limits of 95% highest
density interval
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Models Bm0 Bm f
+ 4.2x1028 1
+ + 5.2x1027 0.13
1.4x1024 3.3x10 5
+ 1.4x1023 3.3x10 6
1.46 3.5x10 29
1.01 2.4x10 29
TABLE 3.14: Study 2: N=10: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the search
length using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. Only the five models
with the highest support are presented.
Parameters R2
intercept 4.7 4.6,4.81
-0.14[-0.16,-0.13] -0.90 [-0.93,-0.85] 0.81
3.06 [2.0,4.1] 0.22 [0.00,0.43] 0.05
TABLE 3.15: Study 2: N=10: Mean of the posterior distribution of the covariates from the
the model with the highest support. Each parameter and its correlation with
search length is associated with the lower and upper limits of 95% highest
density interval
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Models Bm0 Bm f
+ 2 + 4.0x1016 1
+ 2 + + 5.4x1015 0.13
2 + 1.1x1015 0.03
2 + + 1.7x1014 0.004
+ 8.4x1012 2.0x10 4
+ + 1.2x1012 2.6x10 5
TABLE 3.16: Study 2: N=10: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the
performance using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. Only the five
models with the highest support are presented.
Parameters R2
intercept 27.5 27.2,27.8
-0.55[-0.88,-0.24] -0.30 [-0.50,-0.07] 0.09
2 -0.54[-0.76,-0.32] -0.67 [-0.79,-0.53] 0.45
1.36 [0.99,1.7] 0.71 [0.58,0.81] 0.50
TABLE 3.17: Study 2: N=10: Mean of the posterior distribution of the covariates from the
the model with the highest support. Each parameter and its correlation with
search performance is associated with the lower and upper limits of 95%
highest density interval
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Models Bm0 Bm f
+ 9.1x1018 1
+ + 9.5x1017 0.10
6.1x1015 0.0
+ 6.0x1014 6.5x10 5
0.5 5.11x10 20
0.3 3.2x10 20
TABLE 3.18: N=20: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the search length
using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. Only the five models with
the highest support are presented.
Parameters R2
intercept 7.4 7.11,7.68
-0.25[-0.28,-0.21] -0.81 [-0.88,-72] 0.66
8.9 [5.2,12.7] 0.06 [-0.16,0.29] 0.004
TABLE 3.19: N=20: Mean of the posterior distribution of the covariates from the the model
with the highest support. Each parameter and its correlation with search
length is associated with the lower and upper limits of 95% highest density
interval
3.7 S U P P O RT I N G M AT E R I A L 139
Models Bm0 Bm f
+ 2 + 1.4x1020 1
+ 2 + + 3.1x1019 0.23
2 + 3.3x1018 0.02
2 + + 1.6x1018 0.01
+ 1.3x1011 9.3x1010
+ + 2.21010 1.6x10 10
TABLE 3.20: N=20: Ranking of the different models for the analysis of the performance
using Bayes Factors. Selected model is in bold. Only the five models with
the highest support are presented.
Parameters R2
intercept 727.6 27.3,27.8
-0.44[-0.68,-0.19] -0.07 [-0.3,-0.16] 0.005
2 -0.63 [-0.78,-0.47] -0.66 [-0.78,-0.51] 0.44
1.6 [1.08,1.62] 0.70 [0.57,0.81] 0.49
TABLE 3.21: N=20: Mean of the posterior distribution of the covariates from the the model
with the highest support. Each parameter and its correlation with search
length is associated with the lower and upper limits of 95% highest density
interval
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A B S T R AC T
Sequential decision making – a decision where available options are encountered
successively - is a hallmark of our everyday life. When we search for a job or an
apartment, we may decide to accept or reject it without knowing potential future
options. Consequently, choices in such tasks correspond to risky decisions between
a certain outcome and the risk of continuing search. However, risk preferences
assessed in comparison to the standard optimal model do not correlate with indices
elicited in single risky decision tasks. Moreover, humans make choices as if they
are risk averse in the beginning but risk seeking at the end of search. This paper
examines the influence of the characteristic components of sequential search tasks
on people’s search behavior which may give rise to the observed risk inconsistencies
across the course of search. Results show that the sequential order and the unequal
frequency in accept and reject decision, but not the presentation format of the
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underlying distribution, leads to a systematic bias in people’s choices. We conclude
that the characteristic environment of a sequential search task takes precedence over
stable individual risk preferences which is in part the reason for lack of convergence
thereof between dynamic and single risk taking tasks.
4.1 I N T RO D U C T I O N
Whereas in classic economic decisions, individuals choose from a menu of well-
defined options presented simultaneously, in many real-world decisions the options
are encountered serially and cannot directly be compared to one another. For ex-
ample, when we search for a job, a partner or the perfect day to open a good bottle
of wine, we have to choose an option without knowing potential future options.
Individuals, consumers and firms encounter many variations of these sort of se-
quential search problems and they have been well studied in behavioral psychology
(Rapoport et al., 1966, 1970), marketing science (Moorthy et al., 1997; Zwick et al.,
2003) and economic theory (Stigler, 1961). The difficulty in optimal stopping prob-
lems lies in the dynamic trade off between accepting a sub–optimal option too early
or to reject the right option out of false hopes for a better one in the future. Existing
research finds that people are very heterogeneous with respect to their behavior in
optimal stopping situations (Guan et al., 2018; Guan et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2004),
and it has been suggested that this heterogeneity in dynamic choice situations could
be reflected in risk preference heterogeneity (Cox et al., 1989; Schotter et al., 1981).
Consequently, many authors have proposed that the common finding of stopping too
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early in such tasks can be attributed to peoples general tendency of risk aversion (in
the gain domain) (Schotter et al., 1981; Schunk et al., 2009; Sonnemans, 1998).
However, studies attempting to link individual risk preferences elicited in single
gamble tasks with search behavior in sequential decision tasks have failed to show
any relationship (Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni et al., 2017; Schunk, 2009; Schunk
et al., 2009). It has been argued that the lack of convergence stems from the specific
methods of the chosen elicitation methods which alter the way individuals evaluate
options (Pedroni et al., 2017). Some go even further by assuming that the specific
search environment overshadows any general preferences for exploitative behav-
ior thus predictors for search behavior are exclusively restricted to the particular
environment (Meyers et al., 2020). Indeed, it appears that human choice behavior
on sequential tasks is confounded by complex interdependence between cognitive,
motivational, and response processes, making it difficult to sort out and identify
the specific processes responsible for the observed behavior (Brehmer, 1992; Buse-
meyer et al., 2002; Edwards, 1962; Gonzalez et al., 2017). However, while there
is an enormous experimental literature on the foundations of decision behavior in
static decision situations, the foundations of behavior in dynamic decision situations,
despite being equally important, remain largely unexplored.
The standard optimal search model assumes expected value maximization (i.e.
risk neutrality) such that an option is accepted if it is above a decision threshold that
corresponds to the expected reward of the remaining options (see next section for
a detailed description of the optimal solution). Accordingly, a risk averse subject
would use lower than optimal decision thresholds and thus stop at options that are
below the expected value of the remaining options. This would, in turn, lead to a
shorter search length than prescribed from the optimal model. However, a recent
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study (Baumann et al., 2020) demonstrated that while participants tend to stop
too early in the beginning of the sequence, they accept too little in the later phase
of their search. In particular, participants revealed a risk seeking behavior on the
second–to–last position, on which participants choose to either accept the safe option
or draw one last time from the sampling distribution. Under the assumption of a
symmetric sampling distribution, a rational and thus risk neutral strategy would lead
to an acceptance rate of 50%, accepting options above the expected mean of the
sampling distribution and rejecting options below. However, participants acceptance
rates were significantly lower, accepting only 29% (95%-CI: [26%,32%]) of the
encountered options. This result indicates that the particular parts of a sequential
search task may affect peoples’ choices in such a way that it appears as if people
reverse their risk preference across search.
The goal of this paper is to examine the characteristic components of optimal stop-
ping task that have an effect on choice behavior and thus encourage the emergence
of risk inconsistencies. To do this, we confront subjects with different versions of an
optimal stopping problem which are identical from an economic perspective, in the
sense that the probability distributions over outcomes are the same. Specifically, our
two studies examine the influence of (1) the presentation format of the underlying
distribution, (2) the sequential order and (3) the unequal frequency in accept and
reject decision affect peoples’ decision strategy during search.
The structure of this paper is as follows: First, we explain a typical optimal
stopping problem and its optimal solution; second, we describe the details of our
experiments and discuss their results.
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4.1.1 Optimal Stopping task and its optimal solution
Peoples’ risk preference is commonly assessed relative to a model that assumes
expected value maximization which embodies risk neutrality (Bernoulli, 2011). A
risk neutral agent is indifferent towards the choice between a certain value and
a risky option which holds an equal expected value. Consequently, a risk-avers
person prefers to choose the safe option in this scenario, whereas a risk seeking
person tends to choose the risky one. Accordingly, the normative model in optimal
stopping tasks assumes expected value maximization implying that the decision
maker chooses the sampled option if its value exceeds a threshold which corresponds
to the expected value of continuing search. Optimal thresholds are thus derived based
on the reward distribution of the available options. Its calculation is described based
on the following optimal stopping example:
We consider a decision maker who encounters a sequence of options with rewards
denoted by xN , ,x1 and she wants to find the maximum value in the sequence. If
she accepts option i, then the sequence terminates and she receives xi; otherwise, she
continues to the next option. When the last option 1 is reached, it must be accepted.
The optimal policy is to choose option i when it goes above a position-dependent
threshold Ti. The calculation of the optimal thresholds applied to our scenario, where
payoff is proportional to the chosen value and the goal is to find highest valued
option, is described as follows (see also Gilbert et al., 1966):
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and the goal is to find the highest reward in this sequence.
The optimum strategy for this task is:
If N 1, the decision maker is forced to accept the option, therefore the threshold
of the last ticket is:
T1 0 (4.2)
Consequently, the expected reward (R1) corresponds to the mean ( ) of the distribu-
tion.
If N 2, the decision maker decides to either keep the option on the first position
x2 or to continue to the last one x1. If she decides to continue, the expected reward
of x1 is . Therefore she keeps x2, if x2 , rejects it if x2 and is indifferent
if x2 . Therefore, the expected reward of x1 (R1) is also the threshold on the
second last position:
T2 R1 (4.3)
Than for N 2, the expected reward (R2) is calculated as follows:
R2
R1
f x xdx R1
R1
f x dx (4.4)
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The remaining terms of the sequence can be computed in a recursive manner. For
each N, the decision maker accepts the option if it is above the expected value of the
remaining N 1 options (x Rn 1) and reject it otherwise (x Rn 1). Therefore
the threshold on the n-th position (Tn) is:
Tn Rn 1 (4.5)
Accordingly the expected value of the reward (Pn) is :
Rn
Rn 1
f x xdx Rn 1
Pn 1
f x dx (4.6)
Figure 4.1 shows the monotonically decreasing thresholds which correspond to the
optimal solution in our studies with options sampled from 160, 20 .
Additionally, the sampling distribution is displayed on each position indicating the
range of options that are accepted on each position. It shows that the monotonically
decreasing threshold involves an adaptation of the acceptance rate across position.
Whereas only 12% of the encountered options are accepted on the very first position,
the acceptance rate increases to 50% on the second-to-last position, indicated by a
threshold that corresponds to the mean of the sampling distribution (here T2 160).
In this sense, subjects using lower than optimal thresholds and thus accept more
often are classified as risk averse. In contrast, risk seeking subjects set their threshold
higher, thus becoming more selective.
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FIGURE 4.1: Optimal thresholds for the optimal stopping task with 10 options sampled
from 160, 20 . Black line represents the decreasing optimal
thresholds across position. Histogramms illustrate the sampling distribution
of the safe option 160, 20
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4.1.2 Presentation of sampling distribution
To decide when to stop searching depends largely on the sampling distribution of
the alternatives. Therefore, distortions in the assessment of the distribution’s esti-
mates may lead to systematic biases in peoples’ decision thresholds. In an optimal
stopping task, subjects discover the sampling distribution by experiencing options
from the respective distribution (here 160, 20 ). Several studies
have shown that the way how we acquire information about distribution can lead to
large behavioral differences (Barron et al., 2003; Erev, 2012; Hertwig et al., 2009;
E. Weber et al., 2004). In particular, experimental investigation of decision-making
in humans relies on two distinct types of paradigms, involving either experience-
or description-based choices. In experience-based choices, outcome distributions
are inferred by experiencing repeated draws from the distribution, corresponding to
the way how distributions are presented in the optimal stopping task. In decisions
by description, outcome distributions are explicitly described, by numerically pre-
senting outcomes and probabilities. Barron and Erev (2003) demonstrated that the
deviations from maximization that one observes in choices between lotteries depend
critically on how the information was acquired (i.e, through a description or through
experience). Furthermore, it was suggested that outcome and probability informa-
tion translate into systematically different subjective representations in description-
versus experience-based choice. Following this line of research, we assume that
biases in optimal stopping behavior may emerge from the format presentation of
the underlying sampling distribution. Therefore, the goal of the first study is to test
whether there are behavioral differences in experienced based versus description
based decisions in optimal stopping problems. To do that, we designed an exper-
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iment where participants perform two optimal stopping tasks which only vary in
the presentation of the sampling distribution. In one task, the underlying sampling
distribution is discovered by encountering alternatives. In the other task, outcome
and probabilities are numerically presented thus providing the full information about
the underlying sampling distribution.
We hypothesize that the format of the presentation, by experience or by descrip-
tion, may cause different biases in the estimates of the underlying distributions
which would result in differences in search behavior. Furthermore, the indication of
the full information of the sampling distribution throughout search should increase
the transparency of the dynamic task structure and accentuate the independence
between options. Therefore we expect that the full information of the underlying
distribution leads to less biased decision thresholds, leading to a mitigation of the
apparent inconsistency in the risk preferences.
4.2 S T U DY 1 : E X P E R I E N C E V E R S U S D E S C R I P T I O N
Participants performed two optimal stopping tasks which varied in the way how
the underlying sampling distribution was presented. In the first task, participants
encountered values sampled from the distribution and thus inferred its estimates
based on experience (Experience Task, ET). In the second task, the sampling distri-
bution was numerically displayed, thus participants had full information about the
task structure (Descriptive Task, DT). The goal of this study was to understand the
effect of decisions by experience or by description on participants search behavior
in optimal stopping tasks.
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4.2.1 Methods
4.2.1.1 Participants
We recruited 70 participants (26 females; age range: 20-70) on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to participate in the experiment. Participants gave informed consent, and the
study design and methods were approved by the ethics committee of the University
of Zurich. Participants received a fixed payment of $3 and a performance dependant
bonus ranging between $0 - $4.
4.2.1.2 Procedure
Figure 4.2 schematically depicts the procedure of the two types of tasks. In the ET,
participants were instructed to sell their crashed car to a scrapyard for the highest
price possible. In each trial, they could visit up to ten offers. If they declined the
offer, they went on to the next one and it was not possible to go back in time. The
trial ended if they accepted an offer, or if they arrived at the 10th offer which they
were forced to accept. Price offers were sampled from a normal distribution with a
mean of 160 and a standard deviation of 20. The bonus was performance contingent,
by randomly choosing one of the 60 trials and dividing the chosen offer by 10 (for
example an offer accepted at a price of 170$ would result in a bonus of 1.70$). In
order to avoid learning effects during testing, participants performed a learning phase
in which they were exposed to a total of 60 price offers from the same distribution
( 160, 20 , see Supporting Material Figure 4.8 for the details about
the learning procedure).
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FIGURE 4.2: A1-A2: Screenshots of the experienced task (ET). The cover story is about
finding the best offer for a broken car. In each trial, they could visit up to
ten offers. B1-B3: Screenshots of the descriptive task (DT). People were
instructed to win as much money as possible in a casino gambling task. In
each trial, participants could spin a wheel of fortune up to 10 times and after
each gamble they either accepted the outcome and proceeded to the next
trial.
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The DT imitated a casino gambling scenario where people tried to win as much
money as possible (see Fig. 4.2 B1-B3). In each trial, participants could spin a wheel
of fortune up to 10 times and after each gamble they either accepted the outcome and
proceeded to the next trial, or rejected it and spun again. The wheel of fortune was
not changing throughout the experiment and represented a normal distribution with
a mean of 160 and a standard deviation of 20, equivalent to the sampling distribution
in the ET. Participants were always aware of the total number of spins in each trial
and of the actual position in the sequence (see Fig. 4.2 B1). It was not possible to go
back to an earlier outcome of a gamble after it was initially declined. If they spun the
last gamble (10th) they ware forced to choose the outcome. The bonus corresponded
to the outcome of one randomly chosen trial divided by 100, following the same
procedure as in the ET.
The two tasks were randomly presented and consisted of 60 trials. To ensure
that participants encountered the exact same values in both tasks, we generated 60
sequences prior to the first task (60 x 10 values 160, 20 ). The order
of the sequences in both tasks was randomized and each participant encountered a
newly generated sample.
4.2.2 Results
4.2.2.1 Search length and performance
First we analyzed if the presentation manipulation influenced behavioral measure-
ments such as search length and performance (see violin plots, Fig. 4.3 A and B).
Participants average search length (measured as the number of ‘reject’ decisions
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in a sequence plus 1) was 4.7 in the ET (SD = 1.03) and 4.1 (SD = 0.86) in the
DT, with 78% of the participants searching more in the ET than in the DT. The
average accepted price was 180.3 (SD=2.0) in the ET and 180.1 (SD=2.7) in the
DT. The optimal model without any error would search on average 5.1 and choose
options with an average reward value of 182.5 suggesting that participants did not
search in accordance with the noiseless optimal model in our experiment in both
tasks. A Bayesian t test (prior scale = medium, Morey et al., 2018) provided evi-
dence that participants search less in the DT compared to the ET (MSLDi f f 0.61,
HDI95 0.33,0.88 , BF10 300). The average accepted prices in both conditions
differed only slightly, which is supported by a Bayesing t test showing moderate
evidence for no difference in the mean accepted price between the ET and the DT
(MSLDi f f 0.17, HDI95 0.25,0.58 , BF10 0.2).
We find stable individual differences in search length and the average accepted
price between the ET and DT, indicated by a correlation coefficient of r = 0.7
[0.53,0.82] between search length and r =0.74 [0.59, 0.84] between the accepted
option value (BF10 300 for both tests, analysis conducted using (prior scale =
medium, Morey et al., 2018)).
To investigate whether the probability to accept differed between the ET and the
DT across the sequence, we used a logistic mixed model (for an introduction, see
(Singmann et al., 2019); see also (Bolker et al., 2009)) with the choice response as
dependent variable (accept (1) vs reject (0)) and Condition (ET vs. DT), Position
(a centred continuous variable denoting the 9 positions) and the interaction of
Condition Position as fixed effects, and Participants as random intercepts as well
as random slopes for Condition Position. The model revealed a significant effect
of Condition, 2 5 102.04, p .0001, whereas participants accept overall more
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in the DT than in the ET. The estimated marginal means (EMM) for the DT exhibited
a higher acceptance probability: EMMET = 21%, 95%-CI [20%, 23%], EMMDT
= 25%, [23%, 26%]. Furthermore, the analysis of choice probabilities shows a
significant increase across position ( 2 5 914.83, p .0001) in both conditions
and a significant effect of the interaction of Condition Position ( 2 5 23.95,
p .0001). As shown in Figure 4.3 C, participants in the DT accepted more often in
the beginning of the sequence compared to the ET, but adapt their rate of acceptance
less strongly across the sequence.
To get a better understanding of the divergence in acceptance probabilities between
the two tasks, we calculated participants’ acceptance probability dependent on the
accepted values. To do so, we split the accepted values into quantile ranges, whereas
Qi is defined as the range of values from the 0.ith to the 0.i 0.1 th quantile of the
sampling distribution. Figure 4.3 D shows Q6 - Q10 (out of a total of ten quantile
ranges). Thus it shows that differences in acceptance rates are mainly driven by
values ranging in the upper 20% of the sampling distribution (Q8-Q10). In particular,
acceptance rates for these values are higher in the DT than in the ET.
4.2.2.2 Does the presentation format affect risk preference inconsistencies?
We next address the question about the impact of the descriptive format on the
decision strategy leading to reversals in risk preferences. We expected that the
full information of the distribution leads to a more independent update of the
decision thresholds across search, which in turn would result in an attenuation
of the observed asymmetries in risky behavior. Participants’ decision thresholds
were calculated in both conditions (ET and DT) by fitting a logistic curve (i.e.,
generalised linear model; GLM) for each combination of participant and position
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F I G U R E 4. 3: A: Vi oli n pl ots of p arti ci p a nts’ s e ar c h l e n gt h i n b ot h pr es e nt ati o n c o n diti o ns
bl u e: E T, or a n g e: D T, gr e y: o pti m al. B: Vi oli n pl ots of p arti ci p a nts’ a v er a g e
a c c e pt e d pri c e, bl u e: E T, or a n g e: D T, gr e y: o pti m al s e ar c h l e n gt h if o pti m al
p oli c y is a p pli e d); C: pr o b a bilit y t o a c c e pt o n e a c h p ositi o n, bl u e: s e q u e nti al
off er t as k, or a n g e: s e q u e nti al g a m bli n g t as k, bl a c k: o pti m al. b ars: st a n d ar d
err ors of t h e m e a n, D: Pr o b a bilit y t o a c c e pt a n off ers/ c ert ai n o ut c o m es
di vi d e d i nt o v al u e r a n g es. Q 6: Val u es r a n gi n g b et w e e n t h e 5t h a n d 6t h
q u a ntil e, Q 7: Val u es r a n gi n g b et w e e n t h e 6t h a n d 7t h q u a ntil e, et c.
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(i.e., the total of number of GLMs was number of participants times 9). Each GLM
was fitted to participants’ choices (accept: 1 or reject: 0) as dependent variable
with the independent variable being the certain outcome (in the DT condition) or
the offer value (in the ET condition). From each GLM we calculated participants’
individual decision thresholds (i.e., the indifference point between accept and reject)
as minus intercept divided by the slope. The individual decision threshold defines the
point on the continuous variable (i.e., value of the certain option/offer) at which the
logistic function predicts an acceptance rate of 50%. Figure 4.4 displays participants
average decision thresholds on each position (blue: ET, orange: DT, black: optimal
thresholds), together with the individual decision thresholds. Indeed, 82% of the
participants in the ET and 95% of the participants in the DT have a lower than optimal
threshold in the beginning of their search, thus showing risk averse preferences. On
the second-to-last position, 96% of the participants are above the optimal threshold
in the ET and 98% in the DT, revealing risk seeking preferences. Consequently, the
observed inconsistency of risk preferences in optimal stopping tasks remains in the
DT, despite the full information about the probabilities and outcomes on each time
step. This finding is in contrast to our hypothesis which stated that the descriptive
format is more informative and thus leads to a more consistent adaptation of the
decision thresholds compared to the optimal, i.e., risk neutral model.
Figure 4.4 B indicates participants average reject rates on each position in the ET,
the DT and when following the optimal rule. Reject decisions are predominant in
optimal stopping tasks in both task conditions, with an overall participants’ reject
rate of 76% in the ET and 72% in the DT.



















































FIGURE 4.4: A: Individual (transparent lines) and average decision thresholds (bold lines)
across positions (blue: ET, orange: DT). Optimal threshold: black dotted
line. Decision thresholds represent the fixed value at which participants
are indifferent to accept it or further search/gamble. Light gray dotted line
represents the mean of the distribution. B: Frequency of reject decisions
on each position. ET: blue bars, DT: orange bars, optimal: grey bars. Black
dashed line indicates a rejecting rate of 50%.
4.2.3 Discussion
In an optimal stopping task, subjects discover the sampling distribution by ex-
periencing options from the respective distribution. Thus we speculated that the
presentation of the underlying sampling distribution, where samples are experienced,
may bias choice behavior leading to apparent inconsistent risk behavior. Therefore,
we contrasted the conventional optimal stopping task, which involves inferring the
distribution by encountering values, with a gamble that provided the a description
of outcomes and probabilities. We speculated that the descriptive format of the
underlying distribution would lead to a difference in search behavior. In particular,
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providing the full information should enhance the transparency of the task, resulting
in an attenuation of risk inconsistencies across search.
Our results indicate that the presentation format leads to significant differences
on participants’ choice behavior, whereas acceptance probabilities are higher when
the distribution is described. This finding agrees with the hypothesis that the way
how estimates are inferred, by experience or description, may lead to biases in
their search behavior. From a risk preference perspective, people thus are more
risk seeking in the experienced format throughout their search. This result is in
line with the observation that participants become more risk seeking in the gain
domain when decisions are based on experience (Ludvig et al., 2018). It has been
argued that in decisions based on experience, extreme values (big wins or big losses)
carry proportionally more weight, leading to higher risk seeking for gains and
risk aversion for losses. Some evidence for this potential extreme-outcome rule
comes from studies with non-human animals, which can only rely on experience for
learning about outcomes. Many of these studies have also reported risk seeking for
gains (Hayden et al., 2008; Heilbronner et al., 2013; Kacelnik et al., 1996; McCoy
et al., 2005, e.g.), and some evidence suggests that this risk seeking for gains may
be driven by extreme outcomes in a context. The contact with extreme outcomes in
the experienced task might thus have elicited relatively more salient and weighted
responses, driving the subsequent choices in their search for the optimal offer.
However, despite the difference in participants acceptance rates, the format of
the presentation has a minor effect peoples’ strategy of updating their decision
thresholds. In particular, we observe the same pattern in both conditions compared
to the optimal model: Whereas decision thresholds are too low in the beginning
of search, they are too high at the final positions. Therefore, the asymmetry in
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risk preferences remain in both condition. This finding is surprising, since we had
assumed that participants exposed to the full information will be less sensitive to
the sequential character of the task and thus update their decision thresholds more
independently. Especially on the second–to–last position, which corresponds to a
single choice between a fixed outcome or spinning the wheel one more time, we
would have expected that participants approach their acceptance rate more closely
to 50%. On this position, the certain outcomes spread evenly around the mean, with
50% above and 50% below the mean.
A possible explanation for the similar biases in choice behavior in the descriptive
format could be that feedback was provided after each choice. It has been suggested
that in this description and experience case, information from description may be
combined with information from experience (Jessup et al., 2008). Lejarraga (2011)
argued that information from description is neglected in the presence of feedback. In
that sense, the feedback provided in the descriptive format may override any benefit
given by the full information, thus both presentation formats lead to same biases in
participants choices.
We thus conclude that the presentation of the underlying sampling distribution has
a minor impact on the decision strategy which causes the apparent inconsistencies in
risk preferences across search. We rather speculate that the dynamic character of the
task may trigger other cognitive mechanisms that override stable risk preferences.
Indeed, research exploring dynamic effects has found that individuals become more
risk-seeking following losses and argue that due to loss aversion, the individual
becomes more willing to accept a lottery if it offers a possibility of erasing the
previous negative outcome (Rabin et al., 2009; Read et al., 1999). In that sense, dur-
ing the course of search, participants may substitute away from normative decision
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thresholds (thus expected values) towards outcomes that have a lower likelihood of
appearing, in an effort to obtain the option they have hoped. We will address this
issue in the second study.
A second explanation for increased risk seeking behavior at the end of the se-
quence is the overall predominance of reject decisions in optimal stopping tasks
(see Figure 4.4 B). Participants arriving on the last positions may just tend to reject
the certain outcome despite its superiority compared to the risky option. Erev and
Haruvy (2016) review studies in which participants repeatedly choose between a
risky prospect and a safe option, and receive immediate feedback (e.g., Erev, 2012).
They (Erev et al., 2016) conclude that there exists a strong tendency to simply repeat
the most recent decision, which is even stronger than the tendency to react optimally
to the most recent outcome. In that sense, the inequality in accept and reject choices
inherent to an optimal stopping problem may lead to a bias towards reject decisions
on the later positions, which we will examine in the next study.
Sequential choices
An important characteristics of optimal stopping task is its dynamic aspect during
search: It involves a sequence of choices where decisions are sequentially linked
so that rejecting an option at a specific time directly influences future choices.
Numerous studies have shown that decision with risky or uncertain outcomes are
affected by the outcomes of previous decisions (Ofek et al., 2007; Thaler et al., 1990;
M. Weber et al., 2005). Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p.286) also recognize that
“there are (..) situations in which gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation
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or aspiration level that differs from the status quo”. In these situations,“the outcomes
of an act affect the balance in an account that was previously set up by a related
action” (Tversky et al., 1981, p. 457). For example,“a person who has not made
peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him
otherwis” (Kahneman et al., 1979, p.287). In an earlier study, McGlothin (1956) has
shown that a person betting on a long-shot at the end of the racing day would be
fully aware of the “riskiness” of the horse but seek it out to recover his or her losses.
Similarly, research exploring dynamic effects has found that individuals become
more risk-seeking following losses and argue that due to loss aversion, individuals
becomes more willing to accept a lottery if it offers a possibility of erasing the
previous negative outcome (Rabin et al., 2009; Read et al., 1999). Rabin et al. (2009)
conclude that losses are integrated and evaluated jointly with prospects in the same
brackets. Imaz (2016) has shown that the increase in risk–taking following a paper
loss is a product of dynamic inconsistency in preferences – individuals deviate from
their planned risk-taking strategies to take on more risk after a paper loss, and that
realization of a loss mitigates these deviations.
Following these lines of research, we suggest that participants’ risk seeking
behavior at the later stages in search might be caused by a feeling of hope that
the anticipated option must appear in an additional search. As a consequence,
participants update their decision thresholds depending on earlier outcomes and not
– as prescribed by the optimal policy – exclusively on the remaining future options.
In the second study, we aim to understand if inconsistencies in risk preferences
might emerge from the dynamic structure in optimal stopping tasks. To do this,
we contrasted search behavior in an optimal stopping task with choices in single
gambles with identical statistical properties. We hypothesise that removing the
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sequential character between choices leads to independent updating of decision
thresholds between gambles. This, in turn, will mitigate the inconsistency in risk
preferences found in optimal stopping tasks
Imbalance of accept and reject decision
A further important characteristic in optimal stopping tasks involves that only one
option within the sequence can be accepted, which implies that all the options before
have to be denied. Consequently, reject decisions are overrepresented throughout
search (see also Fig. 4.4 for reject rate in Study 1). Whereas choices on early
positions (position 1 - 6) should be rejected, according to the optimal, in up to 85%,
the reject rate should be rigorously adapted on later positions, reaching an reject
level of 50% at the second to last position.
However, people insist in rejecting sure outcomes on later positions, as if they
become more risk seeking. We speculate that the apparent increase in risk seeking
behaviour emerges from a bias to repeat prior choices. Studies have shown that
people are prone to replicate their choices, no matter whether these choices led to
success or failure (Charness et al., 2005; Erev et al., 2016). Consequently, removing
the imbalance of accept and reject decisions should attenuate the tendency to repeat
the reject decision on later positions, and thus reduce the increase in risk seeking
behavior. To test our assumption, we added a third task which removed the inequality
between accept and reject decisions.
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In the second study, we examine the differential effect on behavior between optimal
stopping choices and single gambles that are identical in outcome and probabilities.
Furthermore, we test if the imbalance of accept and reject decisions, which is an




We recruited 70 participants (26 females; age range: 20-70) on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to participate in the experiment. Participants gave informed consent, and the
study design and methods were approved by the ethics committee of the University
of Zurich. Participants received a fixed payment of $3 and a performance dependant
bonus ranging between $0 - $4.
4.3.1.2 Procedure
All participants engaged in three tasks. One of these tasks was identical to the car
selling task in Study 1. Participants had to find the best offer within a sequence of
10 sequentially presented offers in a total of 40 trials (Sequential Offer Task, SOT).
Values were sampled from 160, 20 . Prior to the task, participants
encountered a minimum of 60 values drawn from the sampling distribution (see
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Supporting Material Fig. 4.8 for a description of the learning phase). In the second
task, participants encountered 160 single gamble trials, in which they either could
choose a certain outcome or to spin a wheel of fortune which displayed the outcomes
and probabilities (Single Gamble Task, SGT, see Fig. 4.5). Importantly, choices were
matched corresponding to the choices in the SOT on the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th position,
by adjusting the expected value of the gamble to the expected value of search in
the SOT. Outcomes and probabilities were adjusted accordingly, by determining the
probability for specific value ranges. For example, if the participant encounters a
safe value of 155 on position 3 in the SOT, he would encounter the same choice
in the SGT in which he decides between accepting 155 or spin the wheel which
corresponds to the outcomes and probabilities when arriving at the 3rd position
(Fig. 4.5 A). This way, we could ensure that the gambles in the SGT have the
identical statistical properties as the choices in the SOT (see Supporting Material
Text 1 for a detailed description on the calculations of outcomes and probabilities
for each wheel). Fig. 4.5 A - D shows the four wheels which display outcomes
and probabilities according to the four positions in the SOT. Accordingly, the 160
trials consisted of 40 (trials) 4 (positions) (40 sequences from the SOT x 4
positions) which were randomly presented. We note that in the SOT, participants
might have stopped earlier and thus have not encountered all the offers up to position
9, nevertheless, in the SGT, participants encountered all possible 160 gambles (4
wheels x 40 sequences = 160 trials). Consequently, we generated the 40 sequences
before the first task started and used the exact same values in both tasks. The order
of the 160 gambles was randomized and we introduced two trial runs prior to the
real task.
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In the third task was designed in the same fashion as the Holt and Laury gambles
(Holt et al., 2002), where people decided between a certain outcome and spinning
the wheel. The four wheels corresponded to the ones used in the SGT (see Fig. 4.5
A - D), however this time, the certain outcome ranged closely around the mean
(mean +/- 5,10,15,20) with a total of 8 values for each wheel (we call it short Single
Gamble Task, sSGT). This task always started with the gamble showing the wheel
representing the 3rd position (see Fig. 4.5 A) and it changed after 8 trials to a gamble
showing a wheel that represents the next position (here: position 5). Fixed outcomes
were monotonically increasing, starting from the lowest value. Participants were
instructed that the fixed outcome increased in each sequence of 8 trials and that the
wheel changed after each 8 trials. There was a total of 32 trials.
In order to avoid that the two gambling tasks appeared by immediate succession,
we arranged the order in the following way: The SOT appeared always on the second
place, whereas the SGT and the sSGT were randomly assigned to the first or third
place.
4.3.2 Results: Sequential Presentation
4.3.2.1 Agreement with Study 1
We first test if the behavioral measures in the SOT coincide with the identical se-
quential offer task in Study 1. Participants search length is on average 4.8 (SD = 0.9)
and the average price is 180.5 (SD = 2.5), thus behavioral measures coincide with
the measures obtained in Study 1 (ET). A Bayesian t test (R BayesFactor::ttestBF
package, prior scale = medium; Morey et al., 2018) indicates no evidence for a
4.3 S T U DY 2 : S E Q U E N T I A L I T Y A N D I M B A L A N C E 167
FIGURE 4.5: Study 2: Four wheels used in SGT and sSGT: Each wheel corresponded to
the outcome distributions of the remaining options when choosing on the
3rd, 5th, 7th or 9th position in the SOT. Participants could either choose the
certain outcome or spin the wheel with the hope for a greater reward.
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difference in search length nor performance between the ET from Study 1 and the
SOT in Study 2 (MSLDi f f 0.3, HDI95 0.62,0.03 , BF10 0.8, M
Per f
Di f f 0.23,
HDI95 0.98,0.48 , BF10 0.22).
4.3.2.2 SOT versus SGT
Our first analysis examines if choice behavior differs between the sequential offer
task and independent single gamble choices with identical statistical properties.
Therefore, we compared participants’ probability to accept on the 3rd, 5th, 7th and
9th position between the SOT and the SGT (Figure 4.6 A). For this analysis, we
selected only trials in the SGT which were actually encountered in the SOT. For
example, if a participant stopped at the 6th position in a sequence in the SOT, he
encountered the 3rd and 5th position, thus only the trials that corresponded to these
two choices were considered in the SGT. Visual inspection reveals that participants
differ in their choices on the corresponding positions between the SOT and the SGT.
Whereas in the SOT, participants increase their accept rates across position in a
linear manner, in the SGT they seem to be more adapted to the optimal model. In
order to test if choices differ between the two conditions, we used a logistic mixed
model with the response variable (accept safe outcome (0) vs. reject/choose the
gamble (1)) as dependent variable and Condition (SOT vs. SGT) and Position (as
factor) and Condition Position as fixed effects (Participants as random intercepts
as well as random slopes for Condition and Position). We used Type 3 likelihood-
ratio tests (LRTs; in R afex::mixed; Singmann et al., 2019) which provide p values
for nonzero differences inexplained variance between the full model (i.e., with all
possible effects) and the restricted models (i.e., without the tested fixed effects).
We find a significant main effect of Condition ( 2 21 5.30, p 0.021) such
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that the estimated marginal means (EMM) for the SOT and the SGT exhibited
an overall higher acceptance rate in the SOT: EMMSOT = 22.3%, 95%-CI [20%,
24%], EMMDT = 19.6%, [17%, 21%]. Furthermore, both Position (
2 21 78.24,
p .0001), and the interaction Condition Position ( 2 5 10.97, p .01)
reveal a significant effect. As shown in Figure 4.6 A, while in both conditions accept
probabilities are increasing, participants accept less on early positions in the SGT but
adjust their acceptance rate more strongly in gambles representing the 9th position.
This result indicates that despite identical statistical properties, choice behavior
differs between independent gambles and sequentially presented choices.
We further wanted to understand if participants’ accept probabilities between
the two tasks are consistent between the SOT and the SGT on the corresponding
positions. A correlation analysis revealed moderate evidence for a correlations on
the 3rd position of = 0.27 [0.04,0.47] (BF=4.5) and strong evidence for correlations
on the 5th ( = 0.38 [0.17,0.57], BF=96), the 7th ( = 0.39 [0.17,0.57], BF=93) and
the 9th position ( = 0.54 [0.36,0.69], BF>300, analysis conducted using (Morey
et al., 2018, prior scale = medium).
Participant’s risk preference has been shown to shift from risk averse to risk
seeking during search in an optimal stopping task. Whereas decision thresholds
are lower than in the normative model in the beginning of search, they are higher
at the later stages of search. In order to examine if independent gambles with
identical statistical properties lead to the same inconsistency in risky preferences,
we determined the decision thresholds in both tasks by fitting a logistic function
(i.e., GLM) to each participant’s choice data (accept (1) vs. reject/gamble (0)) as
a function of the fixed outcome. Figure 4.6 B (blue: SOT, orange: SGT) displays
the decision threshold in both the SOT (blue line) and the SGT (orange line) and
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F I G U R E 4. 6: A: Pr o b a bilit y t o a c c e pt o n e a c h p ositi o n, bl u e s oli d li n e: S O T, or a n g e s oli d
li n e: S G T ( o nl y c h oi c es i n cl u d e d t h at c orr es p o n d t o c h oi c es i n t h e S O T),
d ar k or a n g e d ott e d li n e: S G T ( all c h oi c es), bl a c k d as h e d li n e: o pti m al m o d el.
T h e si z e of t h e d ots r e pr es e nt t h e a m o u nt of d at a p oi nts p er p arti ci p a nt (s e e
l e g e n d), err or b ars r e pr es e nt st a n d ar d err ors. B: I n di vi d u al (tr a ns p ar e nt li n es)
a n d a v er a g e d e cisi o n t hr es h ol ds ( b ol d li n es) a cr oss p ositi o ns ( bl u e: S O T,
or a n g e: S G T, p ur pl e: s S G T). O pti m al t hr es h ol d: bl a c k d ott e d li n e. D e cisi o n
t hr es h ol ds r e pr es e nt t h e fi x e d v al u e at w hi c h p arti ci p a nts ar e i n diff er e nt t o
a c c e pt it or f urt h er s e ar c h/ g a m bl e.
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indicates that that participants update their decision thresholds in closer agreement
with the optimal model. Moreover, the reversal of risk preferences is reduced, thus
suggesting that the sequential order of choices leads to decision strategies that
override stable individual risk preferences.
However, participants in the SGT still exhibit an increase in risk seeking behavior
in gambles representing the later positions in the SOT. The average thresholds on the
9th position are lower in the SGT than in the SOT (see Figure 4.6 B), however the
comparison of the decision thresholds on the 9th position between the SOT and the
SGT do not seem to differ (Bayesian t test, MDi f f 0.9, HDI95 2.2,0.58 ,
BF10 0.2). However, both lie significantly above the optimal threshold (BF>300)
which reflects peoples’ apparent risk seeking preference. Consequently, despite
the closer adaption of thresholds to optimality in single gamble tasks compared to
sequential choices, the increased risk seeking behavior in gambles representing the
later positions remains.
One possibility for this finding is the selective sample of choices due to the nature
of optimal stopping tasks. It might be possible that risk averse participants accept
earlier and therefore choices from the more risk seeking participants dominate on
the final positions. In the above analysis, we only considered choices in the the SGT
which were encountered in the SOT. In order to test this assumption, we compared
the accept probabilities of the selective sample from the SGT, which corresponds to
the choices encountered in the SOT, with the complete set of choices in the SGT,
that is 40 choices on position 3, 5, 7 and 9, in Figure 4.6 A (orange line: selective
data set, dark orange dotted line: full data set). Even a quick glance shows that the
accept probabilities are essentially on top of each other, providing evidence that the
selective sample in the optimal stopping task represents unbiased choice behavior
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on each position. A logistic mixed model with response (accept (0), gamble (1))
as dependent variable and Condition (all choices in the SGT versus only choices
which were encountered in the SOT) and Position and the interaction of Condition
Position as fixed effect and subjects as random intercepts and slopes supported
the finding, showing no significant effect of Condition, 2 21 0.1, p 0.9 nor
its interaction with Position 2 21 0.28, p 0.9.
4.3.3 Results: Imbalance in Choices
The inequality of reject and accept decisions inherent to optimal stopping tasks
remained in the SGT, thus reject choices were overrepresented, most pronounced in
gambles mirroring early positions in the SOT. We expect that the seeming increases
of risk seeking behavior on later positions is partially caused by the tendency
to repeat prior choices, which are predominately reject decisions. Therefore, we
introduced a third task in which the unequal frequency of choices was removed.
In the sSGT, the gambles corresponded to the four wheels of fortune presented in
the SGT (Figure 4.5 A-D). Within each of the four gambles the certain option was
initially lower than the expected value of the gamble (expected value - 15) and
increased in steps of 5 (until expected value + 15), making the safe option more
and more attractive. We assessed a person’s decision threshold for each wheel by
determining the point at which he switches from rejecting the safe option to accepting
it. For instance, rejecting a safe option of 155 in favour of spinning the wheel, but
accepting the following value of 160 would lead to a decision threshold of 157.7
(optionre jected optionaccepted/2). Fig. 4.6 B (purple lines) shows participants’
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average decision thresholds across the four gambles. It indicates that in contrast to
the SGT, participants update their decision thresholds in close agreement with the
optimal model. However, risk preferences are in closer agreement with the SGT,
revealing an overall risk seeking behavior.
In order to measure stability in decision thresholds across the two tasks, we
calculated correlations of decision thresholds between the SGT and the sSGT on
each of position. We find very strong evidence for a correlation of r = 0.47 [0.24,0.66]
(BF>100) and r = 0.41 [0.18,0.62] (BF=55) on gambles representing position 3 and
5 respectively, but no evidence for gambles representing position 7 and 9 (BF=0.33
and 0.34, respectively). This result suggests that the imbalance of reject and accept
choices inherent in the SGT affects mainly choices on later stages of search.
In order to assess an absolute measure of participants’ risk preference in the SGT
and the sSGT, we subtracted the expected value of the corresponding gamble from
participants decision thresholds, with positive values indicating risk seeking and
negative values risk averse participants (see Figure 4.7). A separate test for both the
SGT and the sSGT with absolute risk preference as dependent variable and position
as independent variable (R BayesFactor::lmBF package Morey et al., 2018) provides
strong evidence for an effect of position on risk preferences in the SGT (BF>300)
but moderate evidence for no effect in the sSGT (BF=0.23). This result provides
evidence that removing the imbalance of accept and reject choices attenuates the
apparent risk seeking behavior on later positions, resulting in stable risk preferences
across positions.
Furthermore, we were interested if risk preferences measured in the sSGT predict
search behavior in the optimal stopping task. We used a mixed model with response
(accept: 1, reject: 0) as the dependent variable and the average indifference point
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measured in the sSGT as fixed effect and Participants as random intercepts as well
as random slopes for the indifference point. We find a significant effect of the
indifference point on search behavior ( 2 5 3.9, p .02), such that higher risk
aversion measured in the gambling task leads to higher acceptance rates (and thus
earlier stopping) in the SOT.
4.3.3.1 Risk preferences in minimal context
In contrast to the well documented phenomena that people tend to be risk averse in
the gain frame (Kahneman et al., 2013a, 2013b; Tversky et al., 1981), participants
performing the sSGT and the SGT revealed a general risk seeking preference relative
to the optimal model across all gambles. These findings suggests that our particular
task in which people spin a wheel of fortune, evokes a relatively higher risk seeking
behavior, whereas safe options that exceeded the expected reward of the gamble were
rejected. In order to confirm that participants are generally risk seeking in our tasks,
we added a short third study including 50 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(20 females; age range: 23-69) in which we removed any additional context. The
task was constructed so that the participant could either choose a certain outcome
or spin a wheel of fortune. The wheel corresponded solely to the 9th position in
the sSGT (see Figure 4.5 D), which represents the outcomes and probabilities of a
normal distribution with mean of 160 and standard deviation of 20. A total of 20
safe outcomes were sampled from the same distribution, by making sure that 10
values were above and 10 below the expected value of the gamble.
We calculated an absolute measure of participants’ risk preferences by fitting a
logistic curve (i.e., GLM) to participants’ choices (accept:1 or reject:0), with the
difference between the safe outcome and the expected value of the gamble as the
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dependent variable. Participants’ average indifference point is shown in Figure 4.7
(in blue) on the 9th position. The result confirms the the basic trend of risk seeking
preference gambling tasks. The comparison of the indifference points between the
two tasks (new study and sSGT, on 9th position) provides strong evidence that risk
preferences do not differ between these two data sets (Bayesian t test, BF=0.16). This
result rules out that risk preferences in the sSGT are affected by further contextual
effects and confirms a general risk seeking tendency in our wheel of fortune task.
4.3.4 Discussion
The first purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of two important char-
acteristics inherent in optimal stopping problems on peoples’ decision strategies
and thus on the apparent emergence of risky inconsistent preferences. First, we
investigated if the sequential character leads to a bias in participants decision thresh-
olds, by contrasting choice behavior in an optimal stopping search and in single
gambles which were identical in outcomes and probabilities. We find that decision
behavior differs significantly between the conditions, whereas single gambles lead
to an attenuation of the risk preference inconsistency found in optimal stopping
problems. However, we still observe a seemingly increase of risk seeking behavior
in gambles representing the later position in the optimal stopping task.
The second purpose of this study was to examine the effect of unequal proportions
of reject and accept decisions on human’s decision thresholds. We speculated that
the tendency to repeat predominant reject decisions could lead to choices which
look like as if people become more risk seeking at the later stage. Our results
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show that choices differ significantly in gambles with an equal proportion of accept
and reject choices. In contrast to the increase in risk seeking behavior found in
imbalanced choice situation, risk preferences are stable once this imbalance is
removed. Furthermore, we found a general tendency of risk seeking behavior in the
wheel of fortune task, which was confirmed in an additional study measuring risk
preferences in a minimal context.
4.3.4.1 Sequential vs single gamble decisions
We have shown that choices in a sequential context deviate significantly from
independent single gambles despite identical statistical properties. The reversal in
risk preferences is attenuated in single gambles which represent the aggregated
outcome distributions of the corresponding choices in the optimal stopping task.
We speculated that the sequential character of the task may let participants think
that if they only search enough, they will find a good option. The adherence to
an aspiration level set prior to search leads to most pronounced deviations from
optimality on the last positions, since these stages of search require to update the
decision thresholds most strongly. Our finding is in line with a well documented
phenomenon in repeated risky decisions, whereas Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
recognized that “person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept
gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise ”.
4.3.4.2 Effect of unequal frequency of accept and reject decisions
Our results have shown that the overrepresentation of reject decision in optimal
stopping tasks leads to an adherence to the same choice on later stages of the search.
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Several studies have shown that decision inertia plays a role in human decision
making under risk and that humans have the tendency to repeat previous choices in
decision making with monetary feedback (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016; Erev, 2012).
The imbalance of reject decisions implies that the range of values considered
as losses is much wider than the range of values in the gain domain (see 4.1 on
each expect on the 9th position. Several studies have shown that the set of available
options in decisions under risk can affect the selection of the certainty equivalent, that
is in our case, the decision threshold (Birnbaum, 1992; Stewart et al., 2003). Results
of Walasek and Stewart (2015) have shown that a difference in the distributions of
gains and losses is able to change subjects’ degree of loss aversion. In particular, it
has been demonstrated that wider ranges of the loss domain leads to lower sensitivity
towards losses thus resulting in a reversal of loss aversion. The explanation for this
behavior is provided by the Decision by Sampling theory (Stewart et al., 2006):
A given loss looks better when most of the other losses being offered are larger.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, we hope that future work will consider
the impact of differing gain and loss ranges on human choice behavior in sequential
search tasks.
4.3.4.3 Basic tendency for risk seeking preference in MTurk Samples
We find that our sample of participants are overall slightly more risk seeking (in
the gain domain) by being more likely to prefer gambles with lower expected value
compared to payoffs with certainty. However, the general tendency of risk aversion
is a very common and robust phenomenon: when people make a choice between
a risky and a certain reward with identical expected values they tend to prefer the
safe option (Kahneman et al., 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, a study investigating risk
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preferences of MTurk participants has showed that this sample is even slightly more
risk–avers compared to a student population (Goodman et al., 2013). Our results do
not agree with these studies and we conclude that either the description format of
outcomes and probabilities (see Fig. 4.5 D) or the process of spinning a wheel of
fortune causes a bias towards choose the gamble above the certain outcome.
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In an optimal stopping task, values are presented sequentially and only one option
can be selected. A consistent finding reveals that individual’s behavior relative to
the baseline of expected value maximization is inconsistent across search, shifting
from risk averse to risk seeking behavior. However, the architecture of the task
involves different features of the decision environment, such as stepwise incremen-
tal decisions, an unequal frequency of reject decision or inferring the underlying
distribution by experience. We found that specific characteristics of the task override
stable risk preferences leading to the apparent inconsistent risky behavior across the
course of search. Consequently, the lack in consistency of observed risk preferences
between sequential decisions and single gambles (Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni et al.,
2017) can partly be attributed to peoples’ adaptation to the features of the sequential
tasks which takes precedent over any general tendency of risk preferences.
Nevertheless, we found small but significant correlations between risk preferences
measured in the gamble task and search length in the optimal stopping task (r 0.29,
p=0.03), which indicates that higher risk seeking preferences go in hand with more
search in the in the optimal stopping task. This result is surprising given that previous
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studies (Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni et al., 2017) could not find any association in risk
preferences between single and dynamic risk taking tasks. A possible explanation
for these controversial findings is that the particular implementation of the dynamic
task may determine to great extent decision behavior and thus the identifiablity
of stable risk preferences. Previous studies have used particular implementations
of the balloon analogue risk task (BART Lejuez et al., 2002) and the Columbia
Card Task (CCT Figner et al., 2009), involving a trial–to–trial change of the key
statistical properties from trial to trial (e.g. in the BART, the random determination
of the balloon’s explosion point). Accordingly, these tasks involve an additional high
degree of uncertainty, which may add increased noise on people’s decision strategy
and thus on the observed risk preferences. The optimal stopping task used here
represents a realistic search problem and entails a stable environment across trials,
which lets people establish a consistent decision strategy across contexts (Baumann
et al., 2020). Under such conditions, observed behavior allows to determine risk
preferences and thus give hope to find a general underlying mechanism (Pedroni
et al., 2017) of risk attitude across single and sequential risky decision making tasks.
F U T U R E R E S E A R C H
Optimal stopping tasks involve stepwise incremental decisions and immediate feed-
back, which correspond to “hot” decision making paradigms. Figner et al. (Figner
et al., 2009) have shown that in a “hot” version of a dynamic risk taking decision
task, the affective system tends to override the deliberative system in states of height-
ened emotional arousal. Therefore, affective processes may play an important role
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during the course of search, in which each time step involves an increase of risk.
Indeed, this paper has shown that the removal of the stepwise decisions leads to a
change in peoples’ decision strategy closer to the optimal solution, indicating more
deliberative information processing takes control. Therefore, an important goal of
future research would be to identify the interplay between deliberative and affective
processes during the search for the optimal alternative.
Despite research reporting no convergence in behavioral measurements between
“hot” decision making tasks such as the BART and monetary gambles, there is
increased effort to examine the presence and directionality of associations between
brain activation in such risk task. Results suggest that the low correlation between
risk taking measured in these two task is mirrored in limited functional convergence
in neural risk matrix regions. However, these results are difficult to interpret since
reliability estimates are based on certain BART implementations (i.e., feedback
vs. no feedback, total amount of balloons, distribution over explosion points). The
optimal stopping paradigm used here reflects tasks closer to reality but reducing
uncertainty by providing stable environments. Moreover, it has been shown that
peoples decision strategy is consistent across contexts, such as varying numbers of
alternatives or changing variances (Baumann et al., submitted). Furthermore, this
paper indicates correlations between search length and risk preferences elicited in
single gamble task thus providing evidence for an underlying construct of risk. We
thus suggest that optimal stopping task used here may be a promising candidate to
examine brain function in response to sequential search behavior and might shed
further light on the associations between sequential and single gamble tasks.
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4.5 S U P P O RT I N G M AT E R I A L : T H E I M PAC T O F S E Q U E N T I A L S E A R C H
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Text 1: Determination of wheels of fortune
The values are drawn from a standard normal distribution with a mean of 160 and a











For the calculation of the slices, we truncated the distribution between 120 and
200. Position 9
On the 9th position, the decision maker can either accept the certain outcome
or spin the wheel, which corresponds to a draw from the distribution. Therefore,
the slices of the wheel are proportional to the probabilities to draw a value in the
indicated ranges. For example, the probability to receive a value that lies between




f x dx (4.8)
Accordingly, the probability for a value between 180 and 190 is the following:




f x dx PPos9190 200 (4.9)
Position 7
At the 7th position, one can draw up to 3 times from the distribution. In this case,
the sizes of the slides corresponding to the value ranges change as follows:
The probability to receive a value in the range of 190 - 200, under the condition




f x dx3 (4.10)
The probability to receive a value in the range of 180 - 190, under the condition




f x dx3 PPos7190 200 (4.11)
etc.




FIGURE 4.8: Learning phase A: Sequential presentation of price offers sampled from
predefined distribution 160, 20 . B: After each 20 prices,
participants are asked to estimate the average of the prices just seen. C: At the
end of the learning phase, participants have to predict how a future sample
from the same predefined population might look, where they essentially
had to draw a histogram using this interface. D: Feedback was provided by
superimposing the correct distribution over their estimate.
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